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An international border fundamentally settles the control to organise, 
occupy and administer space. It determines the citizenship of millions 
and legitimates statesmen to claim the juridical and therefore political 
acceptability of their control, both internally and externally. Since the 
rise of the territorial state, people both in politics and the academy have 
imagined hundreds, if not thousands, of borders on the basis of for 
example political, economic, military-strategic, or cultural realities. Yet in 
the instances that the existence of a new entity has been recognised in the 
past decades, practices reveal a reluctance to accept the drawing of original 
borders. The outcome of international negotiations upon a sovereignty 
change has typically been rather to maintain existing international borders 
and to follow administrative borders in demarcating the new international 
borders in line with the uti possidetis principle.1 This principle in 
international law provides that “states will come to independence with the 
same borders that they had when they were administrative units” unless 
representatives of states affected by these borders agree otherwise (Shaw, 
1997: 97). So when the Republic of South Sudan seceded from Sudan 
most recently, it indeed gained recognised statehood within the borders of 
the ten southern states of Sudan, while Kosovo preceded this secession in 
2008 within its former provincial boundaries.
1  The notion uti possidetis, ita possideatis – that is, ‘as you possess, so may you possess’ – 
emerged in Roman private law as a prohibition against disturbance of the status quo in 
possession of immovables regardless of its establishment by violence (Jiménez de Aréchaga, 
1992: 449), and entered the international law related to sovereignty change in the early 
eighteenth century. Its legal scope has increased gradually since then, with judges at the 
International Court of Justice confirming the application of the uti possidetis principle 
to boundaries established between colonies belonging to different colonial empires – 
that is, international boundaries – and boundaries established in states’ home territories 
rather than only to colonies’ administrative boundaries for which no legal instrument of 
transmission was available. 
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This begs the question: How are borders drawn? More specifically, how do 
diplomatic actors manage the implications of changes in state sovereignty 
for international borders?
The current practice that privileges existing borders over their alternatives 
is something of a puzzle. The uti possidetis principle endorses the principle 
of the stability of state boundaries. It protects the territorial unity and 
framework of new states, and it hence falls within the tradition of other 
principles of international law that establish the sacrosanctity of territorial 
delimitations.2 But the existing borders provide a context for the expression 
of social relations that does not likely represent distinctions between 
groups of peoples and may be inconsistent with natural phenomena and 
economic trademarks or value – that is, they do not likely conform to 
the ‘lived’ geographies. This has kept peoples fighting for competing 
border delimitations on all continents. While the new international 
borders of Kosovo left significant minorities unsatisfied or uncertain about 
their status in the redefined state, the 1/1/56 boundary maintained to 
separate South Sudan and Sudan has been disputed within and between 
the formerly unified states. Elsewhere, whether in Transnistria or in 
Nagorno-Karabakh, peoples claim to redraw borders in a more rational 
or legitimate manner. Some have made compelling cases that different 
border delimitations would be superior to maintenance of the existing 
international and administrative borders, yet their claims are denied for 
adherence to the uti possidetis principle.
The question of how diplomatic actors manage the implications for 
international borders of sovereignty change is a question of how boundary 
maintenance has triumphed over the alternatives it replaced. For example 
after World War I and II, international borders were drawn to demarcate 
ethnic or religious patterns of settlement, strategic interests, or historical 
delineations. And in the nineteenth century, alternatives to the ‘bundling 
of rights’ associated with territorial sovereignty were even recognised in 
buffer states and neutral areas while the colonial world was characterised 
by ‘spheres of interest’ or influence, suzerainties and condominiums 
(Kratochwil, 1985: 4). Yet it is more complex than that. During the crises 
that result in the drawing of new international borders, typically there 
are multiple competing criteria of demarcation on the table. During the 
2  The territorial integrity and inviolability and intangibility principles for example protect 
borders from violation by force, while the nemo dat principle permits succession only 
within the territories under the predecessor’s control.
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international negotiation process concerning the dissolution of Yugoslavia, 
for example, there were initiatives for alternative borders along political, 
strategic, or ethnic lines that would have united or divided the successor 
states in diverse ways. Thus, the question of how practices are constructed 
is also a question of how the uti possidetis principle triumphs over the many 
alternative criteria of demarcation that are contending for recognition.
The explanation does not only generate insights for dealing with territorial 
claims, it also provides input for theoretical debate. Borders are inherently 
artificial divisions between human beings and drawing them is a political 
act. Academics have paid considerable attention to this act. This attention 
is warranted because the establishment of new international borders 
has been stimulus for some of the most glorious and tragic moments 
in international politics. It has meant recognition of external self-
determination for some, while it is often associated with violent destruction 
and frustration of others. Also, international borders are among the most 
important institutions in politics; save in a few exceptional cases, they 
delimit the sphere of application of a state’s authority and provide the basis 
for operation in the international order. The development of transnational 
structures particularly in Europe and an increasing international concern 
with affairs within the territorial jurisdiction of states impact territorial 
sovereignty, yet boundaries still are the defining element of the polity. 
They form the essential framework that legitimises and demarcates the 
exercise of the sovereignty of states, which are created and sustained 
within a specific spatial setting. And particularly in the circumstances 
of sovereignty change, peoples are likely to attach meaning to territorial 
definition. The precise delineation of the new border then settles issues 
concerning populations and control over valuable pieces of land, whether 
defined historically or ethnically or otherwise.
Thesis statement 
The argument in this dissertation is that practices are socially constructed 
on the basis of shared opinions and largely unquestioned beliefs that are 
instilled in (groups of ) negotiators who gain influence in the practice of 
boundary politics. I consider boundary politics a practice by which people 
represent – and ultimately construct – “a ‘world’ characterised by particular 
types of places, peoples and dramas” (Tuathail and Agnew, 1992: 190). In 
the social spaces of international negotiations, where boundary politics are 
played out, individuals meet to draft a peace agreement who have different 
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social or professional backgrounds and different representations of this 
world. While professionals in diplomacy tend to manage the implications 
of sovereignty change on the basis of a fear of disturbance of international 
order by nationalism and state dissolution, public and military influences 
in diplomacy regularly introduce practices to prevent outbreaks of crises 
between entitled or antagonistic communities. Assumptions about 
‘territories’ and ‘nations’ and the relationship between the two social facts 
as a characteristic of a ‘workable’ or ‘stable’ border remain unarticulated 
and are often unreflective and seldom questioned, yet they reduce the range 
of strategies that (groups of ) negotiators consider effective or ‘strategic’ 
when they recognise their relevance in the context of their negotiations.
I then argue that the negotiators’ struggles for recognition of their 
expertise shape the relative influence of their assumptions on outcomes. 
Power in the practice of boundary politics is socially produced and 
results from negotiation of the competence or legitimacy to classify and 
prioritise issues. This negotiation develops in negotiators’ interactions in 
practice on the basis of the power relations between represented fields or 
institutions. Constrained by their institutions and institutional hierarchy 
in the practice of boundary politics, negotiators will in their encounters 
with individuals from different fields make strategic moves to maintain or 
improve their position. Particularly outbreaks of violence that contradict 
their beliefs about peaceful territorial change create opportunities for 
groups of negotiators with different backgrounds can gain influence. These 
negotiators will then tend to autonomise specific discussions and reinforce 
the credibility of their assertions in it, making it increasingly difficult for 
others to question their stances. The practice of boundary maintenance, 
just like the accommodation of alternative realities, is thus the outcome 
of an interaction of contesting ideas that a (group of ) negotiator(s) 
authoritatively establishes as the ‘strategic’ and perhaps the only ‘realistic’ 
territorial arrangement in the negotiation process.
This argument sheds new light on the development, manifestation and 
(tacit) contestations of practices in boundary politics. It responds not to the 
question why states or their representatives comply with specific practices 
such as boundary maintenance in line with the uti possidetis principle, but 
unravels how such practices become dominant in boundary politics. 
My approach is grounded in the theoretical developments of the reflexivist 
International Relations theory. Particularly Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of 
practice informs analysis of the agents and the social processes through which 
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they establish practices in boundary politics on the basis of an unreflective 
and unquestioned common sense that Bourdieu (1977: 164) labels doxa. 
The implications of Bourdieu’s theory have been elaborated upon in 
contemporary scholarly work, where the authors such as Kauppi (2003; 
2010), Bigo (2005; 2006; 2011), Kauppi and Erkkilä (2011) and Madsen 
(2007; 2011) explore shared knowledge in practices of international 
politics. This dissertation is an original attempt to develop these theoretical 
insights to cover social spaces where people with different backgrounds 
interact, in line with among others Dezalay and Garth (2002), Vauchez 
(2008) and Madsen (2007) and Kauppi and Madsen (2013). International 
negotiations in circumstances of a sovereignty change characteristically 
imply communication between individuals socialised in heterogeneous 
networks and experiences ranging from local to national to international 
and from military to legal to political. 
This forms an intervention in various bodies of literature. Many scholars 
in International Relations consider practices in boundary politics fixed; 
they focus on context rather than agents and social processes and thus 
assume that practices are determined by a stable set of actors for familiar 
reasons. They approach practices mostly as the outcome of coercion (e.g. 
Krasner, 1999; Coggins, 2011), self-interest (e.g. Zacher, 2001; Carter 
and Goemans, 2011; Prorok and Huth, forthcoming) or legitimacy (e.g. 
Strang, 1990; Jackson, 1990; Fabry, 2010). 
A basic premise of realist arguments is that whether standards of behaviour 
are honoured depends on state interest. This leads Krasner (1999) to 
conclude that fundamental rules of sovereignty are routinely compromised. 
On this basis, realists can however not account for the regular adherence 
to the uti possidetis principle. Even if we take the argument that principles 
are overruled by the state interest of the powerful as empirically correct, 
its logic does not address the multifaceted nature of power. It stresses 
the role of politicians and undervalues the influence of those who have 
to maintain the peace for negotiations to succeed like military officers 
and political representatives of the parties to the dispute. In addition, if 
national interests were as clearly defined as realists suggest, negotiators in 
teams representing a single institution should cohere around a common 
understanding of stakes in the negotiation process, not differentiate on 
the basis of their social backgrounds. I show that while some negotiators 
find it in their interest to maintain the existing system of sovereign states, 
others consider it their national interest not to get (militarily) involved in 
a dispute.
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Unlike realists, neoliberal institutionalists and constructivists or English 
School theorists tend to reason towards adherence with the uti possidetis 
principle. Carter and Goemans (2011) for example find that while existing 
boundaries are focal points in negotiations, the uti possidetis principle 
serves as an institution that facilitates agreement in failure to find on an 
alternative. Constructivists and English School theorists, on the other 
hand, often consider the principle an international norm that constructs 
and is constructed by the desire to maintain international order. But 
people do not share an interest or socialisation in line with the uti possidetis 
principle. Practices and discourses in boundary politics have varied 
significantly over time and space. Even if state leaders agreed to overcome 
state weakness, these theories do not account for decisions to maintain 
boundaries where alternatives were made available by powerful actors, nor 
for adherence to the uti possidetis principle after detailed and laborious 
map-making procedures, like in the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Kosovo. By focusing on structure or context, theorists in international 
relations arrive at an unsatisfactory explanation of outcomes in boundary 
politics; they find reason or ‘sense’ in the policy of boundary maintenance, 
yet variation and changes in negotiators’ stances indicate that actors are 
not interchangeable. Individual or inter-group lines of division appear in 
the practice of boundary politics.
Scholars in mediation studies emphasise agents in negotiation processes, 
yet they do also not account for variations in their discourses and practices. 
They tend to emphasise negotiators’ power and (self )interest (e.g. Walter, 
1997; Kydd, 2003; Maoz and Terris, 2006; Rauchhaus, 2006) and 
strategies (e.g. Touval and Zartman, 1985; Fearon, 1995; Powell, 1999) 
in the process towards a peace settlement. As such, they assume the direct 
and rational representative character of negotiators and their collective 
behaviours in negotiations. My findings show, however, that negotiators’ 
preferences and behaviours vary on the basis of their different social 
backgrounds. Descriptions such as ‘the West’ or ‘the Americans’ or even 
‘the mediators’ or ‘the disputant’ do not suffice to explain practices in 
boundary politics. A few scholars indeed find that cultural (e.g. Salacuse, 
1998; Duffey, 2010; Banai, 2013) or occupational bonds (e.g. Neumann, 
2002; 2005; 2007) inform stances, but they do not account for the 
influence of particular stances in practice – that is, they do not provide an 
understanding of where the power to shape outcomes lies. 
Understanding actors’ stances and their influence on the shape and content 
of the negotiated settlement requires emphasis on both agents and social 
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processes in the practice of boundary politics. In the principal-agent theory, 
scholars such as Hawkins et al. (2006) and Pollack (2003; 2007) highlight 
the power relations between actors who draw and implement prescriptions. 
They find that principals (heads of state and foreign ministers) delegate 
authority to agents (negotiators) who may improve their positions by 
acting independently in ways undesired by their principals. Yet they leave 
concepts of agent slack politically empty. In contribution to this theory, 
I pay attention to capital and the collision of fields in practice to identify 
how negotiators formulate preferences and move within and across fields 
to shape the outlook of the peace settlement.
My argument applies to international negotiation processes in boundary 
politics. The role of agents and the social processes through which they 
establish practices is particularly effective when practices are not dominated 
by a detailed prescription on the border’s location. Many borders are 
drawn by armies or statesmen without the intervention of international 
negotiators, as was the case for example in the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, 
and a third state’s national interests sometimes determine the location of 
the boundary. Yet borders drawn in international negotiation processes 
that are more generalisable are arguably the most relevant for theory and 
practice in International Relations. 
Structure of the dissertation
The next chapter builds empirically the puzzle that is central to the 
dissertation. The common wisdom underlying both academic explanations 
and negotiators’ rationales for boundary maintenance is that this practice 
stabilises situations and as such contributes to peace and order. I present 
and evaluate this logic using an original dataset on border fixity in territorial 
transfers in the twentieth century. In a large-N quantitative analysis of events 
following territorial transfers, I assess three concrete conjectures about the 
relationship between boundary maintenance and order: drawing original 
borders is held to increase the risk of separatist contagion in the region, the 
probability of future conflict between the affected states, and civil war in 
the affected states. I find that the widespread belief in the territorial order 
reinforcing effects of the uti possidetis principle is largely unwarranted. 
To the contrary, drawing original borders was in the twentieth century 
associated with a lower risk of separatism in the region while it was less 
frequently followed by interstate and intrastate war. This raises questions 
about the decision of negotiators to uphold the uti possidetis principle in 
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practice; it supports the theoretical claim that we need to consider how 
outcomes are constructed in practice. 
Having established that boundary maintenance does not contribute 
to peace and order, I elaborate on the explanation for this outcome in 
boundary politics in the remainder of the dissertation. Chapter 3 develops 
the Bourdieusian approach in a theory of practice, which focuses attention 
to the agents and social processes through which they establish practices 
in boundary politics. I argue that people are guided in their aspirations 
and ability to envision alternatives by commonplaces that Bourdieu 
(1977: 164) captures under the notion of doxa. These shared beliefs are 
often largely unquestioned; they are shaped through socialisation in 
networks and experiences and thus vary with negotiators’ backgrounds. 
I then conceptualise international negotiations in boundary politics as 
spaces of interaction between fields. Groups of negotiators from different 
professional fields meet who share different commonplaces and thus have 
different stances on outcomes. They struggle for recognition of their 
expertise or authority to define practices. This means that practices in 
boundary politics are socially constructed on the basis of the beliefs of 
(groups of ) negotiators who gain in struggles for influence in practice.
In line with the theory of practice, I trace the history of discourses and 
practices in boundary politics in chapter 4 to explain where common 
wisdoms and practices came from. A systematic analysis of institutional 
and policy documents and an extensive review of secondary sources 
assembled at distinguished institutions for the studies of international 
negotiations and boundary politics leads to the conclusion that the 
discourses and practices of boundary maintenance are the outcome of 
an arbitrary history. Alternatives have in the past been recognised in the 
practice of boundary politics; boundary maintenance does not trace back 
to the earliest Roman law or the decolonisation of Latin America in the 
1820s. It is the ‘strategic’ response to the fear – whether realistic or not 
– that state break-ups and the creation of small (ethnically homogenous) 
states are undesirable in the contemporary international order, which 
has prevailed in boundary politics under the authority of professional 
diplomats and state leaders since conflict broke out following the ethnic 
partition of India and Pakistan in the early 1950s. 
Chapters 5 and 6 then elaborate on how negotiators establish these 
practices in an in-depth study of international negotiations concerning 
the dissolution of Yugoslavia and subsequent internal division of territory 
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along ethnic lines of one of its republics Bosnia and Herzegovina between 
1991 and 1995. I rely on a two-step qualitative research design based on 
a review of historical materials and secondary sources as well as interviews 
with the key negotiators to demonstrate that different groups of negotiators 
anticipate different threats to security, and hence differ in what they 
consider a ‘strategic’ or ‘realistic’ territorial arrangement. These different 
stances are grounded in their different backgrounds; while professionals 
of politics tended to associate territorial adjustments to accommodate 
aggressive nationalism with a threat of international order, military officers 
generally considered these delimitations necessary as codifications of 
geopolitical strategic realities to ensure a defensible peace. I conclude that 
the interplay and sequencing between these different groups of negotiators 
shaped the outcomes in negotiations. Professionals of politics in Europe 
assumed authority to define maintenance of the republican boundaries in 
1991, but the subsequent violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina contradicted 
their common wisdom that adherence to the uti possidetis principle would 
calm tensions down. This created an opportunity for military officers to 
gain influence to settle disputes within these confines by codification of 
ethnic separation.
The concluding chapter summarises the main arguments presented 
and considers the study’s implications for the theory and practice of 
boundary politics in the twenty-first century. I develop the practice of 
boundary politics as a social space in which actors coming from different 
occupational fields compete to determine how to manage the implications 
of sovereignty change, and suggest that we hence need an inclusive 
ontological framework addressing both agents and context to study this 
practice. Practices and their changes have to be explained in light of both 
challenges and opportunities in the context of a territorial dispute as 
well as the preferences and habits of the agents involved in international 
negotiations. I discuss a few interesting avenues for future research and 
how my findings cast doubt on the maintenance of existing boundaries 
in practice. 
Conclusion 
Practices in boundary politics have important implications as they create a 
different reality for citizens and state leaders. Yet scholars in International 
Relations poorly understand how these practices are constructed, in 
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part because they have assumed elements of reason or ‘sense’ behind the 
repeated adherence to the prescriptions of the uti possidetis principle. 
Negotiators have limited the ways to manage sovereignty change. My 
first goal in this book is to elucidate the significance of this decision for 
national, regional and international order, showing that reluctance to 
engage in the issue of territorial adjustment proves more volatile than 
has previously been thought. The next critical task is to explain how this 
practice was constructed. Here I also take on the widespread acceptance of 
boundary maintenance by arguing that it is prevalence of a specific group 
of negotiators rather than the quality of existing boundaries that accounts 
for the implications of sovereignty change being managed in line with the 
uti possidetis principle. Indeed, it is the shared assumption of particularly 
professionals of politics that boundary maintenance stabilises situations for 
international order that fixes its position in practice. My goal for this book 
is to explain these processes behind practices in boundary politics and to 
consider how they developed to bear on future international relations. 
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Chapter 2
A Statistical Analysis of Practices in 
Boundary Politics: International, 
Regional and Domestic Violence after 
Territorial Change
Those who design the future do not draw on a clean slate; new states 
seldom have new borders. The meanings of territory and boundaries have 
varied across time and culture and situation. Yet in the entire twentieth 
century, only seventeen out of 137 states that gained independence were 
territorially redefined. Most states maintained their existing administrative 
and international boundaries in line with the uti possidetis principle. This 
practice in boundary politics gained prevalence with only nine states 
entering the international system in violation of the uti possidetis principle 
since the end of the Second World War, when the common border 
between India and Pakistan developed to separate religious and ethnic 
communities while the northern extension of Bangladesh was curtailed to 
safeguard an Indian corridor to the north-eastern provinces (Prescott and 
Triggs, 2008: 335). Since Comoros became independent with the island 
Mayotte remaining under French control in 1975, no new borders have 
been drawn. In fact, since the 1986 judgment of the International Court 
of Justice on the use of the uti possidetis principle in the Burkina Faso/
Mali border dispute, not a single international border drawn to manage 
a military conflict was original. All internationally recognised boundaries 
have been drawn along existing lines.
Boundary maintenance is commonly associated with peace and order with 
international, domestic, and regional implications. First, adopting existing 
boundaries as international borders is thought to minimise the likelihood 
of international conflict occurrence between territorially affected states. 
Reliance on familiar lines allegedly minimises uncertainty, reducing the 
negotiation costs of bargaining over infinite possible borders and lowering 
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the transaction costs by relying on the coordinating function of existing 
borders (Jackson and Zacher, 1997; Carter and Goemans, 2011). The uti 
possidetis principle would also legitimate boundary settlements on existing 
borders in international law (Shaw, 1997), introducing precedent and 
reputation costs for challenges (Prorok and Huth, forthcoming). Second, 
drawing new borders according to existing boundaries is thought to 
reduce the risk of domestic civil war. Ruling out revisions corresponding 
to patterns of ethnic settlement would discourage minorities left on the 
wrong side of the new border. Indeed, insistence on the sanctity of existing 
boundaries is reported as a deterrent for separatist mobilisation in the 
aftermath of decolonisation in Africa, despite the manifest weakness of 
many postcolonial states (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982; Seymour, 2013; 
Byrne and Englebert, 2014). Third, boundary maintenance is believed 
to prevent the regional spread of separatism after territorial changes. 
Upon decolonisation, most notably, maintaining colonial borders was 
considered necessary to prevent weak postcolonial states from collapsing 
under the weight of competing claims from multiple ethnic and tribal 
groups (Herbst, 1989). 
But what if the common wisdom about the stabilising effect of adhering to 
existing borders is wrong? While the idea of fixed boundaries contributing 
to peace and order is an evocative one, these ideas have seldom been 
subjected to systematic scrutiny. Scholars in International Relations 
have concentrated on state creation or secession without differentiating 
between states that were territorially redefined and those created along 
existing borders. The literature on boundary politics, on the other hand, 
has been focused on a limited number of cases at the cost of generalisation. 
Carter and Goemans (2011) are a rare exception. They find that adhering 
to existing borders reduces the probability of international territorial 
disputes, thus substantiating beliefs about the stabilising effect of boundary 
maintenance. A first glance at events in the twentieth century however 
reveals that almost three out of four partitions along existing borders left 
the states in a militarised interstate dispute in the first decade. In the post-
1975 period, only two out of twenty-nine new states – namely Cape Verde 
and the Solomon Islands – did not end up in an interstate dispute causing 
more than 1,000 deaths a year. On a similar note, a third of the states that 
gained independence within their administrative boundaries experienced 
a civil war in the first ten years of existence. The vast majority of the states 
that gained independence with adherence to the uti possidetis principle 
hence experienced some type of violence quickly following secession.
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In this chapter, I examine how the means of drawing borders impacts 
territorial order using original data coded for this project. I begin by 
exploring patterns in boundary politics to find that adherence to existing 
boundaries was established practice over the course of the twentieth century, 
particularly in partitions. I then unpack the logic underlying this practice. 
I elaborate on claims about how the uti possidetis principle affects regional, 
dyadic, and domestic territorial orders. These claims are operationalised 
and tested statistically on a dataset including all territorial changes in the 
twentieth century in order to assess how variation in boundary making – 
that is, whether territorial change occurs along existing borders or original 
ones – impacts territorial order. This leads to the conclusion that the 
prevailing wisdom about the pacifying effect of existing borders is wrong. 
Adhering to existing borders does not mitigate threats of war and territorial 
claims, either in states affected by a territorial change or the wider region. 
Existing boundaries prove rather volatile international borders. Redrawing 
borders is often treated as a ‘Pandora’s Box’ – a seemingly small act with 
far reaching and unforeseen implications. Peering inside, however, I find 
that the box is empty. We may hence question the reliance on existing 
boundaries when effecting territorial change.
A new dataset on border fixity in territorial transfers
While existing studies offer rich insights, they have not combined 
conclusions on the consequences of state creation (e.g. Kaufmann, 1996; 
1998; Sambanis, 2000; Tir, 2002; 2005; Chapman and Roeder, 2007; 
Sambanis and Schulhofer, 2009) or the development of the uti possidetis 
principle (e.g. Shaw, 1996; Hensel, Allison and Khanani, 2006) with 
the rich case studies in which scholars have studied the geography of 
boundaries (e.g. Brownlie, 1979; Biger, 1995; Prescott and Triggs, 2008). 
They examine border fixity without distinguishing between settlements 
that adhere or deviate from existing borders. Insights on the consequences 
of boundary maintenance derive largely from case studies in which scholars 
have not developed generalisable conclusions. To date, the study of 
boundary politics has been dominated by a handful of national experiences 
and prominent cases. Many scholars have argued that adherence to the 
administrative boundaries has reduced territorial conflict in the Americas 
(e.g. Zacher, 2001: 229; Castellino and Allen, 2003: 74-75; Domínguez 
et al., 2003: 21; Kacowicz, 2005: 60) and Africa (e.g. Touval, 1966: 644; 
Jackson and Rosberg, 1982; Herbst, 1989; 1990; Kacowicz, 1997: 368; 
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Zacher, 2001: 229-231; Castellino and Allen, 2003: 114). Carter and 
Goemans (2011) were the first to study the effect of boundary maintenance 
on the probability of international disputes in a broader context of the 
twentieth century. Yet their findings rest on a set of cases that excludes 
both practices of decolonisation and peaceful transfers of territory while 
the time period for conflict to follow territorial change is unlimited. For 
the most part, we are hence left without even basic descriptive data on the 
effects of (re)drawing boundaries.
To address this gap in the literature, I define border fixity to include the 
means of drawing borders. I hence distinguish between territorial changes 
that are delimited along existing lines from those establishing original 
borders. I follow Carter and Goemans (2011: 288-290) in their basic coding 
rule that existing borders are “1) international boundaries, 2) internal 
provincial boundaries, and 3) internal county boundaries”. I differ in two 
important respects, however. First, unlike Carter and Goemans (2011), 
who trace borders back to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, I consider only 
the borders in place at the time of the territorial change. Historical borders 
redrawn in conquests or agreement in the time period before a territorial 
change are excluded. The rationale underlying the association between the 
uti possidetis principle and order is based on the deterrent effect of fixity – 
that is, border fixity would leave peoples no options for contestation. This 
renders the implications limited to maintenance of the existing situation 
in exclusion of the many sometimes unclear historical practices. 
Second, I code boundaries as maintained when a new international border 
follows 100 per cent existing boundaries. This threshold avoids arbitrary 
coding inherent in any lower percentage and captures the essence of the 
uti possidetis principle, which prescribes complete rather than partial 
or convenient adherence to existing borders. Alternatives imply coding 
cases such as the division of Trieste in 1920 and the territorial exchanges 
between Pakistan and India in 1971 and between Iraq and Kuwait in 
1993 as occurring along existing borders, yet minor adjustments in the 
new borders may critically influence the subsequent inter- and intrastate 
relations. Carter and Goemans (2011) used an 85 per cent threshold. 
Although they say that “[c]ases in which the precise threshold chosen is very 
important are rare” (Carter and Goemans, 2011: 289), their coding rule 
may significantly bias their results to misrepresent the effects of territorial 
change. While meaningful changes were made to the borders separating 
for example Pakistan and India in 1947 or Pakistan and Bangladesh in 
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1971, assigning states continued access to religious communities and a 
cul-de-sac of provinces, exactly the redefinition of the boundary at the 
International Court of Justice in 1986 calmed down tensions between 
Burkina Faso and Mali. 
This dataset includes as the unit of analysis a boundary change in the 
twentieth century, including both partition and territorial transfers. 
Partition is here defined as the de jure political separation of populations 
into independent sovereign states. Cases of de facto control of territory or 
other internal political arrangements are not considered partitions because 
the creation of a new international border is fundamental for the purpose 
of analysing the consequences of (re)drawing borders. Territorial transfer 
includes “all territorial changes involving at least one nation-state,”3 as 
identified in the Correlates of War Territorial Change Dataset (Tir et 
al., 1998). These cover both border changes that resulted from military 
conflict and changes made under (non-violent) duress, such as the transfer 
of Sudetenland. Including these territorial transfers sharply improves 
coverage of the early twentieth century and distributes findings more 
evenly across existing and original boundaries in avoidance of domination 
by a few influential experiences and prominent cases. The dataset covers 
446 cases of boundary change.4
Patterns in boundary politics
The new data reveal that the established practice in the twentieth century 
was to draw borders following existing boundaries, particularly in 
partitions. A total number of 265 territorial changes (or 59.4 per cent) 
occurred along existing lines, including 87.6 per cent of the 137 partitions. 
In the post-World War II period, 91.4 per cent of the new states were 
established within existing internal or international boundaries and no 
state was created in violation of the uti possidetis principle after 1975. The 
principle thus gained authority in partitions as time progressed. 
For territorial changes more broadly and violent changes specifically, this 
practice also became increasingly prominent over time. After the Second 
3  In the Territorial Change dataset, the definition of state developed in the Correlates of 
War project is used.
4  Thirty-two cases involving micro-states are excluded.
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World War, 180 out of 255 territorial changes (or 70.6 per cent) took 
place adhering to existing boundaries, including nearly 60 per cent of cases 
when armed force was the primary agent of the territorial change. In the 
last quarter of the century, parties reverted to the prescriptions of the uti 
possidetis principle in all but one exchange of territory under circumstances 
of militarised violent dispute. Boundary maintenance is common practice 
particularly when the sovereignty change concerns dependent territory. 
More than three-quarters of the exchanges in colonies did not happen 
along an original boundary. But also changes that concern a state’s 
homeland territory are increasingly affected by existing boundaries. While 
more than half of these were in the twentieth century shaped along original 
boundaries, also when they took place under militarised circumstances (or 
45 out of 80 cases), nearly 70 per cent followed the uti possidetis principle 
after 1975 (see Table 2.1).
Table 2.1: Adherence to existing borders in the twentieth century
20th century post-1945 era post-1975 era
























Explaining the logic of the uti possidetis principle
Institutionalisation of boundary maintenance when effecting change 
of territory is supported by the conventional wisdom that doing so 
bolsters peace and order. There are three concrete conjectures about the 
relationship between border change and order, where drawing original 
borders is held to increase the risk of separatist contagion in the region, 
the probability of future conflict between the affected states, and civil war 
in the affected states. 
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Regional effects: spread of separatism
First, scholars in International Relations share the statement that changing 
borders is contagious, which is largely undisputed in the practice of 
politics. The fear is that redrawing borders can “set off an epidemic of 
catastrophic proportions” because alteration of existing boundaries 
to accommodate ethnic demands will challenge the legitimacy of all 
international boundaries (Lake and Rothchild, 1998: 3; Saideman, 1998; 
Zartman, 1966). Saideman and Ayres (2000) find some evidence of such 
regional diffusion effects of separatism in a cross-sectional study of ethnic 
groups. Saideman (1998) also suggests that there is spatial reinforcement 
of secessionism on the basis of a comparative study of the breakups of 
the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Forsberg (2013) more 
recently contradicts these findings. The logic is that the success of one 
secessionist movement may trigger the members of other ethnic groups to 
promote independence violently; people could gain confidence in resorting 
to violence and may learn from their strategies (e.g. Gurr and Moore, 
1997; Kuran, 1998; Gurr, 2000). Territorial change is then held to be a 
“modular political phenomena” – or, an “action based in significant part 
on emulation of the prior successful example of others” (Beissinger, 2007: 
259) – that generates new claims modelled on successful examples.5 And 
if even a fraction of the eight thousand ethnic groups in the world claimed 
border revision, the consequences would be profoundly destabilising 
(Gellner, 1983: 43-52). Limiting boundary change to existing boundaries 
is then held to restrict the number of potential claimants.
This fear of regional contagion was particularly important in decisions to 
uphold colonial borders upon the decolonisation of Africa. The African 
leaders proclaimed respect for the new states’ colonial borders in the context 
of the Organisation of African Unity – a decision that was applauded within 
the United Nations to prohibit the reopening the question of state borders. 
In the ‘First Report on Succession of States’ of 1968, the members of the 
United Nations International Law Commission noted upon requests for 
codification of succession issues that “[t]he attitude of the founders of the 
Organisation of African Unity […] was inspired by realism and political 
wisdom” (United Nations, 1970: 112). In practice as well as in academia, 
5  Separatist contagion is generally understood as a regional, rather than a global, 
phenomenon as “[e]thnic conflicts […] are not likely to produce global conflagrations 
unless they become linked with other issues” (Lake and Rothchild, 1998: 24).
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people generally held that the lack of internal cohesion in Africa made the 
new leaders in the continent politically expedient to respect the territorial 
status quo. As Bartos (1997: 56) formulates it: “should race, religion or 
language be taken as criteria in setting boundaries, ‘on ne trouvera en Afrique 
aucune véritable nation’” [one will not find any real nation in Africa]. A 
change of existing boundaries could therefore stimulate an endless call for 
territorial change in the region.
International dyadic effects: interstate dispute
The second deterrent effect of adhering to existing boundaries concerns 
international wars driven by irredentist challenges. Decisions on control 
over people and territory are often considered “all-or-nothing ventures” 
(Tir, 2005b: 714). Existing boundaries can then serve as focal points 
for the parties thus minimising political, jurisdictional, and economic 
uncertainty. They contribute to the development of a local sense of 
‘homeland’ and mitigate the practical difficulty of considering all possible 
boundaries in negotiations (Jackson and Zacher, 1997; Zacher, 2001; 
Carter and Goemans, 2011; Huth, Croco and Appel, 2011; 2013). They 
are also in international law established as legitimate bases of title to 
territory with the uti possidetis principle (Shaw, 1997), creating precedent 
for non-compliance with legal principles and reputation costs for those 
who challenge them in enforcement (Prorok and Huth, forthcoming). 
Boundary maintenance is thus deemed to generate the least questions 
about the legitimacy of international borders; original boundaries may 
generate armed confrontation between states concerning their exact 
location and implications. In addition, Carter and Goemans (2011: 284) 
hold that new borders may result in armed incidents when citizens violate 
boundaries that do not conform to their “business as usual”. For example, 
they claim that farmers’ continuation of business on the wrong side of the 
border contributed to international disputes between France and Spain 
upon boundary revision. 
This idea that uti possidetis is an effective principle for the preservation 
of international peace has been a major drive for maintaining existing 
boundaries in practice. It is referred to in many authoritative legal and 
political documents. In the decolonisation process in Africa, for example, 
the fear of international wars driven by irredentist challenges was called 
upon before the African leaders pronounced acceptance of existing 
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borders in the 1964 Cairo Declaration drafted under the auspices of 
the Organisation of African Unity. At the World Summit Conference of 
Independent African States of 1963, the President of Mali spoke: “We 
must take Africa as it is, and we must renounce any territorial claims, if we 
do not wish to reintroduce what we might call black imperialism in Africa” 
(Touval, 1967: 104). Legal specialists at the International Court of Justice 
reiterated this fear of interstate conflicts in the 1986 Burkina Faso/Mali 
case. In their decision, they state that the “obvious purpose [of adherence 
to existing boundaries] is to prevent the independence and stability of new 
states being endangered by […] the challenging of frontiers” (International 
Court of Justice, 1986: 565). 
Domestic effects: civil war
Third, scholars in International Relations have subscribed to the idea that 
boundary maintenance contains a shift of conflict downward to minorities 
in the territorially affected states. The claim is that granting territorial 
adjustments to represent more accurately the distribution and demands 
of one ethnic group incites civil war by signalling that a government may 
give in to the demands of other groups (Walter, 2006; 2009; Griffiths, 
2015). Boundary maintenance under these circumstances sets a threshold 
for communities to demand a sovereignty change. The fear of spreading 
unrest internally notably informed decisions both in the Soviet Union and 
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s to release 
first-order units – that is, the republics – but not lower-level units such as 
the autonomous provinces or oblasts like Kosovo and Chechnya even when 
peoples in these units were organised in secessionist movements. The right 
to secession of the republics was constitutionally guaranteed; adherence to 
these existing boundaries limited the precedent that the secessions set to 
peoples in the first-order territorial units, which is thought to discourage 
others and thus reduce civil war violence (e.g. Toft, 2002).
Civil war may furthermore develop from members of minority groups 
stranded on the ‘wrong’ side of the border, who are more likely to challenge 
new than familiar boundaries. Scholars such as Kaufmann (1996), Fearon 
(2004), Johnson (2008) and Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2009) hold 
that minorities are inevitable in a process of territorial change. These 
may be unable to cooperate in the establishment of new state authority 
where leaders of ethnic groups become predatory (Sambanis, 2000) or the 
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primary security providers (Posen, 1993; Kaufmann, 1996; 1998; Tullberg 
and Tullberg, 1997). Therefore, they hold that a border’s stability rather 
than its location matters to prevent recurrence of intrastate conflict. Such 
stability can buy state leaders time to consolidate national identities and 
domestic institutions while encouraging minorities to “seek recompense 
from within the state structure” (Castellino and Allen, 2003: 16; Ratner, 
1996: 595). This led the decolonisation of Africa to occur in line with a 
snapshot of the map delimiting some 50 units that denied or dissuaded 
hundreds of nations (Jackson, 1993). Alesina et al. (2011) indeed find that 
borders that do not align with ethnic patterns of settlement are not prone 
to civil war. They argue that drawing new, less artificial borders would not 
reduce any potential for intrastate violence; it would simply change the 
scale and location of the intrastate ethnic conflict.
Testing the logic
The three conjectures about the relationship between border change and 
order that underlie the institutionalisation of boundary maintenance in 
sovereignty change have testable empirical propositions. First, the logic 
connecting the drawing of original borders to the spread of separatism can 
be tested by examining the emergence of separatist movements in the states 
neighbouring the states affected by the boundary changes. Neighbours of 
states that lost or gained with the drawing of an original international 
border should experience a higher risk of separatist mobilisation than 
states adjacent to those affected by a territorial change along existing lines.6 
Second, if original boundaries are particularly volatile, the states affected 
by such a border should be more likely to experience contestation in an 
international conflict after settlement. The logic centres on the boundary 
rather than the relationship between states involved in a territorial change; 
in cases of decolonisation or partition, it hence concerns international 
disputes between states touching the new border rather than the state 
dyad. Finally, the logic connecting unchangeable boundaries to a reduced 
risk of intrastate conflict emergence requires that fewer wars erupt in states 
that gained or lost territory along an existing border than in states affected 
by an original boundary.7
6  The effects of territorial changes on states contiguous to a colonial power are not included 
in the analysis encompassing decolonisation.
7  The effects of territorial changes on colonial powers are not included in the analysis 
encompassing decolonisation.
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H1: Adherence to existing boundaries bolsters territorial order following 
territorial change. Specifically:
H1a: Compared to territorial changes that occur along existing borders, 
drawing original borders increases the probability of separatism in states 
neighbouring the territorially affected states.
H1b: Compared to territorial changes that occur along existing borders, 
drawing original borders increases the likelihood of conflict between the 
states concerned.
H1c: Compared to territorial changes that occur along existing borders, 
drawing original borders increases the likelihood of intrastate conflict in the 
territorially affected states.
Alternative explanations exist for the international, domestic, and regional 
implications that are commonly associated with boundary maintenance. 
Roeder (2007) theorises that secessionism is affected by the presence of 
administrative units or ‘segments’ in a state while democratic institutions 
(e.g. Auvinen, 1997; Krain and Myers, 1997; Sambanis, 2000; Gurr, 2000) 
and high levels of economic development (e.g. Muller and Weede, 1990; 
Auvinen, 1997; Sambanis, 2000; Fearon and Laitin, 2003) are considered 
key determinants of domestic peace. Democratic states would provide 
peaceful ways to deal with conflicting preferences and the satisfaction of 
economic needs can dampen tensions. Fearon and Laitin (2003) further 
find that the likelihood of civil war onset is more than five times greater 
in the first two years of a state’s independent existence than in other years 
while also the terrain has an influence. Tir (2005a: 545) finally concludes 
that partition process affects “the extent of support for extremist (i.e. 
conflictual) versus moderate (i.e. accommodative) policies, which in turn 
determine the prospects for future peace”. Peaceful secessions, he finds, are 
less likely to result in domestic violence than their violent counterparts. 
With regard to international war, whether a leader is willing to use force to 
change the new boundary may be influenced by the state’s relative ability 
to (re)take territory. The importance of power distribution is established 
among scholars, even though they do not agree about whether balance (e.g. 
Morgenthau, 1948; Waltz, 1979) or preponderance (e.g. Bremer, 1992) 
benefits peace. Many scholars have furthermore shown that democracies 
tend to interact peacefully with one another (e.g. Russett and Oneal, 2001) 
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while sharing security interests increases the international and domestic 
costs of war for leaders who may thus be less inclined to use violence to 
acquire territory. Tir (2005b; 2006) adds that peaceful partition processes 
have a lower likelihood than violent processes that the new border will 
be militarily contested. If peace and order are affected by maintenance 
of existing boundaries, these alternative hypotheses should not obfuscate 
the effects of boundary politics on international, domestic, and regional 
security. They are therefore modelled in the analyses.
Dependent variables
I employ three primary dependent variables, supplemented by a number 
of alternative specifications. First, to test the regional contagion effects 
of boundary change, I measure separatism in states neighbouring the 
territorially affected states through a dichotomous variable created on the 
basis of Coggins’ (2011) dataset on secessionist movements between 1930 
and 2000.8 Results are verified with a dichotomous indicator of intrastate 
conflicts over territory as coded in the Uppsala/PRIO dataset in which 
the first act of violence and the first year in which more than twenty-five 
people died as a cause of separatist violence are reported.9 
Second, I measure the occurrence of an international conflict between 
states affected by boundary change (e.g. conflicts between the rump and the 
secessionist state) using data on territorial disputes and militarised interstate 
disputes (MIDs) to examine the international security consequences of 
boundary change. A dichotomous variable indicates whether a MID 
occurred after a territorial change, as coded in the Correlates of War 
Militarised Interstate Disputes dataset.10 The analysis is complemented 
with an ordinal variable that operationalises territorial disputes as four-
8  A value of “1” indicates that a separatist movement emerges in any of the neighbouring 
states while “0” represents their absence. Following Coggins (2011), a movement is 
included when it has 1) a formal declaration of full-independence; 2) a national flag; 3) 
a claim to territory and population; and 4) an existence of at least 7 days and at least 100 
individuals who claim at least 100 square meters of territory.
9  A value of “1” indicates a rise of separatist violence into a first act of violence or the 
death of >25 people per year in any of the neighbouring states while “0” represents the 
stabilisation of the level of violence. 
10  A value of “1” indicates the occurrence of an interstate dispute between two states 
contiguous to a new border while “0” represents the absence of a dispute.
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fold construct ranging from no dispute (“0”) to a territorial dispute where 
no actions were taken (“1”) to the initiation of negotiations (“2”) to the 
initiation of military action (“3”) on the basis of Huth’s (1996) and Huth 
and Allee’s (2002) Status Quo dataset covering 348 violent and nonviolent 
territorial disputes spanning 1919 to 1995.
Third, I assess the domestic effects of border changes with a dichotomous 
variable for intrastate war with sustained combat and at least 1,000 battle-
related deaths per year, as defined in the Correlates of War dataset.11 In 
order to account for politically significant protests that did not develop 
into full-scale war, I add a dichotomous indicator capturing lower levels 
of violence on the basis of the Uppsala/PRIO dataset, which counts wars 
involving 25 or more deaths from 1946.12 
All variables are coded for periods of two, five and ten years and at any time 
after the territorial change through to 2000. Although some scholars focus 
on accumulated time since the border change (Tir, 2005a; Tir, 2005b; 
Carter and Goemans, 2011), this limits the ability to connect cause with 
effect. Both Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2009) and Chapman and 
Roeder (2007) opt to use a two-year interval “in order to limit the number 
of exogenous and possibly confounding shocks that may intercede between 
a peace settlement and our measurement of consequences” (Chapman and 
Roeder, 2007: 683). Sambanis (2000), Tir (2002) and Johnson (2008), 
however, use longer timeframes—notably five and/or ten years—to assess 
the long-term consequences of partition. In order to speak to the many 
different analyses of the consequences of territorial change, I verify results 
in the different time periods restricted to a decade to detect most, if not 
all, of the effects.13 
11  A value of “1” indicates the occurrence of a civil war in the territorially affected state 
while “0” represents the absence of war.
12  A value of “1” indicates the occurrence of a civil war in the territorially affected state 
while “0” represents the absence of war. Following the Uppsala/PRIO dataset, armed 
conflict is included when there is “a contested incompatibility that concerns government 
of territory or both” (Gleditsch et al., 2002: 619).
13  Tir (2002: 276) argues that “[d]issatisfied parties are unlikely to wait longer than 10 
years to show their discontent” and that the effects negotiation attempts are likely to 
become obvious within this time period.
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Independent variables
As noted above, the independent variable is dichotomous to represent 
whether border changes completely followed existing international or 
internal boundaries (“1”) or established original boundaries (“0”). Borders 
here are de jure lines; changes in de facto or administrative boundaries are 
excluded from this conceptualisation. The logic of the uti possidetis principle 
concerns new international borders. These are thought to be stable when 
they are fixed to discourage contestation, which limits the relevant de facto 
or administrative boundaries to recent ones. To avoid endogeneity with 
decolonisation, the means of drawing borders is measured for all territorial 
changes in the twentieth century. As the decolonisation of Africa took 
place largely in accordance with the uti possidetis principle and resulted in 
relatively few MIDs and separatist conflicts (Tir, 2005b; Englebert and 
Hummel, 2005), including these cases should increase the likelihood of 
finding a stabilising effect for reliance on existing boundaries. Alternative 
analyses are run as robustness checks.
Control variables are also included to account for alternative explanations. 
In the model for regional contagion effects of boundary politics, the number 
of states in the international system is included on the basis of Gleditsch 
and Ward’s (1999) dataset to control for the increased opportunity for 
separatism in a larger number of states.14 I also coded the number of 
segment states in the region on the basis of the list provided by Roeder 
(2007). Finally, I add controls for domestic factors like the emergence of 
a new independent state, state disappearance and the size of the territory 
exchanged and process-related factors concerning the existence of conflict 
prior to the territorial change and the type of territory – that is, homeland or 
dependent territory – exchanged as coded in Tir et al.’s (1998) Territorial 
Change Dataset. These variables allow a test whether findings hinge on 
characteristics of the states or area or process rather than on the adherence 
to existing boundaries. If exchanges of sizeable territories are more likely 
to be fought over in civil war, or if intrastate violence following adherence 
to existing boundaries can actually be explained by the fact that difficult 
negotiations in military conflict are more likely to result in solutions on 
14  Gleditsch and Ward (1999: 398) consider a state an independent entity when it “1) 
has a relatively autonomous administration over some territory; 2) is considered a distinct 
entity by local actors of the state it is dependent on; and 3) has a population greater than 
250,000”. 
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the basis of the uti possidetis principle as a focal point, these effects are 
accounted for in the model.
In the model for interstate disputes following a territorial change, the 
natural logarithm of the power ratio between the stronger and weaker state 
is included in line with the literature (e.g. Russett and Oneal, 2001; Tir, 
2005b) to account for effects of the power distribution between the states 
involved in a territorial change. This variable is created on the basis of 
the COW National Material Capabilities dataset. A dichotomous variable 
furthermore captures whether affected states are both democracies (i.e. a 
Polity score of at least 7) and the effects of common security interests on the 
likelihood of war are coded as alliance formation in the Correlates of War 
Formal Alliance dataset. Finally, I include control variables concerning the 
partition process to account for the effects of the existence of conflict prior 
to the territorial change and the size and type of the territory exchanged as 
coded in the Territorial Change dataset. It is plausible that the exchange of 
large territories and homeland are more likely to be fought over than small 
or dependent areas; these territories may be of greater strategic importance. 
In the model for civil war, I include the same domestic and process-related 
factors as in the model on separatism because literatures on these types 
of intrastate violence largely overlap. The analysis additionally contains a 
control for effects of the level of economic development in states involved in 
the territorial change. This continuous variable records a state’s industrial 
capacity by means of the primary energy consumption per capita provided 
in the Correlates of War Material Capabilities dataset.15 To account for the 
low probability of war in democracies, the model furthermore includes 
whether states are a democracy (i.e. a Polity score of ≥7). 
Method of analysis
I employ Pearson’s chi-square test as a first cut to assess whether the 
manner in which a border is changed matters for international, domestic, 
and regional order and follow with logistic regression to analyse the 
probability of unrest, disaggregating by categories of territorial change 
where appropriate.
15  GDP per capita could not be used as a parameter for economic development because 
reliable data are not available for the beginning of the twentieth century.
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Results
Regional spread of separatism upon territorial change
According to the ‘Pandora’s box’ argument, allowing one state to draw 
original borders encourages separatist movements in the region (H1a). 
However, adhering to existing borders has not prevented the spread of 
separatism in the post-1930 period. While 41.7 per cent of the cases in 
which an original border was drawn resulted in an increase in separatism 
in the region within two years, this occurred in 45.9 per cent of the cases in 
which existing boundaries were followed – a difference that is statistically 
insignificant (χ2=.415, p=.519) and thus indicates that drawing borders in 
line with the uti possidetis principle does not contain a regional spread of 
separatism. Also when taking into account the outbreak of conflict over 
territory, evidence suggests that maintaining boundaries did not prevent 
separatism in the first two years after a territorial change (χ2=1.757, 
p=.185). The number of separatist movements in fact increased within a 
decade in nearly seven per cent more territorial changes following existing 
than original boundaries (see Table 2.2).16 
16  The conclusions are robust upon excluding the effects on the territorially affected states. 
Adhering to existing boundaries does not contain the regional spread of separatism at 
two (χ2=.134, p=.715), five (χ2=.141, p=.707) and ten (χ2=.575, p=.448) years after the 
territorial change. 65.5% of territorial changes following existing boundaries resulted in 
regional contagion within ten years while this occurs in 60.7% of changes where original 
borders were drawn. 
Table 2.2: Spread of separatism within ten years after a territorial 
change 











Total 172 84 256
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Model 1 adds variables from the leading alternative explanations to the 
relationship between the means of drawing borders and the increase in 
separatist movements in the region (see Table 2.3).17 The effect of following 
existing boundaries when drawing an international border is quite strong. 
Territorial changes where boundaries were left unchanged were nearly twice 
as likely to be followed by an increase in separatism than changes where 
original borders were drawn. This conclusion holds when separatism in 
the region is represented in a continuous variable that denotes the number 
of separatist movements per neighbouring state (Model 2).18  
The argument that drawing original borders encourages separatism 
is most often mentioned in relation to state independence as a specific 
instance of territorial change. A closer look at the events following state 
independence, however, reveals that adherence to existing boundaries does 
not significantly dampen the effects of territorial change. Six out of ten 
states where boundaries were redrawn upon independence experienced 
the emergence of secessionism in the region in the first ten years of 
existence (namely India, Pakistan, Bhutan, North and South Vietnam and 
Bangladesh). The same effect was observed among 64.4% of the far greater 
number of states that maintained existing boundaries in independence. 
This difference is statistically insignificant (χ2=.077, p=.781) and thus 
supports that drawing borders in line with the uti possidetis principle does 
not limit a regional spread of separatism (see Table 2.4 in the appendix).19 
17  The linktest of Model 1 reveals that the model is a statistically significant predictor of the 
independent variable (p=.000) while no relevant variable are omitted (p=.279). The Log 
Likelihood Chi-Square statistic furthermore shows that the model as a whole is statistically 
significant (p<.000) while the value of the Hosmer and Lemeshow’s goodness-of-fit test 
indicates that there is no significant difference between the model and the observed data 
(HL=10.95, p=.205). In addition, there is no indication that the model suffers from 
multicollinearity as all VIF scores are close to 1 with a mean of 1.22. Finally, the Cook’s 
distance values indicate that the model contains no influential cases because all distances 
are below 1.
18  The linktest of Model 2 reveals that the model is a statistically significant predictor of the 
independent variable (p=.000) while no relevant variable are omitted (p=.194). The Log 
Likelihood Chi-Square statistic furthermore shows that the model as a whole is statistically 
significant (p<.000) while the value of the Hosmer and Lemeshow’s goodness-of-fit test 
indicates that there is no significant difference between the model and the observed data 
(HL=11.05, p=.199). In addition, there is no indication that the model suffers from 
multicollinearity as all VIF scores are close to 1 with a mean of 1.24. Finally, the Cook’s 
distance values indicate that the model contains no influential cases because all distances 
are below 1.
19  The effect is also insignificant two (χ2=.162, p=.687) and five (χ2=.004, p=.947) rather 
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Table 2.3: Logit models for the spread of separatism within ten years 
after a territorial change 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variables
B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) 
Existing boundaries 681* (.395) .740* (.432) 1.168* (.617)






# of neighbouring states .255*** (.066) .148*** (.043) .127 (.090)






# of neighbouring segment 
states 
3.391*** (.734) 1.557*** (.395) 3.521** (1.406)






Prior conflict .335 (.403) .029 (.430) .305 (.556)






Type of territory gained .891 (.269) omitted .763 (.869)




Type of territory lost .269*** (.084) .203** (.077) omitted




State independence -.886** (.430) -1.015** (.471) -.278 (1.020)






State disappearance -1.371 (.894) -2.227** (.969) -1.904** (.937)






Size of the area exchanged .106** (.051) .114** (.055) .137** (.069)






Constant -3.231** (1.155) -1.951** (.678) -2.386 (1.188)
N 250 241 129
Pseudo R2 .242 .241 .230
Model χ2 76.82 72.59 32.72
Note: *p<.10. **p<.05. ***p<.001.
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Many of these territorial changes concerned decolonisation, yet boundary 
politics in the future is more likely to involve homeland. Model 3 excludes 
the colonial cases.20 In this model, drawing international borders following 
existing boundaries is again strongly associated with a regional spread of 
separatism. Territorial changes where boundaries were maintained were 
nearly three-and-a-half times as likely to be followed by an increase in 
separatism in the region than changes where original borders were drawn. 
Put differently, while only 63.5 per cent of the boundary changes involving 
an original border resulted in an increase in separatist movements in the 
region in the first decade, this occurred in 84.3 per cent of the cases 
where existing boundaries were followed – a difference that is statistically 
significant (χ2=7.534, p=.006). Violence also occurred more often when 
boundaries were maintained. 81.8 per cent of the territorial changes along 
existing boundaries resulted in a regional spread of separatist violence in 
the first decade, while such contagion was seen in only 75.5 per cent of 
the cases where boundaries were redrawn. These findings provide initial 
evidence against adherence to existing boundaries in territorial changes; 
this procedure is more likely to be followed by a growth in the number 
of separatist movements and violence in the region than drawing original 
borders.
International conflict upon territorial change 
With regard to international security, the prevailing wisdom is that 
adherence to existing boundaries prevents disputes between states affected 
by territorial exchange (H1b). Evidence suggests however that maintaining 
boundaries in fact increases the probability of a militarised interstate dispute 
than ten years after the territorial change. Conclusions are robust upon excluding the 
effects on the territorially affected states. Adhering to existing boundaries does not contain 
the regional spread of separatism at two (χ2=.250, p=.617), five (χ2=.001, p=.974) and ten 
(χ2=.724, p=.395) years after the state gained independence.
20  The linktest of Model 3 reveals that the model is a statistically significant predictor of the 
independent variable (p=.007) while no relevant variable are omitted (p=.912). The Log 
Likelihood Chi-Square statistic furthermore shows that the model as a whole is statistically 
significant (p=.000) while the value of the Hosmer and Lemeshow’s goodness-of-fit test 
indicates that there is no significant difference between the model and the observed 
data (HL=3.35, p=.911). In addition, there is no indication that the model suffers from 
multicollinearity as all VIF scores are close to 1 with a mean of 1.35. Finally, the Cook’s 
distance values indicate that the model contains a few mildly influential cases, but deleting 
these cases does not affect the conclusions.
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(MID). 56% of the territorial changes that followed existing boundaries in 
the twentieth century resulted in an international conflict within five years; 
a conflict emerged in only 52 per cent of the cases in which boundaries 
were redrawn – a difference that increases to nearly ten per cent in the first 
decade after the territorial change. This difference is statistically significant 
(χ2=3.845, p=.050), which indicates that drawing borders in line with the 
uti possidetis principle is in fact more likely to be followed by interstate 
dispute than creating original borders (see Table 2.5). 
Model 1 includes control variables for alternative explanations to 
the relationship between the means of drawing borders and onset of 
international war (see Table 2.6).21 The relationship is strong, but in contrast 
with common beliefs. Territorial changes where existing boundaries were 
followed were almost twice as likely to result in an international dispute 
than changes where original borders were drawn.
21  The linktest of this model reveals that the model is a statistically significant predictor 
of the independent variable (p=.006) while no relevant variable are omitted (p=.624). 
The Log Likelihood Chi-Square statistic furthermore shows that the model as a whole is 
statistically significant (p<.000) while the value of the Hosmer and Lemeshow’s goodness-
of-fit test indicates that there is no significant difference between the model and the 
observed data (HL=14.78, p=.063). In addition, there is no indication that the model 
suffers from multicollinearity as all VIF scores are close to 1 with a mean of 1.14. Finally, 
the Cook’s distance values indicate that the model contains a few mildly influential cases, 
but eliminating these cases from the analysis does not significantly affect the conclusions.
Table 2.5: 
Emergence of MID within ten years after a territorial change 











Total 276 155 431
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When focusing on instances of state independence, arguably the most 
relevant sub-set of territorial changes, the evidence suggests that adherence 
to existing boundaries in conformity with the uti possidetis principle 
resulted in an MID within ten years after independence in 71.2 per cent 
of the cases compared to only 70.6 per cent of cases in which original 
borders were drawn. This relationship is statistically insignificant (χ²=.003, 
p=.959), which means that the adherence to existing boundaries does not 
prevent interstate disputes between states affected by territorial change 
(see Table 2.4).22 Also in territorial transfers that followed after a military 
conflict between organised forces of both sides, the agreement to uphold 
the existing boundaries does not minimise the risk of war onset. These 
boundary changes result in an almost equal number of militarised interstate 
disputes, regardless of the means by which the international border was 
drawn (χ²=.137, p=.711).23
To draw conclusions relevant for the future in which decolonisation 
has approached completion, Model 2 covers only changes to homeland 
(see Table 2.6).24 The evidence suggests that states are more likely to 
fight wars when their territories were changed along existing boundaries 
then when they drew original boundaries. Controlling for the fact that 
negotiations in military conflict or concerning large areas may be more 
likely to conclude on the basis of the uti possidetis principle as the lowest 
22  The effect is also insignificant two (χ2=1.461, p=.227) and five (χ2=1.167, p=.280) 
rather than ten years after the territorial change. Conclusions are robust when representing 
international war in a dichotomous variable that denotes the territorial disputes identified 
by Huth and Allee (2002). Adhering to existing boundaries does not prevent interstate 
territorial disputes two (χ2=.692, p=.405), five (χ2=2.415, p=.120) and ten (χ2=1.450, 
p=.229) years after a boundary change.
23  The effect is also insignificant two (χ2=451, p=.502) and five (χ2=.279, p=.598) rather 
than ten years after the territorial change. Conclusions are robust in analysis of territorial 
disputes identified by Huth and Allee (2002). Adhering to existing boundaries does not 
prevent interstate territorial disputes two (χ2=.026, p=.873), five (χ2=.001, p=.973) and ten 
(χ2=.034, p=.854) years after a boundary change.
24  The linktest of this model reveals that the model is a statistically significant predictor of 
the independent variable (p=.000) while no relevant variable are omitted (p=.510). The Log 
Likelihood Chi-Square statistic furthermore shows that the model as a whole is statistically 
significant (p<.000) while the value of the Hosmer and Lemeshow’s goodness-of-fit test 
indicates that there is no significant difference between the model and the observed 
data (HL=8.35, p=.400). In addition, there is no indication that the model suffers from 
multicollinearity as all VIF scores are close to 1 with a mean of 1.08. Finally, the Cook’s 
distance values indicate that the model contains no influential cases because all distances 
are below 1.
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Table 2.6: Logit models for the emergence of international war within 
ten years after a territorial change 
Model 1 Model 2
Variables
B (SE) B (SE) 
Existing boundaries .632** (.324) 1.616** (.541)




Democratic dyad -1.199** (.414) -3.651** (1.292)




Prior conflict .772** (.370) 1.370** (.514)




Common security interests 1.420** (.547) omitted
exp b [95% CI] 4.136 
[1.417; 12.074]
Dyadic power distribution -.111 (.093) -.074 (.121)




Type of territory lost -.231 (.178) omitted
exp b [95% CI] .793 
[.560; 1.124]  
Size of the area exchanged .104** (.049)  .027 (.083) 




Constant -.070 (.557) -.023 (.827)
N 281 125
Pseudo R2 .113 .171
Model χ2 37.59  26.29
Note: *p<.10. **p<.05. ***p<.001.
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common denominator, territorial changes that follow existing boundaries 
are more than five times as likely to result in an international militarised 
dispute than changes where original homeland borders are drawn. In other 
words, an MID followed in the first decade in 77 per cent of the cases in 
which international borders were drawn along existing boundaries, while a 
significantly lower rate of 55.2 per cent of the original boundaries resulted 
in a dispute (χ²=11.589, p=.001).25 With this more than twenty per cent 
difference in the likelihood of an international war onset, evidence suggests 
that drawing borders according to the uti possidetis principle is more likely 
to result in international war than negotiating original ones. These findings 
cast doubt on the future adherence to the uti possidetis principle.  
Intrastate conflict upon territorial change
The final argument in favour of adhering to existing boundaries concerns 
the ways that the uti possidetis principle prevents new intrastate wars 
from emerging (H1c). However, maintaining existing boundaries has 
not limited the outbreak of civil wars in the twentieth century. While 
territorial changes along existing boundaries were followed by war in an 
affected state within two years 13.5 per cent of the times, this occurred in 
only 10.9 per cent of the cases in which original boundaries were drawn 
– a difference that is statistically insignificant (χ2=.593, p=.441) and thus 
indicates that drawing borders in line with the uti possidetis principle does 
not prevent the outbreak of civil war. Violence in fact broke out within a 
decade in nearly four per cent more territorial changes following existing 
than original boundaries (see Table 2.7). Also for the outbreak of lower 
levels of violence, maintaining boundaries did not work to reduce the risk 
of civil unrest after a territorial change (χ2=1.918, p=.166).
Particularly in states that lost sizeable territories (>7,500km2), civil war 
is more likely to break out following a territorial change along existing 
boundaries than when borders were redrawn. The difference was nearly 
twenty per cent in the twentieth century, which is statistically significant 
(χ2=3.631, p=.057). Yet also the states that gained territory were more 
25  This conclusion is robust in analysis of territorial disputes identified by Huth and Allee 
(2002). While only 46.8 per cent of the boundary changes involving an original border 
resulted a territorial dispute within ten years, this occurred in 69.4 per cent of the cases 
where existing boundaries were followed – a difference that is statistically significant 
(χ2=7.484, p=.006).
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likely to experience civil war after a territorial change that followed existing 
rather than original boundaries (χ2=2.760, p=.097). While violence was 
onset within ten years in only six cases (or just over 10 per cent) where 
original boundaries were drawn, this occurred in 34 instances (or just over 
20 per cent) of boundary maintenance. Still the conclusion is robust upon 
adding control variables from the leading alternative explanations, which 
is done in Model 1 (see Table 2.8).26 Territorial changes where existing 
boundaries were followed were more than three-and-a-half times as likely 
to result in civil war than changes where original borders were drawn.
The argument that maintaining existing boundaries minimises the risk of 
civil war onset primarily relates to the homeland rather than dependent 
territory. A closer look at the events, however, reveals that adherence to 
existing boundaries is particularly likely to be followed by civil war when 
the territorial change concerns lost homeland. Nearly 50 per cent of 
states that lost territory in conformity with the uti possidetis principle saw 
emergence of a civil war in the first decade; this happened only 10.9 per 
26  The linktest of Model 1 reveals that the model is not a statistically significant predictor of 
the independent variable (p=.229) but no relevant variable are omitted (p=.818). The Log 
Likelihood Chi-Square statistic furthermore shows that the model as a whole is statistically 
significant (p<.000) while the value of the Hosmer and Lemeshow’s goodness-of-fit test 
indicates that there is no significant difference between the model and the observed 
data (HL=3.48, p=.901). In addition, there is no indication that the model suffers from 
multicollinearity as all VIF scores are close to 1 with a mean of 1.21. Finally, the Cook’s 
distance values indicate that the model contains no influential cases because all distances 
are below 1.
Table 2.7: Emergence of civil war within ten years after a territorial 
change











Total 105 280 385
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Table 2.8: Logit models for the emergence of intrastate war within ten 
years after a territorial change 
Model 1 Model 2
Variables
B (SE) B (SE) 
Existing boundaries 1.295** (.605) 1.196* (.630) 




Economic development -.168** (.086) .120 (.150) 




Democracy .027 (.484) .031 (.924)




Prior conflict .694 (.453) .794 (.592)




Type of territory gained omitted omitted
exp b [95% CI]
Type of territory lost 1.137* (.613) omitted
exp b [95% CI] 3.117  
[.937; 10.368]  
State independence .260 (.921) 2.096** (.807) 




State disappearance .260 (.921) -1.362 (1.039)




Size of the area exchanged .335** (.138)  .430* (.226)




Constant -6.578*** (1.837) -7.486** (3.030)
N 200 91
Pseudo R2 .108 .248
Model χ2 21.08  30.33
Note: *p<.10. **p<.05. ***p<.001.
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cent of the times homeland was lost with redrawn borders – a difference 
that is statistically significant (χ2=15.214, p=.000). And these territorial 
changes are followed by civil war in over 15 per cent more states that gained 
them (χ2=3.553, p=.059). Model 2 shows that also when controlling for 
alternative explanations, there is a strong relationship between the means of 
drawing borders and onset of war in either state involved in the territorial 
change when it concerns a loss of homeland (see Table 2.8).27 Adherence 
to existing boundaries was more than three times as likely to be followed 
by civil war than drawing original borders.
Maintaining the existing boundaries has finally not minimised the risk of 
civil war onset in the first years of a state’s independent existence, nor has it 
stopped violence in territorial transfers that followed a military conflict. 2 
out of 16 states whose borders had been redrawn, or 12.5%, experienced a 
civil war within ten years after independence, whereas violence emerged in 
19.1% of the cases where new states maintained their existing boundaries 
– a difference that is statistically insignificant (χ2=.413, p=.521) and thus 
indicates that drawing borders in line with the uti possidetis principle does 
not prevent civil war upon partition (see Table 2.4). In military conflict, 
adhering to existing boundaries in fact proved more often followed by civil 
war in the first years than drawing original borders (χ2=3.740, p=.053). 
In only nine cases where boundaries were redrawn in conflict situations, 
or 17.3%, an intrastate dispute broke out within two years– namely, 
China’s reoccupation of Manchukuo and Southern Sakhalin Island in 
1905, the secession of Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Georgia from the Soviet 
Union in 1918, China’s territorial exchange with Japan in 1945 and the 
reshaping of India and Bangladesh in 1971. But where it was decided to 
adhere to existing boundaries, violence was onset 34% of the times. These 
findings confirm that it may be necessary to reconsider the adherence to 
prescriptions of the uti possidetis principle in cases of territorial change.
27  The linktest of Model 2 reveals that the model is a statistically significant predictor of 
the independent variable (p=.000) but no relevant variable are omitted (p=.194). The Log 
Likelihood Chi-Square statistic furthermore shows that the model as a whole is statistically 
significant (p<.000) while the value of the Hosmer and Lemeshow’s goodness-of-fit test 
indicates that there is no significant difference between the model and the observed 
data (HL=6.62, p=.579). In addition, there is no indication that the model suffers from 
multicollinearity as all VIF scores are close to 1 with a mean of 1.26. Finally, the Cook’s 
distance values indicate that the model contains no influential cases because all distances 
are below 1.
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Robustness check: temporal trends
The findings were subject to a final robustness check for differences within 
the twentieth century. If changes in the security situation affected outcomes 
in boundary politics such that the increased adherence to the uti possidetis 
principle and a reduction in territorial conflicts and expansion interacted, 
territorial changes along existing boundaries in the second half of the 
century would prove less volatile. Yet analysis of outcomes in the post-
World War II period, which is the era that many (e.g. Kaufmann, 1996; 
Sambanis, 2000; Chapman and Roeder, 2007; Johnson, 2008) examine 
separately, does not change the substantive importance of the drawing 
original borders. In only 26 cases where boundaries were redrawn, or 37.7 
per cent, there was an increase in separatism in the region within two 
years, while this occurred in 42.8 per cent of the cases in which existing 
borders were followed – a difference that is statistically insignificant 
(χ2=.506, p=.477) and thus confirms that drawing borders in line with the 
uti possidetis principle does not contain a regional spread of separatism. 
Regional contagion took place within a decade in more than three per cent 
more territorial changes following existing than original boundaries.
Also concerning the outbreak of militarised interstate disputes and civil 
war, findings are confirmed when focusing on the period since 1945. A 
significant twenty per cent more territorial changes that followed existing 
rather than original boundaries resulted in an MID in the first decade 
(χ2=8.879, p=.003) while adherence to existing boundaries did not 
prevent the outbreak of civil wars. Civil violence occurred within two 
years in twelve per cent of the cases where states did not change existing 
boundaries while this occurred in only 8.7 per cent of the states when an 
original border was drawn (χ2=.522, p=.470). This difference is statistically 
insignificant in the first decade (χ2=.141, p=.707) while also lower level 
violence was not more likely to occur upon a change of boundaries 
(χ2=1.918, p=.166). This indicates that there were no relevant changes in 
that pacified the consequences of adhering to existing boundaries over the 
course of the twentieth century. 
To the contrary, violence increased particularly in the last twenty-five years 
of the century that mark the time in which according to Holsti (2004: 
102) the key elements of the “territorial compact” were spelled out and 
implemented. In the first decade after a territorial change, intrastate war 
broke out in over thirty per cent more cases of territorial change when 
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existing rather than original borders were drawn. This difference is 
statistically significant (χ2=7.060, p=.008), indicating that adherence to 
the prescriptions of the uti possidetis principle increased the likelihood of 
violence. Also when taking into account lower level violence, civil war 
occurred more often when boundaries were maintained than when they 
were changed upon transfer. The relationship with interstate war and 
regional contagion similarly became stronger in the post-1975 period. 
Then territorial changes that followed existing boundaries were followed 
by violence in a significant 35 per cent more cases than when borders were 
redrawn (χ2=8.674, p=.003) while only eight out of 23 territorial changes 
where boundaries were redrawn borders, or 34.8%, resulted in increased 
separatism in the neighbouring states. ‘Separatism after territorial change 
increased in more than 70 per cent of the cases where boundaries were 
maintained, which is a difference that is statistically significant (χ2=8.293, 
p=.004)’. Evidence hence suggests that in this period, adherence to existing 
boundaries in territorial change was particularly volatile.
Conclusion
The widespread belief in the territorial order reinforcing effects of the uti 
possidetis principle seems largely unwarranted. Drawing on a new dataset 
on border fixity in territorial transfers, I find that maintaining existing 
borders does not contribute to peace and order upon territorial change. 
The aftermath of partition and territorial transfer tends to be characterised 
by continued conflict and a (re-)emergence of territorial claims and 
boundary maintenance does not prevent this. To the contrary, drawing 
original borders was in the twentieth century associated with a lower 
risk of separatism in the region while it was less frequently followed by 
interstate and intrastate war. This is a strong indicator that border fixity in 
fact contributed to the level of disorder. These results are robust to various 
model specifications and periodisation.
These findings cast doubt on the adherence to the uti possidetis principle 
in the practice of boundary politics. Scholars, state leaders and diplomats 
alike have overestimated the deterrent effect of border fixity. They tend 
to argue that the existing boundaries are clearly defined and familiar for 
national and international audiences while they limit the options for 
territorial change to (administrative) political units. As such, there would 
be less conflict over the location of the new international border while 
51
particularly ethnic communities that straddle existing borders would be 
discouraged from pursuing their claims (e.g. Carter and Goemans, 2011). 
This presumes, however, that a “state can function within any borders” 
(Ratner, 1996: 591) and that “problems relating to minority rights [can 
be dealt with] within the context of acceptance of the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the new states” (McFarlane, 1999: 16). Events in the 
twentieth century reveal that is not true. Limiting the range of possibilities 
for states to make territorial changes to existing boundaries in fact had 
negative impacts on international peace and order. 
The question remains how beliefs in line with the uti possidetis principle 
developed if they prove unfounded in practice. The following chapters 
address how practices in boundary politics are constructed. They offer an 
explanation for how boundary maintenance became the common practice 
for drawing international borders that is based on the domination of 
specific negotiators rather than the quality of existing boundaries for peace 
and order. Indeed, practices in boundary politics are socially constructed 
on the basis of beliefs that (groups of ) people share who gain influence in 




A Sociological Approach to Practices in 
Boundary Politics
How do diplomatic actors manage the implications of changes in state 
sovereignty for international borders? Boundary politics play out under 
circumstances of serious uncertainty about the future. Information 
about actors and their rationales is difficult to obtain or assume because 
a sovereignty change is often the prime moment at which new actors 
emerge, (new) ideas and interests are consolidated, and power relations are 
redefined. One could even argue that there are many potential threats to 
(inter)national security that are impossible to predict because the events 
are unique and non-recurring. Yet it is clear that the stakes involved in 
the development of boundary policies are high. The stakes are first of all 
symbolic. Outcomes establish alternative worlds; maps represent realities 
based on alternative power configurations. (Re)producing within the 
bounds of these maps what and who are significant, actors establish a 
territorial order that is static or subject to development. They define what 
is possible and/or desirable in the practice of boundary politics. 
This has an impact not only on the territorial delimitation of the new 
sovereign entity under consideration, but also on the future of irredentist 
and secessionist movements located elsewhere. It defines effectively who 
qualifies for independence. The stakes are thus also eminently political. 
Practices in boundary politics may in fact generate severe threats to post-
independence peace and order, the effects of which could be irreversible 
and impact the very foundations of the modern state system. They could 
undermine the political and legal arrangements through which these 
threats have been made controllable in the past: the established practice of 
boundary maintenance.
Under these circumstances, there are manifold ways in which the future 
can be assessed, calculated and mastered. Negotiators in the practice of 
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boundary politics can decide to draw borders in numerous ways. Yet in 
nearly all cases of state secession since the end of World War II, they 
have rejected alternatives to the existing borders in conformity with the 
uti possidetis principle.28 A quick glance at history reveals that practices 
were different before decolonisation was realised on the African continent, 
with particularly the inter-war period being characterised by attempts at 
unifying communities rather than territories. And even in contemporary 
practice, negotiators have developed territorial arrangements to 
accommodate alternative realities. They have for example agreed to an 
internal division along ethnic lines in Bosnia and Herzegovina and a 
secession of Kosovo from the Republic of Serbia, undermining the very 
logic of territoriality underlying boundary maintenance. This raises the 
question: how do negotiators arrive at outcomes? Do negotiators involved 
in boundary politics share a single set of commonplaces, or do they have 
varying ideas about possible and/or desirable? And how then do particular 
commonplaces come to influence practices as the outcome of negotiation 
processes?
This chapter is broadly divided in three parts. In the first part, I outline 
the basic premise of my central argument, which is that diplomatic actors 
manage the implications of sovereignty change on the basis of shared 
opinions and largely unquestioned beliefs that are instilled in (groups of ) 
negotiators who gain influence in the negotiation process. They prioritise 
their belief in the ‘feasible’ or even the only ‘realistic’ answer to questions 
of territorial definition. I theorise that negotiators’ interactions are 
characterised by struggles for authority, putting the (groups of ) negotiators 
whose expertise is recognised in practice in a position to establish prevailing 
conceptions of (social) reality and thus to shape practices in boundary 
politics. In the second part, I set this focus on social processes and agents 
in analysing how outcomes are constructed in the practice of boundary 
politics apart from existing theories that emphasise reason or ‘sense’ in social 
reality and fail to account for variations in stances and influence between 
(groups of ) negotiators. In the final part, I operationalise the implications 
of the sociological argument, establishing methodological standards and 
observable markers for the identification of (tacit) commonplaces and 
power relations in practice, and I outline the research design. 
28  With a few noteworthy final exceptions for example with recognising partition in 
Comoros and annexation in the Western Sahara upon decolonisation, they have maintained 
existing boundaries.
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Knowledge in practice: a sociological approach
 “Every established order tends to produce (to very different degrees and 
with very different means) the naturalisation of its own arbitrariness,” 
Bourdieu (1977: 164) holds. Different stances and their impacts on 
behaviour may be unclear or completely hidden for actors. They may be 
particularly difficult to unveil in the hierarchical structures of diplomacy, 
where both international negotiators and representatives of the conflicting 
parties naturally tend to understate dissent. For uncovering how outcomes 
for changing sovereignties are constructed, it is thus necessary to analyse 
the practice of boundary politics – that is, to consider the agents and 
the social processes through which they establish practices in managing 
territorial disputes. For this critical or sociological perspective, I build 
on Pierre Bourdieu (e.g. Bourdieu, 1977; Bourdieu, 1983; Bourdieu, 
1990; Bourdieu, 1991; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992), who in his 
theory of practice developed a method to overcome the opposition 
between objectivism and subjectivism, or between social physics and 
social phenomenology. Bourdieu contends that objective social structures 
influence individuals’ practices by determining constraints and possibilities, 
while subjective representations guide individuals’ personal or collective 
struggles to uphold or improve their position in these social structures 
(Bourdieu, 1977; Wacquant, 2006). Social structures and representations 
are in Bourdieu’s theory thus mutually constituted and corresponding, a 
process out of which arises the “sense of limits, commonly called the sense of 
reality” that Bourdieu (1977: 164) calls doxa. 
Established social groups or orders generate commonplaces. These are 
collective beliefs that are grounded in what actors in the group believe. In 
boundary politics, these commonplaces particularly concern conceptions 
of ‘territory’ and ‘nation’ – that is, the practical relationship between the 
two social facts as a quality of a workable or stable border. Negotiators 
may differ in their stances on the relevant actors, the meaning and 
weight they put on particular problems, and the remedies that they 
consider appropriate. These shared beliefs are often unarticulated; they are 
communicated through practices rather than discourse, securing a social 
group’s functioning by means of synchronisation and orchestration of 
practices (Bourdieu, 1977: 163). They silently communicate to individuals 
that certain stances or behaviours in establishing maps are necessary for 
peace and order. They make it appear ‘natural’ or self-evident to them 
for example not to explore adjustments to existing boundaries for fear of 
unspecified ‘endless discussions’ or ‘an outbreak of violence’. 
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This means that although individuals conceive their actions as determined 
by their conscious strive for specific goals, they reason with reflections 
that are embedded in a stock of already-existent beliefs and conceptions 
of (social) reality that guide their aspirations. People tend to take these 
commonplaces and their corresponding behaviours for granted, which 
means that it is not only unarticulated but also unreflective and seldom 
questioned knowledge. As a consequence, this knowledge and its social 
genesis – that is, the initial disputes or arbitrariness of specific rationales 
– are often forgotten as knowledge (Bigo, 2011: 228). Yet it influences 
what (groups of ) individuals perceive as their goal and what they consider 
needs to be done to achieve them. It reduces the range of options that are 
likely to be considered, affirming prevailing conceptions while obstructing 
individuals’ ability to recognise the occurrence and possibility of change.
This is not to say that individuals do not have agency. People are capable 
of autonomous reflection and action. They can systematically explore 
their collective beliefs and think outside social conventions (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992: 40). Indeed, there is an individual dimension of change 
and uncertainty about the incorporation of different commonplaces (Bigo 
and Madsen, 2011: 221). 
It is also the agents’ actions that shape shared beliefs, I maintain in line with 
Bourdieu. Commonplaces then need to be effectuated in practice and are 
thus highly contextual. Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992: 126) argue that 
actors perceive and appreciate situations on the basis of their individual 
and collective histories, notably their past experiences and past encounters 
with other (groups of ) individuals and comparable social settings. These 
histories bind individuals’ preferences through a system of categories that 
structure reasoning in favour of the experiences’ reproduction (Bourdieu, 
1990: 54). So each individual has a unique set of dispositions depending 
on the resources acquired in one’s current and past positions in society,29 
and their decisions are outcomes of individual struggles engaging these 
different dispositions in a specific social context. Yet negotiators who share 
for example training or occupational backgrounds are likely to share certain 
perceptions of constraints and possibilities exposed in these backgrounds. 
29  Bourdieu divides resources into three principal capitals: economic capital (mainly 
material and financial resources), cultural capital (notably skills and titles), and social 
capital (resources acquired through membership in a social group). Symbolic capital then 
is the honour and recognition that emerges from the conversion of other forms of capital.
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The commonplaces appear as an intellectual system of durable dispositions 
– that is, a “present past” or habitus – that influence present-day perceptions 
and judgements and actions in the (social) world (Bourdieu, 1991: 
131). This knowledge is defined as one’s “practical sense of the game” or 
“practical mastery” and it remains bound up in practices (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992: 117; 120-121). It is aimed at practical functions and 
it can only be identified in its execution and through implicit learning. 
For example, it may inform military representatives to consider boundary 
politics a practice of pacification, while lawyers tend to see it as a violation 
in need of reinforcement of law and diplomats generally consider it a 
negotiation process between conflicting parties in which their aim is to 
reconcile differences. These dispositions may be reflected in elements of 
the mandate for negotiation or in negotiators’ discourses and practices.  
Yet the impact of any system of categories depends on the social context 
in which they are enacted, rendering it contextual rather than universal 
or a-temporal. Specific dispositions have meaning or authority only in 
the complete system of relations in and through which they are enacted, 
which leads Bourdieu (1990) and Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) to 
theorise that particular experiences and their associated representations 
are activated only in similarly structured social settings. Social settings 
tend to be formed as “distinct microcosms endowed with their own 
rules, regularities, and forms of authority” in what Bourdieu calls fields 
(Wacquant, 2006). While the military ‘field’ may be separated from the 
police on issues of security (Bigo, 2006), lawyers and diplomats may have 
their own conventions and practices in the development of human rights 
(Madsen, 2007). 
The social structures of these fields, in which people aim to monopolise 
the authority to define (social) reality, influence individuals’ actions and 
representations from outside (Kauppi, 2003: 780). They establish an 
individual’s “space of possibles” in terms of their stances and actions through 
association of costs and benefits and subsequent potentialities (Bourdieu, 
1983: 313). These systems of categories influence an individual’s thought 
processes and behaviours only when the ‘history incarnate in a system of 
dispositions’ and the ‘history objectified in social structures’ correspond – 
that is, when “the subjective necessity and self-evidence of the common 
sense world are validated by the objective consensus on the sense of the 
world” (Bourdieu, 1977: 167). So individuals can think beyond their 
existing beliefs, and only when a diplomat or the principal drafting his 
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mandate for example recognises a specific process of boundary drawing as 
‘typical’ negotiations similar to the one(s) they have participated in before 
are they likely to build on their personal experience in training and past 
negotiations. They will then rather uncritically do the expected more often 
than chance would predict. 
The power of knowledge in boundary politics 
If shared beliefs are dependent on social context and personal background, 
the crucial question is: what makes certain beliefs influential? In other 
words, how do certain beliefs informing actors about the ‘best’ answer to 
boundary questions become determinative for outcomes in international 
negotiations? The practice of boundary politics as such does not form a 
‘field’ in Bourdieusian terms; international negotiations should rather be 
conceptualised as social spaces where (groups of ) individuals embedded in 
various existing social fields interact for the common purpose of drafting 
a peace agreement after taking up the formal assignment to negotiate a 
territorial arrangement upon sovereignty change – that is, social spaces 
where fields intersect, which have been scantly studied in the theory of 
practice (e.g. Dezalay and Garth, 2002; Vauchez, 2008; Madsen, 2007 and 
Kauppi and Madsen, 2013). Indeed, representatives of various aspects of 
‘the international community’ and ‘the parties to the conflict’ are involved 
in the negotiations, including state leaders and diplomats, legal experts, 
representatives of the armed forces, and bureaucrats. They are embedded 
in relatively heterogeneous fields, which may for example be structured 
around the negotiators’ shared occupations, educational background or 
past institutional engagements, as well as common past assignments or 
placements. 
The international negotiation process then is a context in which the 
commonplaces unifying some and differentiating other actors thrive 
prominently, because they are as negotiators mandated to define ‘practical’ 
solutions in a reality of violence and insecurity. According to Mary Douglas 
(1986: 122), it is particularly in such crisis situations that “behaviour 
depends on what patterns of justice have been internalised, what 
institutions have been legitimated”. Kelman (2007: 88) similarly finds that 
“the micro processes of action and interaction in crisis decision making 
inhibit the exploration of new options”. Negotiators are then reluctant 
to raise questions or propose different approaches or alternative solutions 
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with innovative ideas to manage the problem faced in conflict resolution. 
They rather affirm the correctness and righteousness of the course of action 
that they are familiar with and on which their within-group deliberations 
then naturally converge. In the practice of boundary politics, this means 
that different groups of negotiators have different commonplaces and thus 
present different stances shaped by prevailing conceptions in these social 
groups. They may to varying degrees take it for granted, for example, that 
conflicting parties’ interests are incompatible or that they respond only to 
force. Yet operating under such largely unquestioned assumptions, they 
are equally limited in their perceptions of choices available to them and 
the effectiveness of different strategies. 
Negotiators may then not only differentiate in their stances on the 
negotiation process and its policy outcome, but also in the resources that 
they are able to mobilise – that is, both learned and political resources – to 
strengthen their ability to enact their stances and import them into the 
negotiated outcome. 
In line with Kauppi and Erkkilä’s (2011) findings related to the social 
space of higher education and on the basis of Bourdieu’s (1983) and Bigo’s 
(2006) accounts of encounters between actors of different fields, I theorise 
that the interactions between (groups of ) negotiators in the social spaces of 
boundary politics are characterised by struggles for authority. Power in the 
practice of boundary politics is not simply a capability, something that one 
owns on the basis of material or non-material capabilities, as the realists 
such as Waltz (1979) or neoliberal institutionalists like Keohane and Nye 
(1977) would argue. Power distributions can thus not be retrieved from 
the allocation of capabilities in terms of military hardware or economic 
resources or cultural role-modelling, which would assume that capabilities 
are a proxy for power. 
But from a Bourdieusian perspective, power is also not purely relational 
or contextual and thus completely dependent on the specific relationships 
in which it is shaped, as constructivists such as Guzzini (1993; 2005) 
have argued. Conceiving power as relational rather than possessive, 
ideational rather than material and intersubjective, constructivists 
tend to pay insufficient attention to resources. Although they do much 
to problematise the focus on capabilities in terms of the variety of 
potential power relations, both Baldwin (1989) and Barnett and Duvall 
(2005) provide little empirical guidance on the resources of power. But 
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these objective resources may be influential in the practice of boundary 
politics. While international diplomats may be importantly armed with 
experience in similar negotiations, international laws determining a need 
for international recognition to change sovereignties contribute to biasing 
the landscape in their favour in negotiations with local parties. 
I argue that power in the practice of boundary politics is socially produced 
on the basis of the distribution and social recognition of specific resources, 
some of which are determined at the micro level of the negotiation process. 
Hence power, or the relative influence over policy outcomes, is derived 
from one’s position in the negotiation team and process. Being both 
generators and interpreters of knowledge and relations, negotiators develop 
(conceptions of ) power resources that are specific to their interaction setting 
(Lewis, 2010: 210; Bourdieu, 1991: 19-20). With other International 
Relations scholars in practice theory (e.g. Kauppi, 2003; 2010; Bigo, 2005; 
2006; 2011; Kauppi and Erkkilä, 2011; Madsen, 2007; 2011), I argue 
that authority in the practice of boundary politics results from negotiation 
of competence or legitimacy in the capacity to classify and prioritise issues. 
This negotiation concerns the social recognition of ‘authority’ or mastery 
in the practice that determines “human accomplishment” in the context 
of the international negotiation process (Bourdieu, 1983: 322) – that is, a 
(group of ) negotiators’ monopoly of the legitimate knowledge and skills 
required to draw boundaries. 
Authority develops in negotiators’ interactions in practice on the basis of 
the power relations between represented fields or institutions. International 
negotiation processes are embedded in institutional hierarchies; negotiators 
are constrained by the institutions they represent on the one hand, having 
limited autonomy under a mandate and mechanisms of control such as 
selection and monitoring, and by their institutions’ positions in practice 
one the other hand. They enter a process as representatives of a professional 
field either dominating or dominated by others. In their encounters with 
negotiators from different fields, negotiators will make strategic moves to 
maintain or improve their position; they will tend to autonomise specific 
discussions and reinforce the credibility of their assertions in it by forming 
professional alliances of various degrees of formality and claiming to 
possess exclusive professional knowledge (Bourdieu, 1983; Bigo, 2006: 
8-10). 
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Once they are recognised by others as competent in these specific 
discussions, the (groups of ) negotiators occupying central positions gain 
access to the social and political resources that enable them to determine 
elements of the draft peace agreements (Kauppi, 2003: 782-783). They 
may for example be permitted to interpret and prioritise the ‘facts’ on the 
ground or determine who is appointed for negotiation or permitted to speak 
at the negotiation table. In fact, these negotiators’ mere saying something 
or handling things a certain way can already make the persuasive claim 
that ‘this is how things are’ and ‘this is how things need to be interpreted’, 
making it appear necessary and/or legitimate to other negotiators as well 
as their principals. 
Yet the recognition of competence in specific discussions is not only 
dependent on social relations; it is grounded in a negotiator’s access to 
resources, whether the value of these resources is established at the micro 
level of the negotiation process or originates socially and/or historically 
from outside this specific context (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 101; 
118; Adler-Nissen and Pouliot, 2014: 6). In the practice of boundary 
politics, notably a negotiation team’s access to information about the 
conflict situation on the ground and in-house expertise in diplomatic or 
legal or military issues may create opportunities for (groups of ) individuals 
to claim authority over specific issues. Having exclusive knowledge of 
territorial planning or privileged interaction with representatives of the 
conflicting parties on (territorial) demands, for instance, may position one 
favourably for gaining significant influence in discussions on territorial 
delimitations. National legal training may similarly facilitate a negotiator’s 
authority in deliberations on constitutional arrangements. These 
(predominantly bureaucratic) resources are structurally derived, yet they 
need to be played out in practice for them to contribute to one’s influence 
– that is, (groups of ) negotiators need to actually position themselves in 
charge of maps or constitutional texts within the negotiation team. 
For others, it becomes increasingly difficult to question the stances of 
those (groups of ) negotiators that gained authority as their decisions in 
the negotiation process reproduce and legitimise their values and the 
practices that go with them. Eventually, this may lead other negotiators 
and their principals to adopt elements of their reality in order to ensure 
inclusion into the discussions, which means in practice that they reproduce 
commonplaces even if they do not subscribe to the prevailing stances 
(Kauppi and Erkkilä, 2011: 315). So while negotiators may differ on the 
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negotiated settlement, they may develop agreement on the relevant parties 
to negotiate, the weight of ethnicity or history or politics in the conflict 
and its reconcilability. As such, the dominant (groups of ) negotiators wield 
influence over the outlook of the maps annexed to the peace agreement. 
They gain position to formulate answers to boundary questions that are 
acceptable to representatives in the negotiation process. They thus gain 
power without apparent need of coercion, being able to “produc[e], in and 
through social relations, effects that shape the capacities of other players in 
the game to determine their circumstances and fate” (Barnett and Duvall, 
2005: 42). Their recognised competence is rather shaped by negotiators’ 
(past) social and political struggles over particular stakes or interests or, 
ultimately, over being able to define ‘the truth’. 
Looking at social processes in the practice of boundary politics hence 
implies not asking why states or their representatives comply with 
boundary maintenance as the commonly associated practice with the uti 
possidetis principle, developing varying territorial arrangements to capture 
complex social realities, but how these practices have become the dominant 
response to territorial questions raised upon sovereignty changes among 
actors. The focus on agents in these social processes then means that we 
should not ask what makes a stable border but rather how ‘territorial 
stability’ defined and managed in line with the uti possidetis principle has 
become an established practice in boundary politics. What made that the 
dominant negotiators conceived adherence to the principle as the most 
practical or possible response to border questions? And importantly, what 
were different actors’ criteria or conditions for a ‘practical’ or ‘possible’ 
response? Such discourses and practices that are superficially similar can 
capture different commonplaces (Bourdieu, 1991: 22-23). A sociological 
turn in theorisation directs questions to the formation and enactment of 
these commonplaces and doxic beliefs that (groups of ) people involved in 
boundary diplomacy discuss or act with but not about.
Boundary politics and international negotiation: theories and 
contributions
Compliance by coercion
Focusing scholarly attention on reason or ‘sense’ in social reality, theoretical 
contributions have been made by rationalists and constructivists to 
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explain how outcomes are constructed in boundary politics for changing 
sovereignties. Some scholars (e.g. Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2001) theorise 
that compliance with principles such as uti possidetis in international 
politics is primarily driven by powerful states’ rule-enforcement. A basic 
premise of realist arguments is that “rulers, […] usually but not always 
the executive head of state” make choices about policies and institutions 
(Krasner, 1999: 7). Focusing on the distribution of material capabilities, 
most notably measured in terms of military hardware, realists then deem 
that representatives of the powerful states able to change the behaviour of 
weaker actors by means of tacit or explicit coercion. Facing their powerful 
peers, the weaker actors generally comply for fear of punishment upon 
non-compliance. 
Whether existing boundaries are maintained in international diplomacy 
hence depends on the decisions of the heads of state of the materially 
capable states. Indeed, Castellino and Allen (2003) and Davidson (1992) 
find the origins of compliance with the uti possidetis principle in the 
influence of cooperation with and between representatives of superpowers. 
Specifically, they argue that the (ex-)colonial powers steered post-colonial 
politics towards boundary maintenance – a role that has been fulfilled 
more generally by representatives of some (Western) great powers in the 
post-colonial area, according to Castellino and Allen (2003) and Coggins 
(2011). Their powerful positions in the international arena, both in relation 
to other states that were asked to recognise the new states’ independence 
and in relation to the states undergoing the sovereignty change, then 
enabled them to enforce their subscription to upholding existing maps. 
In agreement with this realist reasoning, they find that representatives of 
powerful states uphold the principle of boundary maintenance only when 
they consider it in their interest to preserve the existing system of sovereign 
states by “projecting the nuances of sovereignty onto the forthcoming 
entity, thereby legitimising the entity itself as well as validating further 
the system of sovereign states” (Castellino and Allen, 2003: 9). State 
representatives as such protect the notion of the sovereign territorial state 
over its alternatives, considering widespread or frequent adjustments 
of borders not in their interest, while simultaneously legitimising past 
struggles for control over territory such as in the colonial states’ ‘Scramble 
for Africa’ or the intrastate land swaps in the federal Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavian state. 
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Indeed, presupposing that states are unitary actors whose representatives 
are rationally motivated to “at a minimum, seek their own preservation 
and at a maximum drive for universal domination” in an anarchical 
international environment (Waltz, 1979: 118; Krasner, 1999: 7), structural 
realists do not consider representatives of materially capable states bound 
to international principles or norms of behaviour. Krasner (1999) notably 
finds that powerful actors on the international stage routinely compromise 
fundamental rules of sovereignty such as domestic autonomy when they 
hold it in their interest to do so. As such, realist scholars presume that 
while the practice of boundary maintenance in line with the uti possidetis 
principle is upheld in some cases to ensure preservation of the international 
system, it is abandoned whenever it suits the (national) interest of the 
powerful.
This realist theory is insightful in its identification of power structures 
between states, shaping relations between state representatives involved 
in the practice of boundary politics. Representatives of materially capable 
states and international organisations indeed tend to take the lead in 
this practice. Their very presence and initial position in international 
negotiations is largely based in the hierarchy of their represented institutions, 
enabling the powerful to influence the structure of negotiations. But 
assuming the representatives of materially capable states to flout principles 
whenever they consider it in their interest to do so, structural realists fail to 
explain the widespread adherence to the practices associated with the uti 
possidetis principle. Decolonisation practices throughout reveal a prevalent 
maintenance of boundaries and no state has been created in violation of the 
principle’s prescriptions since the independence of Comoros from France 
in 1975. Since the 1986 judgment of the International Court of Justice on 
the border between Mali and Burkina Faso, not even international borders 
that were drawn upon military conflict have been redrawn in violation of 
the international principle. 
The alignment of practices contradicts Krasner’s (1999) findings and 
suggests that the rules of powerful states do not always define practices 
on the basis of their national interest in boundary politics. Indeed, realists 
pay little attention to the multifaceted nature of power and thus do not 
account for the influence of local actors and military officers on outcomes 
in boundary politics. In international negotiations of territorial disputes, 
a process that can only succeed with the agreement of those who have 
to maintain the peace, such influence is inevitable in the negotiators’ 
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consideration of war demands. This bottom-up power relation indicates 
that it is not always the representatives of the materially capable that 
determine how to manage the implications of sovereignty change. And 
even in teams of representatives from a single institution, negotiators do 
not necessarily cohere around a common understanding of their stakes in 
the negotiation process. Stances may be dominated by a clear (and perhaps 
mandated) national interest in the location of the border for example 
when it distributes access to valuable material and/or symbolic resources. 
But when interests are more broadly defined in terms of restoration of 
peace, (groups of ) negotiators with different social backgrounds may have 
different understandings of their ‘national interest’. While some may find 
it in their interest to maintain the existing system of sovereign states, others 
may consider it their interest not to get (militarily) involved in a dispute.
Compliance for interest
Neoliberal institutionalists try to explain the normalisation of boundary 
maintenance by emphasising the rationality of coordination on the 
practice for states’ representatives. These scholars (e.g. Keohane, 1984; 
Nye, 1990) reason that individuals uphold international rules if they 
perceive compliance as promoting their interest, rendering it powerful 
actors’ task to convince others of self-constraint by structuring their 
incentives in favour of compliance. The latter can be effectuated through 
an actors’ use of material capabilities, which includes both asymmetries 
in military and economic relations, and non-material capabilities such as 
culture and ideology (Nye, 1990; Nye, 2004). Indeed, Simmons (2005) 
and Carter and Goemans (2011; 2013) hold that everyone shares an 
interest in settled boundary agreements, with both territorial disputes and 
disruption of economic and social life emerging in areas with unsettled 
borders as a consequence of jurisdictional and policy uncertainty. Carter 
and Goemans (2011: 282) specifically argue that international borders 
drawn in line with the uti possidetis principle “coordinate the expectations 
and behaviour of both international and domestic actors” and are thus 
produce joint gains, rendering it preferable to territorial alternatives for all 
actors involved in boundary politics.
According to these neoliberal institutionalists, international and local 
actors subscribe to the uti possidetis principle despite any conflicting 
preferences over the precise location of the boundary because they 
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deem it a simple and clear rule that minimises uncertainty and reduces 
transaction costs (Zacher, 2001; Carter and Goemans, 2011; Prorok and 
Huth, forthcoming). They are incited to coordinate on existing borders as 
familiar focal points for determining a new international border’s location. 
Aiming to minimise the risk of costly (re-)escalation of territorial disputes, 
actors in boundary politics commonly recognise that the alternative of 
delineating an original border in a mixed-motive situation that divides 
actors over the zero-sum question of territorial control is an outcome to be 
avoided at all cost (Carter and Goemans, 2011).
The uti possidetis principle as well serves as an institution that facilitates 
agreement in failure to find on an alternative. For many neoliberal 
institutionalists such as Herbst (1989; 2000), indeed, boundary 
maintenance was a simple and rational response by both the colonialists 
and the weak local leaders in the case of Africa’s decolonisation. In light 
of the constraints imposed by the demographic and ethnographic and 
topographic structure of the continent, they deem that “[a]nother rule, 
such as one based on self-determination, would have been immensely 
complicated” (Herbst, 1989: 688). Hence neoliberal institutionalist 
scholars presume coordination in stances and practices on boundary 
maintenance among actors, who wish to uphold existing borders to 
prevent future conflict. 
Theorisation along this neoliberal institutionalist line provides useful 
insights into the reflective considerations behind actors’ decision to 
uphold the uti possidetis principle. Contemporarily, negotiators indeed 
advocate boundary maintenance in line with the principle’s prescriptions 
and they tend to aim at reducing the risk of (re-)escalation of disputes. 
But just like realist theorisation, it assumes rationality to be exogenous 
and hence cannot provide a satisfactory explanation for the fact that actors 
do not coordinate on this ‘rational’ cost-benefit analysis for adherence to 
the uti possidetis principle. In fact, practices and discourses in boundary 
politics have varied significantly throughout history. They shifted from 
an emphasis on territorial stability in Latin America in the 1820s to a 
focus on populations in post-World War I Europe. Only in the 1960s was 
the practice of boundary maintenance reinstated. Neoliberal theorisation 
overlooks these variations in practices of boundary politics; it is essentially 
based on a fixed representation of the truth – that is, a single rationalisation 
of boundary maintenance as an institution coordinating expectations and 
behaviours across time and space. 
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Even if such rationalisation existed as a lowest common denominator 
in weakness, the neoliberal institutionalist theory does not account for 
decisions to maintain boundaries where alternatives were made available 
by powerful actors, nor for adherence to the uti possidetis principle after 
detailed and laborious map-making procedures, like in the cases of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Kosovo. These efforts would be inconsequential in 
neoliberal institutionalism. But in practice, not only adherence to the 
uti possidetis principle, but also the existing borders do often not serve as 
focal points that reduce uncertainty and prevent escalation of territorial 
disputes. In many post-colonial states in particular, the precise location 
of the existing boundaries was unclear and remained contested after 
decolonisation.
Compliance for legitimacy
The constructivists avoid the critiques raised against the realist and neoliberal 
institutionalist theories by noting the significance of ideational factors 
such as beliefs, norms, values and culture. Wendt (1999) differentiates 
relationships with friends, rivals and enemies, and the social logics of 
belief, calculation and coercion. Many mainstream constructivists follow 
Wendt’s (1999) lead, considering sovereignty to be socially constructed, 
albeit largely within the traditionalist state-centric framing. For example, 
Strang (1991) argues that state actors confer degrees of international 
legitimacy on other (aspiring) state actors and their demands for territorial 
change, designating some of them as ‘in-group’ while others are in the 
‘out-group’. This distinction signifies different rules of behaviour. While 
Westerners actively delegitimised national self-determination in early 
history, a positivist analysis supplanted the idea of natural law in the early 
nineteenth century, giving nations an opportunity to gain recognition in 
statehood (Strang, 1996: 32).
The argument that only aspiring state actors who accept the existing 
boundaries are likely to gain recognition of statehood is consistent with 
the observation that the practice of boundary maintenance has gained 
prevalence since the end of the Second World War, with no new borders 
having been drawn since Comoros became independent with the island 
Mayotte remaining under French control in 1975. Yet not all diplomatic 
actors involved in boundary politics accept territorial stability, whether 
through the logic of appropriateness where actors internalise norms that 
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constitute identities and interests (e.g. Finnemore, 1996; Katzenstein, 
1996) or the Habermasian logic of arguing by which actors are convinced 
of the truth of a factual or the normative validity of a moral (e.g. Reus-
Smit, 1999; Risse, 2000; Bjola, 2005). This appears from the continuation 
of violence to change boundaries after adherence to the uti possidetis 
principle for example in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. Indeed, 
President Slobodan Milošević of the republic of Serbia did not accept the 
republican boundaries in the Yugoslav federation while ethnic Serbs in 
North Kosovo fight to be in the Republic of Serbia.   
English School theorists share the societal approach with constructivists. 
Just like for example Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986) and Ruggie (1993), 
they emphasise the development of international norms. Scholars such 
as Bull (1977; 1984), Mayall (2000) and Wheeler (2000) claim that 
international relations are rule-governed and that these rules help to 
maintain international order. They accept that there are variable forms 
of life under anarchy and find actors motivated to comply with rules in 
international politics by a sense of moral obligation – that is, a socially 
constructed and internalised sense of approval or appropriateness of a 
rule that is shared in the ‘international society of states’. Jackson (1990), 
Jackson and Rosberg (1982), Fabry (2005) and Seymour (2008) argue 
along this line that boundary maintenance is an established norm in 
international politics, defining both legitimate membership and rightful 
behaviour within a more general framework of mutual recognition and 
legal equality. In line with the logic of raison de système, this arrangement 
for assignment of property rights has become a referent object for security 
(Bull, 1977: 4-5). It generates and is generated by a common culture 
involving (aspiring) state leaders in the maintenance of the elite’s rules for 
the conduct of relations (Buzan, 1993: 347). Jackson (1990) indeed finds 
that in the 1960s, African leaders consolidated their power within existing 
boundaries as the only practical basis for recognised statehood. 
This theory provides interesting insights into the importance of 
conceptions of legitimacy and processes behind norm development. It 
modifies the realist emphasis on power politics and international anarchy 
and hence recognises a potential for principled behaviour. But boundary 
maintenance is not a “consent common rule,” as theorised by Bull and 
Watson (1984: 1), which appears from decisions to accommodate the 
complex social realities of overlapping territorial claims in cases like Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. Even just within the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
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in the early 1990s, state diplomat Peter van Walsum and representatives 
of the Eastern European Division disagreed with the minister’s official 
policy for boundary maintenance in support of a revision. Like realists 
and the neoliberal institutionalists, mainstream constructivists and 
English School theorists emphasise structure rather than agency. Variation 
and changes in negotiators’ stances indicates however that actors are not 
interchangeable. Their preferences are not determined by a collective 
(perceived) rationality or ‘sense’ of the policy of boundary maintenance in 
the post-1945 era; individual or inter-group lines of division rather appear 
in the practice of boundary politics. Mapping these divisions between 
actors and understanding their distinctions hence requires attention 
for the negotiation processes in which these actors discuss and establish 
boundary policies – that is, for the social spaces where boundary politics 
are played out.
Compliance in practice
Many scholars have highlighted these social spaces in studies of the intricacies 
of international negotiation processes in which parties seek assistance or 
accept help to settle their (territorial) conflict, and they emphasise the 
position of actors in the process. They have identified various negotiator 
characteristics of power and (self )interest as prerequisites for successful 
mediation. For example, for a mediator are important his impartiality (e.g. 
Northedge and Donelan, 1971; Smith and Stam, 2003; Maoz and Terris, 
2006; Rauchhaus, 2006) – or, to the contrary, his bias towards a negotiating 
party that can facilitate communication or coercion in the mediator’s 
interest (e.g. Touval, 1982; Kydd, 2003) – and his leverage through military 
power (e.g. Walter, 1997; Frazier and Dixon, 2006) or through the ability 
to provide material incentives or information or expertise or status (e.g. 
Touval and Zartman, 1985; Kleiboer, 2002; Carnevale, 2002; Svensson, 
2007). For representatives of the conflicting parties, whose characteristics 
are commonly treated as contextual factors in international negotiation 
studies, similarly their internal cohesiveness or representation of a single 
constituency (e.g. Assefa, 1987) and their relative power status, including 
their ability to attract international support, – whether their power parity 
is small to incite mutual concessions (e.g. Ott, 1972; Young, 1967; Rubin 
and Brown, 1975; Zartman and Bergman, 1982) or unambiguously large 
to motivate settlement (e.g. Deutsch, 1973) – are important. 
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Analysis of a negotiator’s positions with these characteristics of power 
and (self )interest however relies largely on an assessment of the static 
attributes of represented parties, with certain negotiation behaviours being 
assumed available only to some state representatives. Scholars assume that 
the negotiator is a direct and rational representation of his (sub)state 
and its material capabilities, discarding agency and thus the negotiator’s 
strategies in effectuating their attributes in practice. This theoretical blind 
spot has been covered by scholars who emphasise behavioural factors. 
Kressel (1972) and Touval and Zartman (1985), for example, denote that 
mediators can adopt various behaviours and corresponding strategies in 
the process towards a peace settlement, ranging from passive reflective-
communication to more interventionist directive-manipulation. Based 
often on findings in early prescriptive studies and studies of mediation at 
social levels other than the international, then, scholars generally assume 
that the negotiators representing the conflicting parties can to varying 
degrees bargain and commit in the negotiation process (e.g. Zartman and 
Berman, 1982; Fearon, 1995; Powell, 1999; Druckmann, 1993; 1994), 
influencing also the behaviours of third party negotiators who can use 
intelligence, knowledge and diplomatic skill to manage these behaviours 
(e.g. Wehr, 1979; Bercovitch, 1984; 2007).
These scholars acknowledge that a negotiator’s strategy and tactics may 
impact his ability to influence the negotiation outcome. Yet they focus 
exclusively on collective behaviours. As such, they still do not offer an 
explanation for different preferences about negotiation strategies and 
outcomes between (groups of ) negotiators within a delegation. Variations 
in actors’ preferences across time and space indicate that no collectives like 
‘the West’ or ‘the Americans’ or even ‘the mediators’ or ‘the disputant’ exist 
in the practice of boundary politics. In fact, by assuming negotiators to be 
rational actors that act according to calculations of costs and (prospective) 
benefits of certain actions and by defining the outcome of negotiations 
simply in terms of success and failure, these scholars in international 
mediation studies do not at all consider negotiator stances on the outlook 
of the peace settlement. 
This theoretical shortcoming is addressed by scholars such as Salacuse 
(1998), Faure and Sjostedt (1993), who bring in negotiators’ stances by 
theorising that a negotiator’s cultural background influences him in the 
negotiation process. Salacuse (1998: 222-223) identified that an actor’s 
negotiation goals, attitudes towards the negotiation process and type 
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of agreement, and negotiation style may be influenced by his “socially 
transmitted behaviour patterns, norms, beliefs and values” while Kelman 
(2007: 65-66) highlights the impact of (collective) fears on behaviours. As 
such, they debunk the notion that negotiators are purely rational actors. 
This contribution is supported in the works of several critical scholars 
on international diplomacy and conflict management. While Fetherston 
and Nordstrom (1995), Duffey (2000) and Banai (2013) highlight the 
effect of individuals’ (cultural) background and worldviews on their 
everyday practice, Cohen (2010) and Neumann (2002; 2005; 2007) 
note the importance of collective dispositions among those who share an 
occupation such as diplomacy. Yet in looking at negotiators’ stances, these 
scholars do not provide an understanding of where the power to shape 
outcomes lies. As such, they cannot account for the influence of particular 
stances in studying the intricacies of international negotiation processes. 
Understanding these differentiations in actors’ stance-taking and their 
influence on the shape and content of the negotiated settlement in the 
practice of boundary politics requires emphasis on both actors and social 
processes involved in the process of negotiating territorial conflicts. In 
the principal-agent approach, scholars such as Elsig (2011), Hawkins et 
al. (2006) and Pollack (2003; 2007) develop an understanding of the 
interaction between principal heads of state and foreign ministers designing 
a mandate and agents implementing it in the negotiations. They find that 
principals delegate authority, tailoring the discretion of their agents by 
demand for credible commitment and policy-relevant information and by 
limitation of discrepancy between preferences, and that agents move within 
the bounds of their mandate to maintain and improve their positions 
(Elsig and Pollack, 2012: 2). Their insights are meaningful in the practice 
of boundary politics, where outcomes are shaped by actor preferences 
and struggles for recognition, yet these scholars do not elaborate on the 
development of stances and interactions in practice – that is, they do not 
provide how negotiators formulate preferences and move both in vertical 
and horizontal relations between professional fields to establish themselves 
as authorities on the negotiated outcome. 
Attention to capital and the collision of fields in practice is necessary to 
understand the processes behind dynamics such as ‘agent slack’, where 
agents act independently undesired by their principals. Hawkins et al. 
(2006: 8) theorise that slacking occurs when agents minimise their efforts 
or shift policy away from their principals’ desired outcomes and towards 
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their own preferences, but they do not provide how these agency losses 
develop. They leave the concepts of ‘shirking’ and ‘slippage’ politically 
empty. Principals will seek to reduce agent slack by selecting agents with 
preferences mirroring their own (Hawkins et al., 2006: 28). But particularly 
in circumstances of uncertainty about outcomes like in boundary politics, 
negotiators are open to influences from context or (groups of ) negotiators 
with different social backgrounds. They may in practice establish 
preferences in discord with their principals and strengthen their position 
through interactions within and across fields, specialising to the point 
where they influence the decisions of their principals rather than the other 
way around.
Genealogical and detailed sociological work put the actors and social 
processes at the forefront of the analysis, highlighting the (social) origins 
of outcomes in practice. These methods direct scholarly focus from actors’ 
reflective cognition and instrumental calculations to the (tacit) logics and 
assumptions that underlie individuals’ rationalisations, considering the 
power-laden interactions between actors to determine their influence in 
practice. As such, they are useful to identify and explain the variations 
in negotiators’ stances and their influence on outcomes in the practice of 
boundary politics.
Practicing the theory of practice: methodological issues
Discovering (tacit) commonplaces
In order to determine what shapes how people think, I follow the structural 
constructivist method inspired by Pierre Bourdieu (1983; 1991). Scholars 
working in this tradition in the field of international relations claim 
that knowledge is socially constructed in space and in time, with both 
competitors and trajectories, and that reality is hence constructed and 
embedded in its social context (Bigo, 2005; 2006; 2011; Madsen, 2007; 
2011; Kauppi, 2003; 2010; Kauppi and Erkkilä, 2011). The question of 
boundary delimitation upon sovereignty change is indeed hardly settled, 
particularly when conflicting parties’ demands for territorial change 
continue after concluding a territorial arrangement like in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Kosovo after Yugoslavia’s dissolution and in places such 
as South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. In fact, concepts such as ‘territory’ and ‘nation’ or even ‘boundary’ 
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are not value-neutral but contested, prevailing practices are challenged, and 
labels like ‘aggression’ or ‘nationalism’ are used to frame competing social 
realities. These discussions are not only important in themselves; they are 
a fundamental part of the object of study in a Bourdieusian sociology 
of boundary politics (Madsen, 2011: 261). Navigating the different and 
competing discourses and practices in international negotiations calls for 
reflexivity – that is, for the researcher to objectivise the discourses and 
practices in boundary politics and to avoid being influenced by one’s own 
categorisations (Bourdieu, 1991). 
A reflexive approach first requires an objectivation of the object of study. 
Bourdieu (1991: 34) describes that there is no distinction between a ‘real’ 
world and the actors’ perception and representation hereof in practice. 
The object of study is hence pre-constructed by perception. Its meaning 
is historically constructed and part of a continuous dialogue between 
knowledge and reality, while it has meaning only within the complete 
system of relations in and through which it is enacted (Bourdieu, 1991: 
17; 21). Generalisations and predictive theories of a social action are thus 
impossible. The methodology for constructing the practice of boundary 
politics as object of study rather implies analysing social meanings, which 
are expressed in and through practice, as outcomes of 1) the temporal and 
2) the situational conditions of particular negotiations. The significance 
of history, for one, centralises the trajectories of specific practices or 
discourses such as the concept of the uti possidetis principle or boundary 
maintenance. Commonplaces in the practice of boundary politics often 
remain unspoken and reflexivity by the actors themselves is thus prevented 
(Bourdieu, 1983: 164). Yet their truth comes out in crises for being 
confronted with competing practices or discourses (Bourdieu, 1977: 168-
169; Bourdieu, 1983: 336-338). Therefore, understanding the courses of 
action demands an assessment of the social history. According to Bigo 
(2011: 237), such a genealogy necessarily starts with the moment of the 
making of a practice and highlights transformations that progressively led 
to the contemporary constitution of commonplaces. 
Doing justice to the situational conditions of particular practices, then, 
requires detailed research in very precise locations to identify the actors and 
interactions that produce a (social) reality (Bigo, 2011: 233). This means 
analysing practices and their associated commonplaces not as freestanding 
but as produced within the structures of international negotiations, which 
are influenced by a range of macro- and micro-level social forces. Such an 
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in-depth sociological analysis of the social space in which boundary politics 
are played out necessarily emphasises how international negotiators and 
representatives of conflicting parties position themselves in the context of 
the negotiation teams and the broader negotiation process, and how they 
employ competitive discourses to define and/or transform the definition 
of reality and thus to influence the content of the negotiated outcome 
(Madsen, 2011: 266). It involves the identification of a discourse or 
practice’s deployment in specific situations, the limited repertories that 
their associated social universes constitute, and the strategies by means 
of which they are legitimised (Bigo, 2011: 228; Bourdieu, 1983: 317). 
One needs to describe the social relations between negotiators as derived 
from practice and how forms of collaboration and competition affect 
the approach to boundaries. So any attempt at a structural constructivist 
analysis of boundary politics implies engagement with the constructed 
visions and divisions in its practice in order to ‘objectify’ them and 
determine the conditions that made the development of a particular 
practice possible. 
Second, reflexivity requires objectivation of the researcher. In order to 
construct a scientifically more autonomous object of study, objectivation 
is not limited to the object itself but also means that oneself needs to 
maintain analytical distance to existing discourses (Bourdieu, 1991: 35-
38). Because of their long and particular histories, as well as their different 
usages and effects in different social contexts, practices in boundary 
politics are marked by some widespread assumptions – that is, structures 
inscribed into negotiators that tacitly project (usually hidden) interests 
into their practices (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). In order to open the 
‘black box’ of boundary politics, one needs to objectivise these stakes and 
interests by overstepping existing discourses and doxic lines of thought 
and not reproduce them in academic descriptions of the practice. Bigo 
(2011: 237) holds that this requires that one does not define a priori the 
resources and stakes that are the most important for actors; these “only 
exist if they are recognised as such” and “they may be important in one field 
and depreciated in another”. Rather, structural constructivism demands 
an inductive and exploratory approach that accentuates conceptual or 
normative controversies over the resources and stakes. These controversies 
are critical elements in the dynamics of boundary politics. They are both 
outcomes of struggles over the production and legitimation of particular 
practices and “empirical evidence of the – only relative – structural stability 
of the area” (Madsen, 2011: 266-268). 
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A Bourdieusian approach to the practice of boundary politics hence 
requires an open and objective tracing of the object and how it was defined 
over time and space by the competing inputs of negotiators. These two 
interrelated methodological pillars together allow an understanding of 
both subjective knowledge – that is, the meanings that actors assign to their 
reality – and objectified knowledge that is gained from contextualising 
and historicising a situation. It implies that the analysis of the practice 
of boundary politics requires a continuous moving between practical, 
contextualised and historicised knowledge. The analysis then enables an 
objectification of the perceived realities by international negotiators and 
representatives of conflicting parties through interpretation of agents and 
historicisation of social processes. 
Recognising struggles for authority in practice
In order to establish the influence of particular shared opinions and seldom 
questioned beliefs in the social spaces of international negotiations, I follow 
the methodology as developed by Pierre Bourdieu (1983) and advanced by 
Bigo (2006) and Madsen (2007) to describe encounters between actors of 
different fields and elaborated upon by Kauppi and Erkkilä (2011) to analyse 
the social space of higher education. Bourdieu (1983) bases his structural 
constructivist method on the epistemological claim that ‘authority’ is a 
contextually dependent and socially constructed quality. Encounters 
between people of different fields are thus characterised by a constant 
struggle between actors who compete for it, seeking to secure the influence 
of their conception of reality on practices. In analysing this competition 
between agents involved in boundary politics, it is necessary to identify 
negotiators’ main interests and stakes and to examine their interactions as 
strategies of (re)definition – that is, to assess the negotiators’ enactment of 
power or influence in playing the game of international diplomacy, and 
not just to describe the rules of diplomacy or the distribution of tokens 
among its players.
The struggle entails (a group of ) individuals positioning themselves as an 
authority in a particular discussion, which is notably the discussion on the 
outlook of the maps annexed to the peace agreement in the practice of 
boundary politics. They can establish their relevant expertise by framing 
matters in certain ways or by taking initiative and producing effects. This 
initial positioning may be conscious (e.g. Madsen, 2007) or unconscious 
and the result of actors’ practical sense of the necessary and the possible 
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(e.g. Kauppi and Erkkilä, 2011). In both instances, however, it creates 
durable effects on the structuration of subsequent practices in negotiations 
because it determines how one is viewed by other negotiators. These may 
challenge the social hierarchy through political and/or social struggles in 
order to influence the negotiated outcome in accordance with their own 
conception of the (social) reality in the conflict area. They can use the 
material and symbolic resources at their disposal to compete for influence 
by accepting the criteria of judgement but contesting their own or others’ 
position on this basis (e.g. Kauppi and Erkkilä, 2011; Bigo, 2006), or 
they may contest these criteria altogether (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 
1992: 101-102). The latter strategy is used for example in struggles to 
redefine the meaning and value of artwork in Bourdieu’s (1983) study 
of cultural production. Such strategies are then countered by negotiators 
who support the established practice. They generally act to preserve the 
status quo representation of (social) reality and as such ensure continuation 
of their influence over the negotiated outcome. 
Authority is then effectuated through non-coercive influence over 
outcomes in the negotiations, which can be observed in practice in 
“vocations, aspirations and expectations” (Bourdieu, 1983: 344). 
Negotiators must actively deploy their expertise on particular issues as 
a resource, authoritatively prioritising their beliefs and practices over 
others in order to produce effects. Bourdieu (1983: 313; 325) contends 
that this often includes delegitimising alternatives by excluding them, 
making parodies of them, and by building alliances between like-minded 
that produce credible substitutes for these alternatives. These are repeated 
in practices to confirm their emancipation. Ultimately, these strategies 
of confirming authority may result in the autonomisation of particular 
commonplaces, rendering them self-evident to an increasing number 
of negotiators. Once such a consensus over the major characteristics of 
reality is achieved, it becomes difficult to question this reality and its social 
structures of domination. Challenges to the prevailing commonplaces 
are hence increasingly uncommon and even the most radical critiques 
of prevailing practices to some extent (and usually unintentionally) 
reproduce the consensus that it disputes (Kauppi and Erkkilä, 2011: 315). 
The commonplaces then simply constitute ‘the way things are’. So in their 
competition for mastery in practice, negotiators may reproduce certain 
structures of domination and power relations, while continuing to fight 
over other aspects. 
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Research design
A study of practice
Bourdieu’s theory of practice requires doing justice to the social construction 
of realities in time and in space. To address the temporal element, this 
sociological study starts with a genealogy of discourses and practices in 
boundary politics that aims to shed light on the trajectories behind how 
outcomes are constructed in boundary politics for changing sovereignties. 
This genealogy necessarily begins with the first change of an international 
border, which is early upon the foundation of the nation-state in the 
nineteenth century when the Latin American states gained independence 
from Spain and Portugal. It then highlights the moments at which either 
discourses or practices in boundary politics transformed in order to mark 
the differences and trace the construction of the contemporary associations 
with the uti possidetis principle. 
To observe the situational conditions of how outcomes are arrived at 
then requires in-depth analysis of negotiations in boundary politics that 
identifies the actors and interaction processes that produce an outcome. 
The aim in this analysis is to build new theoretical insights on the basis 
of an original application of Bourdieu’s theory of practice. Existing 
explanations have proven unsatisfactory. The literature on the theory of 
practice provides a grid to detect systematic patterns in empirical material, 
but it requires in inductive study to formulate concrete hypotheses about 
how diplomatic actors involved manage the implications of changes in 
state sovereignty for international borders. For this purpose, I analyse in-
depth international negotiations in which the territorial arrangement was 
a fundamental subject of discussions between negotiators.
The international negotiations concerning the boundaries of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina between 1991 and 1995 are markedly relevant to develop 
theoretical insights on the significance of agents and the social processes 
through which they establish practices in boundary politics, since they 
consist of separate rounds of negotiations at which distinct teams of 
negotiators combining a variety of backgrounds were involved in drafting 
fundamentally different territorial arrangements ranging completely 
from territoriality to ethnic division. Although teams of negotiators are 
under these circumstances likely to build on each other’s experiences in 
the negotiation process, being influenced for example by predecessors’ 
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successes or failures at achieving (partial) agreement on the map, the 
individual negotiators on each team develop their own stances with 
regard to the conflict situation and the negotiated outcome as a ‘workable’ 
or ‘stable’ territorial arrangement and they logically construct unique 
interactions within and between (groups of ) negotiators. And although 
the objective of this study is not to make generalisable claims about the 
exact stances and interactions of negotiators, these different rounds of 
negotiations permit an in-depth study and comparison of observations 
within the conflict resolution process between 1991 and 1995.
Methodology and data collection
The analyses are conducted using a multi-method research design. The 
genealogy requires engagement with the strategies and instruments used 
to structure practices in boundary politics throughout history. I use 
a systematic analysis of a network of institutional and policy reports, 
doctrines, laws and official statements and an extensive review of secondary 
sources in order to discover regularities and ruptures in the discourses 
on territorial questions and their convergence with certain answers in 
practice. The primary sources constitute mainly ministerial reports and 
memoirs covering the processes leading up to and following territorial 
change, which are at times complemented by legal descriptions of the 
negotiation procedures followed to delimit boundaries. I cross-reference 
and supplement information derived from such primary sources with 
reviews and studies of the events. Such secondary sources are assembled at 
distinguished institutions for the studies of international negotiations and 
boundary politics ranging from various specialised libraries to the Peace 
Palace in The Hague, the Netherlands, and the African Studies Centre in 
Leiden, the Netherlands. 
I then engage with the people that constitute outcomes in boundary 
politics in an in-depth study of negotiation processes to learn how and 
with what implications or effects they understand, enact and interact to 
define practices in this context. I rely on a two-step qualitative research 
design to build a structured focused comparison. A focused comparison is 
theoretically informed, while the term ‘structure’ refers to a standardisation 
of the research strategy across different rounds of international negotiations. 
The first step for this analysis is a systematic examination of historical 
materials, policy documents and institutional communication relating 
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to the definition of territories and peoples upon the sovereignty change. 
Archival research combined with studies of memoirs, opinion pieces, 
transcribed interviews, and newspaper articles allows me to recover details 
of the negotiation process concerning the secession and subsequent internal 
division of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Notably, it enables identification 
of both prevailing and subordinated discourses and practices in specific 
negotiations, and it helps to identify the principal agents interacting with 
them. 
The second step is detailed sociological analysis of these agents and their 
interactions in the social space of negotiations. I wrote life histories of 
the negotiators that illustrate their formal positions and qualifications and 
affiliations; I then conducted a series of fifty-two face-to-face and telephone 
interviews with key negotiators and their supporting staff on the basis of 
those personal histories in order to learn their multiple relations to the 
negotiation process and its outcome (see Table 3.1 in the appendix). Semi-
structured and open-ended interviews can reveal informal or tacit situated 
knowledge and thus help to identify whether (groups of ) individuals 
diverged from the prevailing discourses and practices. They also provide 
insight in these negotiators’ different investments and interactions in specific 
negotiations, which means that they enable insight and understanding 
of the social struggles for control in the process. Interviewees included 
politicians, diplomats, lawyers and army officials from every international 
and local party to the conflict that was represented across different rounds 
of negotiations concerning the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the division 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Considering the hierarchical and secretive 
nature of international diplomacy, and hence the rare expression of 
personal stances in formal communications, the interviews and private 
correspondence or documents that I gain access to during these interviews 
provide valuable information to complement official (ministerial) reports. 
The information I gain in and through the interviews is, however, where 
possible, triangulated with the documents and secondary sources. 
Conclusion
In accordance with Bourdieu’s structural constructivist approach, I focus 
on social processes and agents in the practice of boundary politics rather 
than on (principled) policies in theorising about outcomes. I hypothesise 
that practices in boundary politics are socially constructed on the basis 
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of shared opinions and seldom questioned beliefs that are effectuated by 
(groups of ) negotiators. Their outlook is hence based in the domination of 
specific negotiators who prioritise their belief in the ‘feasible’ or even the 
only ‘realistic’ answer to questions of territorial definition, rather than in 
the quality of existing borders or established practice. In the social spaces 
of the international negotiations, where boundary politics are played out, 
individuals with different backgrounds and thus different conceptions 
of (social) reality meet for the common purpose of drafting a peace 
agreement. Their interactions are shaped by their struggles for authority. 
For negotiators, indeed, power or influence over the negotiated outcome 
is socially produced and constantly negotiated. It ultimately depends on 
the recognition of expertise – that is, the knowledge and skills necessary to 
formulate answers to boundary questions raised upon sovereignty changes. 
Negotiators can then define conceptions of (social) reality and thus guide 
the discourses and practices of other negotiators to shape practices in 
boundary politics.
The following chapters use the structural constructivist method to learn 
how practices and discourses in boundary politics were constructed over 
time and space. Chapter 4 provides the trajectory through which the 
knowledge for contemporary practices and discourses was constructed 
by negotiators, highlighting transformations that culminated in the 
contemporary practice of boundary politics. Chapters 5 and 6 then 
provide a detailed sociological analysis to explore how these discourses and 
practices were established in the international negotiation process in which 
borders were drawn for the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation and 
the internal territorial division of Bosnia and Herzegovina. These projects 
combined offer an explanation for the contemporary adherence to the uti 
possidetis principle that is based on the ‘strategic’ interest of professionals 
of politics who gained authority in international negotiation processes, 
rather than on the quality of existing boundaries or the established practice 
of boundary maintenance. They reveal that the alternative of boundary 
adjustment tends to be raised when outbreaks of violence disrupt the 
dominant ideas about peaceful territorial change; these political breaks 
in history or crises in negotiations offer an opportunity for popular or 
military representatives to gain influence in diplomacy and establish their 
competing practices or discourses.  
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Chapter 4
A Genealogy of Practices in Boundary 
Politics: Conceptions of Peace and Order 
in History 
How did diplomatic actors manage the implications of sovereignty 
changes for international borders over time? The conventional story 
is that the practices associated with the modern uti possidetis principle 
originate in Roman law and since the process of decolonisation in Latin 
America in the nineteenth century have been “logically connected with 
the phenomenon of obtaining independence, wherever it occurs,” as 
judges of the International Court of Justice declared in the 1986 Burkina 
Faso/Mali case (International Court of Justice, 1986: 565). In the 
contemporary practice of boundary politics, the uti possidetis principle and 
its associated maintenance of international and administrative boundaries 
in demarcating international borders are institutionalised. They are 
protected in both international agreements and some national statutes. 
So when in 1991 legal specialists in the Arbitration Commission were 
asked by chairman of the EC Conference on Yugoslavia to comment the 
status of internal boundaries in international law, they concluded that 
their primary concern was that, whatever the circumstances, “the right to 
self-determination must not involve changes to existing frontiers” (Pellet, 
1992: 184). They evoked the uti possidetis principle in Opinion No. 3, 
concluding in line with the International Court of Justice decision of 1986 
that the principle had acquired a universal and peremptory character in 
the international law on state succession of the post-Cold War era.
Yet a complex story of variation in practices is behind this seemingly 
linear institutionalisation of the principle, transforming its meaning to 
the extent that present-day implications contradict some of the early 
practices. The uti possidetis principle was during the decolonisation 
in Latin America one of several principles relied upon to delimit the 
boundaries of colonial entities that gained independent statehood. It 
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was “a rough description of a practice […] easily susceptible to divergent 
interpretations” that in practice related to the right of conquest and the 
concept of actual possession (Hyde, 1945: 509), while the contemporary 
practices associated with the uti possidetis principle relate to legal title 
and the territorial status quo. In post-World War I Europe and the Near 
East, then, practices in boundary politics reveal that strategic, military, 
economic, ethnographic, and political factors influenced the creation of 
new boundaries (Lalonde, 2002: 64). These variations in the practices 
are overlooked in the conventional wisdom that boundary maintenance 
logically connects with state independence – a wisdom that is based on 
parallels between territorial changes in some eras but not others and veils 
differences in practices under the label of uti possidetis. 
These variations indicate that the uti possidetis principle did in the past 
not unambiguously compel actors to respect or adopt existing boundaries 
as international borders. Neoliberal institutionalists in International 
Relations theory such as Zacher (2001) and Carter and Goemans (2011) 
maintain that adherence to the uti possidetis principle is a cost-efficient 
outcome of negotiation processes because it offers a clear rule and thus 
minimises uncertainty. According to Jackson and Zacher (1997: 19), 
“[s]tates and international commercial interests abhor uncertainty over 
what political entities have jurisdiction over particular geographic spaces. 
[…] International conservatism, needless to say, flows from concerns for 
predictability and order”. Yet this cost-efficiency has not fixed practices 
on boundary maintenance in the past. In fact, the uti possidetis principle 
hardly functions as a norm or lowest common denominator because it does 
not provide a standard of practices or expectations for agents in boundary 
politics. History reveals that the practices associated with the uti possidetis 
principle have been redefined at every spur of sovereignty change. 
The challenge is to see beyond the use of the term uti possidetis to the 
complex processes behind shifts in practices that contributed to boundary 
maintenance becoming accepted as common practice for drawing 
international borders in diplomacy, and that could hence generate 
substantial changes in the future. It then appears that different practices in 
boundary politics are necessarily based on different conceptions of peace 
and order. These security maps tend to come out in crises (Bourdieu, 
1977: 168-169; Bourdieu, 1983: 336-338), which are paralleled with a 
transformation in practices when political breaks or revolutions enable 
a set of actors with different social backgrounds to gain recognition of 
their expertise and thus influence in the practice of boundary politics. 
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Particularly when the violence contradicts existing beliefs with regard 
to peaceful territorial change, the prevailing definition of the threat(s) 
related to territories and populations is likely to alter with shifts in power. 
In the past, indeed, professionals in diplomacy generally managed the 
implications of sovereignty change on the basis of a fear of disturbance of 
international order by nationalism and state dissolution, while outbreaks 
of nationalist violence enabling trends in public or armed diplomacy to 
impact boundary politics introduced abandonment of territoriality. 
This then casts doubt on the realist explanations of for example Coggins 
(2001), who argues that discourses and practices are shaped under coercive 
forces of the ‘great powers’ in international diplomacy. The social history 
of discourses and practices in boundary politics suggests that not always 
professional representatives of these states were the powerful actors in 
negotiations. The public and militaries influenced practices at different 
times. And even when political representatives did steer practices in 
international diplomacy, they not necessarily coerced others to conform; 
nor did they agree to maintain the existing boundaries for their focal 
function, being familiar to all parties involved in boundary politics, as 
neoliberal institutionalists have argued. They rather introduced a shared 
logic or doxa that was compelling in light of violence that contradicted 
the prevailing security map in practice. In response to nationalist violence 
after efforts to separate communities in territorial units, they introduced 
territoriality to delegitimise division in nation-states and thus discourage 
outbreaks of such violence in the future.
My account is fundamentally distinguished from existing explanations in 
its emphasis on the logics underlying practices in boundary politics. Many 
theorists in International Relations literature extrapolate the contemporary 
practice of boundary maintenance to the history of the uti possidetis 
principle. This leads them to consider practices in boundary politics fixed; 
they assume that these are determined by a stable set of actors for familiar 
reasons, while I find in this social history that both practices and discourses 
have varied significantly over time. In past circumstances of sovereignty 
change, different territorial arrangements have been formulated by 
different sets of actors in international diplomacy on the basis of their 
different conceptions of peace and order. To understand how particular 
logics shaped territorial arrangements and how these have culminated in 
the contemporary discourses and practices, we need to reconstruct the 
agents and the social processes in the trajectories of their development.
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In this chapter, I first disentangle analytically the notion of uti possidetis 
from the practice of boundary maintenance, showing that the practices 
associated with the term have varied over the course of history to the extent 
that they are contradictory at several points. This directs attention in the 
second part of the chapter to the social history of practices rather than 
principles in circumstances of a territorial change. I find that practices in 
boundary politics are the outcome of (discursive) struggles for definition 
of the security threat(s) posed by populations and their distribution 
across territories. In contrast with the widespread belief that the practice 
of boundary maintenance has its origins the first use of the uti possidetis 
principle in international diplomacy, which was in decolonisation in Latin 
America in the 1820s, I argue the relevance of the post-World War II 
security map in Europe. It gained significance in boundary politics after 
professional diplomats and state leaders established authority with the 
outbreak of violence in ethnically partitioned India and Palestine, and 
its position was strengthened when the reinstated practice of boundary 
maintenance left the boundaries rather stable, at least in terms of large-scale 
interstate conflicts, in the ‘channelled’ African decolonisation process. The 
standardisation of this security map in the uti possidetis principle positions 
contemporary practices in vulnerable contrast with other practices that 
concern the relationship between territory and population in present-day 
international diplomacy.
The uti possidetis principle: one term, many discourses and practices 
The connection between the notion of the uti possidetis principle and the 
practice of boundary maintenance throughout history is so naturalised 
that the two concepts are often analysed as synonyms or descriptions of 
the same process. Originating from Roman law, uti possidetis is in academic 
literature narrated to have become a principle of international relations 
in Latin America that was subsequently adhered to in decolonisation 
in Africa and Asia and disintegration in the federations of Yugoslavia, 
Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union (e.g. Ratner, 1996; Castellino and 
Allen, 2003; Ghebrewebet, 2006; Fabry, 2010). Contemporary practices 
are then considered a mere “rediscover[y]” of what is considered the 
“eminent rationality and usefulness of the 19th century Spanish American 
uti possidetis juris” (Bernárdez, 1994: 417). The narrative that boundary 
maintenance builds on a long historical process is also invoked in practice. 
In their 1986 judgement in the Burkina Faso/Mali case, judges of the 
85
International Court of Justice denote the customary nature, or “general 
scope,” of the uti possidetis principle with reference to its origins in the 
earliest international law for state formation, while the members of 
the Badinter Arbitration Commission mentioned its use “in settling 
decolonisation issues in [Latin] America and Africa” to justify application 
upon Yugoslavia’s dissolution in 1991 (International Court of Justice, 
1986: 565; Pellet, 1992: 185).
In this reading of history, the contemporary practice of maintaining 
existing boundaries is considered the natural outcome of uniform historical 
practice in line with the uti possidetis principle. The term’s past definition 
in what are considered similar situations of territorial change then provides 
the practice of boundary maintenance – and thus the interpretation of 
colonial and administrative maps to determine the location of new 
international borders – legitimacy, both analytically and in practice. It 
naturalises boundary maintenance in contemporary cases of territorial 
change and veils the historical contingencies behind the development of 
this practice in boundary politics. Yet defining the uti possidetis principle 
in terms of the practice of maintaining existing boundaries is in this 
narrative taken for granted. This coalesces principles and practices; it 
denies historical variation and transformations in the actual routines and 
processes practiced in boundary politics under the label of the uti possidetis 
principle.
History reveals that various and at times contradictory practices are captured 
under the notion of uti possidetis. In its first application in international 
law related to territorial change in the early nineteenth century, the uti 
possidetis principle prescribed consolidation or confirmation of actual 
control over territory. It granted local political leaders absolute control 
over whatever territory they de facto possessed as a result of the hostilities 
and their aftermath, recognising the right of conquest and the use of force 
(Simmler, 1999: 35). It was assumed that the previous sovereign had given 
up on retaining the conquered territory by ceasing hostilities voluntarily 
(Ghebrewebet, 2006: 8). In the decolonisation of Latin America, the local 
leaders’ actual control left unclaimed territory or terra nullius particularly 
within the former Spanish territories. This meant that in practice, the 
determination of the new states’ boundaries by territorial acquisition was 
complemented by referring to the orders of the Spanish king30 – a practice 
30  Hyde (1945: 509) finds that the search for existing definitions of boundaries in line with 
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of territorial sovereignty that is at the core of the modern definition of 
the uti possidetis principle. The principle now prescribes definition of new 
states’ territories by reference to de jure information on boundaries existing 
at the time of independence. Effective treaties and maps have a central 
role in arbitration of territorial disputes at for example the International 
Court of Justice while even natural developments of borders are excluded 
in procedures of their delimitation. As such, new states may include 
territories that are actually controlled by others, potentially leading them 
to suffer from new secessionist and/or irredentist claims such as the one 
expressed by the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh.
 
And since its emergence in international diplomacy almost two centuries 
ago, the uti possidetis principle has transformed in its prescriptions on the 
territorial units legible for sovereign statehood. In its earlier forms, the 
principle did not fix which units should be maintained. In the process 
of decolonisation in Latin America, for example, it was within the local 
leaders’ discretion to determine whether to create states from viceroyalties, 
audiencias, presidencias, provincias or any combination of these. Yet this 
decision was in the 1960s not left to the African leaders, who saw all 
colonial boundaries upheld as international borders with a rare except when 
diplomats at the United Nations and/or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of (former) colonial states believed that the existing states were unviable 
(Chem-Langhëë, 2004).31 In its post-colonial application, the practices 
associated with the uti possidetis principle only concern the boundaries of 
the highest administrative order. While the constituent republics of the 
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia were recognised as independent states in the 
early 1990s, territorial claims made to administer lower level units such as 
Kosovo and Chechnya were not accommodated in practice. Independence 
would have been possible for these units under the uti possidetis principle 
defined in the process of decolonisation in Latin America.
In addition to having transformed in meaning, the principle’s prescriptions 
have gained significance as the principal guideline in boundary politics 
the uti possidetis principle was in Latin America no more than “a rough description of a 
practice that has been variously followed when no supervening policy interposed”. 
31  The British administered trust territories of Northern and Southern Cameroon were 
united with Nigeria and the Republic of Cameroon respectively, the French island Mayotte 
seceded from the colony of Comoros and the British colony of the Gilbert and Ellice 
Islands partitioned on the basis of public votes against the practices prescribed by the uti 
possidetis principle.
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since they were developed. In Latin America, adherence to colonial 
boundaries emerged from practice in the early days of independence;32 
any outcome was thus to respect (post-)revolutionary activities (Hyde, 
1945: 505-506). As a result, practices show multiple variations of the 
uti possidetis principle33 and inconsistency in their application based on 
the republics’ immediate needs34 (Lalonde, 2002: 36; Fisher, 1933: 416), 
while international borders were often delimited on the basis of colonial 
boundaries at a critical date antedating independence. In the 1992 El 
Salvador/Honduras case, the judges at the International Court of Justice 
indeed pronounced that uti possidetis was “essentially a retrospective 
principle” (International Court of Justice, 1992: 388). Yet when the 
principle was reinforced in the decolonisation of Africa and Asia and in 
more recent cases of state secession, it no longer permitted such flexibility. 
Its prescriptions only concerned the de jure borders existing at the date 
of independence. Adherence to the uti possidetis principle now “stops the 
clock but does not put back the hands” the ICJ justices declared in the 
1986 Burkina Faso/Mali case (International Court of Justice, 1986: 568). 
Local political leaders may hence be assigned control over territory that 
they effectively lost in the struggle for independence or its aftermath, 
which resulted in secessionist and/or irredentist conflicts for example in 
several former Yugoslav territories after 1991.
32  It was consolidated only at the first continent-wide congress meeting in Panama in 1826 
(Castellino and Allen, 2003: 65).
33  In Latin America, the uti possidetis principle was susceptible to divergent interpretations 
(Hyde, 1945: 509). While the Brazilian view of the principle consolidated the situation of 
fact post bellum, the Spanish American uti possidetis principle can be subdivided according 
to the critical dates adopted in the delimitation of boundaries: uti possidetis of 1810; uti 
possidetis of 1821; uti possidetis before independence; uti possidetis of 1826; uti possidetis of 
1874; and uti possidetis juris of 1880.
34  The particular variant of the uti possidetis principle adopted could differ from one treaty 
to another. Lalonde (2002: 34) points out that Peru, Venezuela and Bolivia each concluded 
a treaty with Brazil on the basis of effective possession while Peru defined its border with 
Ecuador on the basis of the uti possidetis principle. Similarly, Venezuela and Colombia 
refer to the uti possidetis of 1880 to determine their mutual border, while Article 8 of the 
General Arbitration Treaty between Bolivia and Peru instructed the arbitrator to resolve the 
boundary dispute in strict obedience with the principle of uti possidetis of 1810. Kohen 
(1997: 449-450) further mentions that the notion of effective possession was invoked by 
Paraguay in its dispute with Bolivia, by Guatamala in its boundary dispute with Honduras 
and by Salvador in the Case Concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute. In 
these cases the factual situation on the ground was thus preferred over the juridical title to 
territory (Lalonde, 2002: 35).
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A final development in practices is that although it has technically become 
easier to make territorial adjustments, deviations from the uti possidetis 
principle have become less common in the contemporary practice 
boundary politics. While the Latin American leaders agreed in 1848 that 
combining or separating states required the consent of all governments 
of the confederated republics (Castellino and Allen, 2003: 70), the 
consent of only the parties to a dispute is currently sufficient to trump 
the prescriptions of the uti possidetis principle. Still decolonisation in 
Latin American entailed more boundary changes. Boundary maintenance 
was here understood as a means to postpone the discussion of the 
precise location of the boundaries; both in discourse and in practice, the 
boundaries delimited upon independence were considered alterable.35 
Adjustments were made regularly after independence, with or without the 
assistance of arbiters, on the basis of principles of equity, ‘give-and-take’, 
or by referring to “effective occupation and natural, geographical features” 
(Lalonde, 2008: 58; Simmler, 1999: 68-69). Such deviations from the de 
jure boundaries delimited upon independence were never agreed upon in 
decolonisation in Africa or recent secessions. The uti possidetis principle 
is now the definitive guideline for delimiting new international borders, 
rendering secessionist or irredentist claims to territories that are not 
existing ‘units’ ineffectual.
These transformations in the practices associated with the uti possidetis 
principle are summarised in Table 4.1.
35  Early constitutions and declarations of independence of the new republics contain this 
need to postpone the delimitation of boundaries to a more convenient time. Article 2 of 
the Fundamental Law of the Sovereign Congress of Venezuela, for the Union of the Republics 
of New Granada and Venezuela, under the Title of the Republick of Colombia (1819), for 
example, reads: “Its Territory shall be those comprehended in the former Captain-general-
ship of Venezuela and the Vice-royalty of the New Kingdom of Granada […] whereof the 
exact boundaries shall be fixed at a more seasonable opportunity”. Similarly, Article 7 of 
the Constitution of the Federal Republick of Central America  (1824) holds that “[t]he limits 
of the Territory of the State, shall be defined by a Constitutional Law, when the necessary 
information shall have been obtained”. Also the Treaty of Perpetual Union, League and Con-
federation between Colombia and Mexico (1823) and the Treaty of Perpetual Union, League 
and Confederation between Colombia and the United Provinces of Central America (1825) 
contain a clause on the postponement of boundary determination.
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History does thus not reveal an established practice associated with the 
term uti possidetis. To the contrary, there is no standard of practices or 
expectations that constitutes a norm or lowest common denominator in the 
practice of boundary politics; the practices associated with the uti possidetis 
principle are regularly redefined in history so that that the contemporary 
practices contradict some of the early ones. This raises doubts about 
whether the contemporary practice of boundary maintenance actually 
originates in the Latin American process of decolonisation – doubts that 
are reinforced by a cursory glance at the history of the practice in Latin 
America. The states on the Latin American continent were not the first 
states to gain independence within their colonial boundaries. Rather, 
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boundary maintenance upon the withdrawal of the Spanish Crown in 
the nineteenth century mirrored the latest events of state formation in 
the Low Countries and the United States of America.36 Also, and this 
is arguably more relevant for the origins of contemporary practices, the 
historical trajectory shows that the practice of boundary maintenance has 
been challenged at several points in time since it emerged in international 
law in the 1820s. It was abandoned in post-World War I Europe and 
the Near East, for example, to then be reinstated. This indicates that the 
origins of discourses and practices in contemporary boundary politics lie 
not in Latin America. 
A genealogy of discourses and practices in boundary politics: 
conceptions of peace and order 
Security maps in the practice of boundary politics 
Boundary politics play out under circumstances of uncertainty about 
the future. This means that practices are fundamentally based on its 
actors’ conceptualisations of the unknown. They are thus based on how 
negotiators assess, calculate and master peace and present uncertainties as 
risks in this order. Kessler and Daase (2008: 214) hold that “risk names 
both the very boundary of the unknown and the known and the particular 
mode in which the unknown is translated into knowledge and policies”. 
The conceptualisation or ‘securitisation’ of uncertainties related to 
territories and populations – that is, the anticipation of catastrophes that 
are selected for treatment – essentially determine what negotiators define 
or understand as the most ‘strategic’ response in the practice of boundary 
politics. If they for example anticipate enduring conflict between peoples 
coexisting in a territorial unit, negotiators will prefer territorial adjustment 
36  In the case of the Low Countries, the Spanish recognised the independence of the seven 
provinces of the north in the 1648 Treaty of Munster and Britain agreed to American 
independence within the 1763 borders in 1776 (Hubbard, 2009: 43). The American 
Secretary of State confirmed and reinforced this practice in July 1856, in the midst of the 
process of decolonisation in Latin America, when he wrote to his Minister to Great Britain: 
“The United States regard it as an established principle of public law and of international 
rights, that when a European Colony in America becomes independent, it succeeds to 
the territorial limits of the Colony as it stood in the hands of the parent country. That 
is the doctrine which Great Britain and the United States concurred in adopting in the 
negotiations of Paris, which terminated this country’s war of independence” (Ghebrewebet, 
2006: 63).
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rather than if they anticipate a spread of claims for land in and around the 
state. And if negotiators anticipate endless negotiations over delimitations, 
they will advocate the use of existing boundaries rather than if they predict 
difficulties to be reconcilable.
When managing the implications of sovereignty change for international 
boundaries, negotiators necessarily share the belief that post-independence 
peace and order are controllable through the definition of territorial 
arrangements. As an outcome of their negotiations, they pre-emptively 
introduce particular arrangements in order to address their – whether 
realistic or not – fears for instability. It is hence not the management 
of insecurity that shapes negotiators’ strategies in border negotiations. 
This would entail concrete and identifiable or acute threats to stability 
while these are inherently tied to the future of independent statehood 
in the practice of boundary politics. Neither is it the distribution of the 
‘goods’ associated with a practice such as a right to territorial statehood 
or good statesmanship that construct their stances on the practicability of 
particular arrangements. Rather, it is the negotiators’ active management 
of uncertainty and desire to evade ‘bads’ that determine their stances in 
boundary politics. Conceptualised in these terms, boundary politics are a 
discursive practice by which people represent “a ‘world’ characterised by 
particular types of places, peoples and dramas” (Tuathail and Agnew, 1992: 
190). Actors with different security maps identify different sources and 
characteristics of threats to different aspects of order, which subsequently 
inform their different preferences with regard to the practices in boundary 
politics. 
The actors’ different assessments of opportunities and risks for peace 
contain distinct truths and rationalities about the reality of sovereignty 
change. Most notably, they emerge within the space of boundary politics, 
where debates concern the definition of social facts such as borders 
and what their function is in (inter)national relations; ‘nations’ and 
how (nation-)states can and/or should be established; and the ‘just’ or 
‘sustainable’ relationship between territory and population – that is, the 
criteria of legitimate statehood. Negotiators’ rationalities on these issues 
may not be deliberate or even reflective, but they significantly impact 
reality because negotiators assess local facts in specific cases and thus the 
potential of particular paths to security on the basis of these rationalities. If 
negotiators for example consider borders separation lines between political 
entities, they are more likely to emphasise political and legal means of 
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representation than when they consider territorial delimitation a means 
of protecting nations’ cultural heritage. And if they regard nations as 
hard and mutually exclusive groups, they are less likely to see successful 
intermarriage and mingling than if they consider communities to be fluid 
or relational in nature.
In doing so, negotiators do not only answer to a reality; they actively 
construct one. They make particular (sub)national communities and/or 
territorial delimitations ‘problems’ by defining what forms a threat to peace 
and order and what not, and what is fatality and what rather constitutes 
an opportunity for positive change. So while ethnic communities that 
straddle international borders may be defined as security threats in need of 
territorial recognition in some security maps, they may not be considered 
problems for states that can address their needs by law in another. And 
while territorial adjustments in accordance with lines of division between 
communities may be considered fatal for international territorial stability 
in some configurations of security, they may be seen an opportunity for 
(re)stabilisation of states in others. Historically, these variances in security 
maps meant that while negotiators’ efforts at stabilisation upon the 
decolonisation of India in 1948 were directed at separating the Muslims 
from the non-Muslims in distinct states, communities with different origins 
or religions were united under the protection of law a few years later in 
the decolonisation of African states. And while boundaries were redrawn 
in Europe after the First World War, a similar territorial adjustment to 
accommodate communities straddling existing boundaries was considered 
dangerous in the recent outbreak of violence in eastern Ukraine.
A quick glance at history then reveals that the prevailing security map 
among negotiators tends to have endurable effects. Different episodes 
of territorial change are characterised by different standard practices in 
boundary politics. Shifts in the dominant conceptualisation of threats to 
peace and order tend to come out after violence breaks out upon a territorial 
delimitation in confrontation with the existing beliefs with regard to 
peaceful territorial change. Such violence turns uncertainty into insecurity, 
changing the environment from one in which it is unclear who, what, 
when and where stability will be threatened to one in which negotiators 
can identify specific actors and specific threats to post-independence peace 
and order. These identifiable insecurities may undermine the prevailing 
conceptions of peace and order and enable other (groups of ) negotiators 
to gain recognition of their expertise and thus authority in the practice of 
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boundary politics, particularly when negotiators identify past practices as 
the cause of the crisis or as having been unable to address it satisfactorily. The 
dominant definition of the threat(s) related to territories and populations 
and thus the conception of a range of possible answers to border questions 
then generally changes in line with altered power relations in the practice 
of boundary politics, introducing the new (groups of ) negotiators’ security 
map in existing beliefs. 
So transformations in discourses and practices in boundary politics do not 
happen randomly. It is indeed political breaks and revolutionary challenges 
to the existing security map that facilitate a redefinition of (social) reality. 
They enable a different set of actors with different conceptions of threats 
to peace and order to gain influence in the practice of boundary politics. 
A genealogy of these conceptions and related practices hence necessarily 
starts with the first change of an international border, which is early upon 
the foundation of the nation-state in the nineteenth century when the 
Latin American states gained independence from Spain and Portugal and 
states in Europe were redefined for the first time, and highlights the crises 
in which the differences come out.
Practices for security in a historical perspective
Nineteenth century practices: Territoriality
For sovereignty changes in Europe, practices were characterised by 
prioritisation of territory over population even though boundary 
maintenance was not absolute, resembling the practices in Latin America 
in the same era. When Belgium seceded from the Netherlands, for 
example, diplomats from the European states determined in the ‘Bases 
Destined to Establish the Independence and Future Existence of Belgium’ 
of 1831 that the territories of Holland and Belgium were to conform to 
those of the Dutch Republic in 1790 and Belgium in 1815, respectively, 
with minor adjustments for contiguity and existing communication lines 
(Fabry, 2010: 83). And even the counterclaim to the borders of the 1790 
Austrian Netherlands stipulated in the new Belgian constitution ascribed 
to the notion of territorial stability. This practice was largely based on 
the negotiators’ anticipation of instability in the international territorial 
order upon the sovereignty change. They underlined in Protocol No. 12 
of 27 January 1831 the necessity of boundary maintenance in Belgium 
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“to offer to her an existence which at once guarantees her own happiness, 
and the security due to other states,” which the separation of Belgium 
from the Netherlands endangered, particularly if the Belgians fixed their 
states’ limits assuming control of neighbouring states’ (overseas or other) 
territories (Papers Relative to the Affairs of Belgium, Volume 2, 1833: 75-77). 
And while the Greeks, who did not have prior territorial existence, were 
defined ethnically when they seceded from the Ottoman Empire, the 
peoples of Romania, Serbia and Montenegro also gained independence 
in their principalities’ borders that could be adjusted moderately to 
recognise de facto communal, economic or military developments. The 
inclination for territorial stability was again underpinned by assessments 
of events’ consequences for international security. The negotiators at the 
Berlin Conference of 1878 were reluctant to accept radical adjustments 
to territorial delimitations beyond the consensus that a break-up of the 
Ottoman Empire was unavoidable, which also shows from their rejection 
of the Greeks’ claim to Thessaly and Epirus, emphasising the mutual 
rivalries and the balance of power in the international system (Fabry, 
2010: 105; Medlicott, 1963: 133-134). 
This emphasis on territorial stability took shape in the old Western 
diplomatic order, in which negotiating rights were monopolised by state 
authority (Black, 2010: 152). To the exclusion of private or military 
interests, professional diplomats were as direct representatives of states 
in charge of asserting and acknowledging state independence. In line 
with the expectations of the political elites of which they were members, 
these professionals generally considered the European state as a model for 
statehood – a model that was adopted by diplomats entering the elite’s 
arena as representatives of newly independent states, who thus became 
increasingly insistent on precise frontiers (Winichakul, 1994). 
Early twentieth century practices: Self-determination of populations
The character of diplomacy changed in the twentieth century with the 
emergence of new independent states. Repeated revolutions both in Latin 
America and on the European continent imposed challenges that forced 
diplomats to worry about their personal safety, inciting a trend of armed 
diplomacy and intelligence operations. And while military attachés gained 
prominence in increasingly systematic information-gathering processes, 
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international diplomacy was increasingly guided by public politics and 
liberal opinion because representation broadened beyond the existing 
social elites (Black, 2010: 166; 171-173). Jules Cambon (1931: 139), who 
was the French ambassador in Berlin in 1914, wrote: “We are living in 
an age of publicity. The diplomatists of today only faintly resemble their 
forerunners who took part in the Congress of Vienna”. In a developing 
bureaucratic system of control and direction towards professionalism, 
professional diplomats were hence increasingly made to include the public.
In parallel with this change in international diplomacy, the emphasis 
on territorial stability was abandoned. Particularly after boundary 
maintenance had not been able to prevent (ethnic) nationalism from 
disrupting international peace and order in World War I, practices and 
discourses transformed. Borders were increasingly delimited based on 
markers of identity and communities’ wishes, which meant a prioritisation 
of population over territory. Especially for communities expressing claims 
to land owned by parties that were defeated in World War I, American 
President Wilson’s plea for national self-determination was significant. The 
members of the Commission on Polish Affairs, chaired by Jules Cambon 
who was a career lawyer that had served in the Franco-Prussian War before 
he entered the civil service, for example unanimously understood that 
their decisions on Poland’s borders should be based “on ethnic factors 
and on Wilson’s promise of access to the sea” (Macmillan, 2003: 225-
226). And ascribing to this interpretation, the German representatives 
claimed territories on the basis of communal distributions even in their 
contestation of the Commission’s decisions (Macmillan, 2003: 231). 
The participants at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference similarly aimed to 
establish borders along ethnic lines, then-junior British diplomat Nicolson 
(1933: 127) recounts. In the absence of clear lines of division between 
ethnic communities in Europe, they developed a settlement ensuring that 
far fewer Central and East Europeans lived under foreign rule than in 
1914 and that the identities of all other communities were protected by 
law (Crampton, 1996: 37).
In their efforts to determine new boundaries’ delimitations, the negotiators 
used various methods that attest to an emphasis on population over 
territory. They scheduled referenda to take place in a number of contested 
areas in Poland, in which also Polish residents who had fled the areas were 
invited to vote (Wiskemann, 1956: 28); they made Danzig and Fiume 
free cities with international personality; in a few cases, they drew borders 
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so as to include a matching number of minorities on both sides; and 
they demanded the local leaders to codify protection of minority rights 
(Fabry, 2010: 129). The negotiators also made use of an extensive set of 
techniques to map population distributions in particular territories, hence 
establishing where particular communities resided, including “population 
density, migration, longevity, as well as language or religious characteristics” 
(Crampton, 2006: 733). The members of the Commission on Polish 
Affairs, for example, used statistics and thematic mapping to award Upper 
Silesia to Poland, justifying their decision by stating that about sixty-five 
per cent of the area’s inhabitants were Polish-speaking. While census-data 
on language formed the dividing criterion in some cases, other areas were 
divided on the basis of (sometimes decade-old) information on ‘ethnic 
identity’ or plebiscite outcomes. These statistical underpinnings enabled 
the negotiators to put their decisions on a rational and scientific footing.
 
This rationality was based on the negotiators’ emphasis on intrastate 
peace and order, assuming divided communities to endanger the stability 
of states by splitting them internally. Although history and economic 
considerations at times superseded purely communal outcomes, particularly 
when disentangling communities proved difficult, negotiators generally 
associated the sustenance of peace with codification of communities’ 
demands. Notably the British Political Intelligence Department, whose 
staff was drawn from the Department of Information’s Intelligence 
Bureau, issued a memorandum already in November 1918 in which it 
urged that the ethnic boundaries were “more durable and afford a firmer 
support against aggression than the older form of state”37 and that they 
were hence “a condition [for] permanent security to be established” in 
light of the intrastate balance of power and the defensibility of boundaries 
(Dockrill and Goold, 1981: 24). Career diplomats such as Nicolson, who 
increasingly accepted the need to engage with wider public audiences at 
home, yet supported the accommodation of communal demands based on 
an ideological reasoning for the distribution of rights and entitlements. It 
would allow for “scars […] to heal,” which for career civil servants entailed 
that “many economic sinews, some arteries even, had […] to be severed” 
to develop an equitable settlement (Nicolson, 1933: 126-127). 
37   The memorandum includes that the “older form of state” was “often a merely accidental 
congeries of territories without internal cohesion, necessary economic unity or clearly 
defined geographical frontiers” (Dockrill and Goold, 1981: 24).
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Negotiators of the settlement for World War I thus reasoned that after 
a (nationalist) war had been waged in which communities had grown 
increasingly antagonistic, recognition of peoples’ separation contributed 
to the re-establishment and maintenance of peace inside states. Being 
permitted space for themselves, peoples are more likely to subscribe to 
the terms of a peace settlement and thus less likely to (re-)enter into 
violence for “stirring up the spirit of patriotism, of justice or of fair play 
to achieve redress,” British Prime Minister Lloyd George explains in the 
Fontainebleau Memorandum; peoples then “feel in [their] hearts that 
[they] have no right to complain” (Barnes and Feldman, 1982: 42).
A similar conceptualisation of territorially divided nations and minorities 
as a security problem underlay later settlements by professional diplomats 
assembled at the League of Nations. In the Åland Islands case, for example, 
negotiators from both conflicting parties claimed territory for the survival 
of their ‘nation’ (Brown, 1921: 268-269). And the members of the 
Commission of Inquiry, who were predominantly career diplomats trained 
and experienced in law,38 then considered the principle of ethnic self-
determination “relevant at all times and capable of displacing the principle 
of domestic jurisdiction” (Lalonde, 2002: 76-78). As such, the negotiators 
collectively attest to a prioritisation of population over territory. With 
regard to Upper Silesia and Vilnius and the Saar province, for example, 
they unanimously accorded status to the peoples’ preferences expressed in 
plebiscites, and they made adjustments to the Albanian border in line with 
communal demands when they were asked to adjudicate disputes there. 
They did so based on an assessment of the stability inside the states involved 
in the territorial dispute, in line with the security map that prevailed in 
post-World War I Europe. As professionals of diplomacy, however, they 
ensured that the principle of self-determination would not gain the status 
of a universal international claim right. Such universality would have 
inflicted responsibilities on the League of Nations to accommodate any 
community’s claim to territory, which threatens the international order 
with nationalism and state dissolution. 
38  The Commission of Inquiry was composed of president Baron Eugéne Beyens, former 
Foreign Minister of Belgium, Mr. Felix Calonder, former President of the Swiss Republic, 
and Mr. Abram Isaac Elkus, former United States ambassador to Constantinople (Berkeley, 
1922: 159).
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Practices after WWII: Defensible separation of populations
Over the course of World War II, nationality remained prevalent over 
territory in the practice of boundary politics. Early in the war, American 
President Roosevelt praised communal self-determination and the 
plebiscite method as “the most substantial contribution made by the 
Versailles Treaty,” arguing for papal support that communities “should 
not be forced into a government […] or compulsory independence by 
themselves, without an expression of their own views” (Russell, 1958: 
33). He restated his commitment to self-determination later in the 1941 
Atlantic Charter, where he and Churchill advocated territorial changes 
in accordance with peoples’ freely expressed wishes. Yet these discourses 
changed after the 1919 Treaty of Versailles was discredited for having 
“kindled new conflicts” and the League of Nation’s minority system 
proved failing to prevent another war, which stimulated changes in the 
negotiators’ security map in the practice of boundary politics (Wiewióra, 
1959: 20-21). 
In international diplomacy more broadly, the challenge from Nazi 
attitudes and practices put under pressure the conventional practices and 
views. Career diplomats only played a secondary role in the mounting 
international crisis, and they did not always help the prospect of peace 
because their alliances sometimes functioned as a restraint on action, 
Black (2010: 186) notes. State leaders meeting in summits took the key 
role in arbitrating during World War II.39 This war reasserted the primacy 
of raw force. Politicians predominantly relied on intelligence officers to 
provide them with advice on the views of others and on how to pursue 
interests, allowing military officers increasing decision-making powers 
(Black, 2010: 210). At the same time, they often rejected diplomacy as a 
means of compromise because they considered diplomats influenced by a 
professional understanding of (and perhaps sympathy for) other points of 
view (Black, 2010: 210). As such, the war meant a break with diplomacy as 
a separate sphere; military considerations come to the fore in negotiators’ 
search for security. 
39  State leaders were able to take initiatives and to negotiate over a wide geographical span, 
in which they otherwise might have entrusted diplomats, due to technological develop-
ments in air transportation and communications.
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This shift in power meant that discourses and practices in boundary politics 
increasingly concerned geopolitical strategic realities. While practices 
had been based on a largely ideological reasoning for communities’ right 
to recognition and protection of their identities, the consideration of a 
boundary’s defensibility increasingly complemented this reasoning as the 
military gained influence in boundary politics. Negotiators increasingly 
considered elements of infrastructure and industry and geography in 
the delimitation of boundaries that separate communities. As such, they 
conceptualised outbreaks of violence for military strategic gain as a major 
threat to intrastate security irrespective of the underlying communal 
demands.
Considerations of the military defensibility and balance of power rather than 
the distribution of rights hence determined the territorial delimitations. 
And although the negotiators still considered divided communities and 
minorities the main threat to peace and order, national homogenisation 
was no longer effectuated through plebiscites40 but through post facto 
large-scale compulsory population transfers and minority exchanges. After 
peaceful relations had been established both within and between Greece 
and Turkey on the basis of their population exchange in 1923,41 President 
Roosevelt’s closest adviser Harry Hopkins noted in a memorandum that 
the complete eradication of minorities was “the only way to maintain 
peace” (De Zayas, 1979: 8). It prevented the “mixture of populations to 
cause endless trouble as has been the case in Alsace-Lorraine” according to 
Churchill, who spoke in the House of Commons in 1944 (Wiewióra, 1959: 
42-43). So at the 1943 Tehran Conference, American Secretary of State 
Stettinius (1949: 211) agreed with the other politicians that the Germans 
in future Polish territory would be repatriated, thence duly reflecting on 
calculations of population transfers associated with particular boundary 
40  The plebiscite method was ignored quite intentionally, particularly with regard to post-
war Germany. Several politicians who subscribed to the Atlantic Charter noted explicitly 
that it was not applicable to Germany (Wiskemann, 1956: 75) and article 107 of the 
United Nations Charter excludes the possibility of invoking any of the Charter provi-
sions, including the right to self-determination, to negate actions taken as a consequence 
of WWII in relation to the enemy states.
41  In his speech for the House of Commons on 15 December 1944, British Prime Minis-
ter Churchill said: “I am not alarmed by the prospect of the disentanglement of popula-
tions, nor even by these large transferences, which are more possible in modern conditions 
than they ever were before. The disentanglement of populations which took place between 
Greece and Turkey after the last war was in many ways successful and has produced friendly 
relations between Greece and Turkey ever since” (De Zayas, 1979: 11).
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adjustments.42 In the end, the realigning of populations to conform to the 
new boundaries entailed a move of more than 18.3 million people in East 
Central Europe (Kordan, 1997: 704-705). This means that populations 
had become detached from territory, being perceived as movable objects, 
and that inter-communal separation was no longer a goal in itself but a 
means to ensure boundaries’ defensibility in the post-WWII practice of 
boundary politics.43
A similar security map prevailed in the first discussions on decolonisation 
in Europe. At the British Colonial Office, they notably contemplated 
national homogenisation by means of territorial adjustment and population 
transfers for their early decolonisation policies to be “consistent with the 
aspiration of nationhood” (Furedi, 1994: 88). Although inter-communal 
separation was trumped for territorial unity in assessments of the intrastate 
militarily balance in Burma (Selth, 1986: 505), it was the politicians’ 
proclaimed objective in the independent British Mandate of Palestine 
and India. In 1937, a Commission headed by professional politician Lord 
Peel recommended territorial partition of Palestine. The Commission’s 
members considered minorities “the most serious hindrance to the 
smooth and successful operation of partition,” so they held that partition 
in combination with “as far as possible, an exchange of population” would 
offer “a chance of ultimate peace. No other plan does” (Palestine Royal 
Commission, 1937). Similarly, British Prime Minister Attlee addressed 
the possibility of partition “in the best interests of the Indian people” 
already in his first announcement of India’s decolonisation on 20 February 
1947 (Hodson, 1969: 199) – an option that became even more tangible 
after Viceroy Mountbatten concluded that rapprochement between the 
42  When Anthony Eden and Edward Stettinius met in Malta to discuss Poland’s future 
boundaries, for example, Eden summed up the results of the meeting: “The cession upon 
which we and the Americans are agreed would involve the transfer of some 2¼ million 
Germans. The Oder frontier without Breslau and Stettin would involve a further 2¼ 
million. The Western Neisse frontier with Breslau and Stettin would involve an additional 
3¼ million making 8 million in all” (Wiskemann, 1956: 83) and at the 1945 Potsdam 
Conference, Churchill and Eden considered a transfer of at least seven million Germans 
for the delimitation of the Oder-Neisse line unacceptable while the Russians insisted on a 
transfer of all ethnic Poles out of the Soviet Union (Ennekens, 1998: 145-146).   
43  In contrast, territory without people had generally been considered useless particularly 
in agrarian pre-nationalist societies, where local leaders had spent considerable time trying 
to keep and attract settlers (e.g. Herbst, 2000). A noteworthy exception to this trend before 
nationalism rose in international politics is the forced expulsion of the Acadians from the 
Acadie area by the British, also known as Le Grand Dérangement. 
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parties was impossible and a potential catalyst of civil war upon his arrival 
in India in March 1947.44 This indicates that with regard to the colonies, 
the negotiators from post-WWII Europe generally considered ethnic or 
religious minorities a major threat to post-conflict state security. 
This policy for independence was shaped under a notably different 
understanding of race and nationalism than the earlier decolonisation 
of the Latin American states. European state diplomats and colonial 
governors had appropriated Imperial Rome as a model for statehood in the 
early nineteenth century, regarding themselves as bringers of civilisation 
and seeking to bring non-Western powers into the ambit of the Western 
worldview, but they were more open to the dynamic of growing state 
power and populist themes in the early twentieth century (Black, 2010: 
155; 198). Coercion had been the principal response to instability in Latin 
America. Diplomats had moulded nationalist policies on the basis of their 
understanding of the views and the inherent value of peace and order. The 
continued dynamic of new states in the international system combined 
with the growth of nationalist warfare in Europe had however contributed 
to professional diplomats’ sense of flux, which was capitalised in quests 
for recognition in the years following World War I. The representatives 
of aspiring states, who were often not professionals but found themselves 
supported outside the confines of imperial control in the League of 
Nations and by ideologues that had risen to power before the outbreak of 
World War II, were assertive in their rejection or partial accommodation of 
Western principles of statehood (Black, 2010: 197). It left some European 
state diplomats who proved unwilling to compromise finding their careers 
compromised or even ended to live in exile (Black, 2010: 197).
The practices in boundary politics concerning colonies then mirrored 
the practices in Europe. Separation of communities was the expressed 
purpose, but it was not effectuated through plebiscites – a method that the 
last Viceroy if India Lord Mountbatten proposed45 but that was rejected 
by politicians for the potential spread of separatism and military conflict 
(Chakravarty, 2003: 147). Rather, partition in India was primarily intended 
44  Viceroy Mountbatten described the situation as “breaking up under my hands. The 
reason was that neither side would cooperate with each other. I could feel the damn thing 
simmering” (Collins and Lapierre, 1999: 73).
45  Mountbatten said that a referendum “would be a far better way of finding out the will 
of the people and removing weightage than under the system […] whereby the decision is 
left in the hands of three persons” (Chakravarty, 2003: 147).
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for “the existing Provincial Governments,”46 based on votes by district 
representatives who did not meet separately to discuss their communities’ 
collective demands or desire for subdivisions (Hodson, 1969: 199). The 
boundaries in the mixed Punjab and Bengal provinces were then meant to 
delimit “the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims” as 
defined in the 1941 census (Kudaisya and Tan, 2000: 82).47 The Boundary 
Commissions entrusted with the task of separating communities in these 
provinces each consisted of four High Court judges chaired by lawyer 
and experienced political adviser Cyril Radcliffe.48 The chairman aimed to 
separate communities and equalise minority ratios on all sides in line with 
his mandate (Chatterji, 1999: 191), yet he embraced military strategic 
considerations as “other factors” in the territorial delimitation of this 
separation in accordance with the security map for ensuring boundaries’ 
defensibility and balance of power that was dominant among political 
professionals in Europe (Ahmed, 1998: 154-156). Claims put before 
him as well as his final delimitation respected natural boundaries and 
transportation systems, while Radcliffe further prioritised territory over 
population in his use of limited imperial maps to draw the final lines. 
These maps represented villages as blank spaces outlined by administrative 
boundaries, imposing existing lines on the final decision (Chester, 2009: 
22). 
Corrections to the separation between communities in this territorial 
delimitation were then made through post facto large-scale population 
transfers, mirroring the practices in post-WWII Europe. These exchanges 
of peoples were formally agreed upon by the state leaders only with the 
46  From the moment he arrived in India, Viceroy Mountbatten met regularly with the 
Provincial Governors, who informed him about the situation in their provinces. In fact, 
Mountbatten’s House was constructed so that the Viceroy was able to invite and host the 
stay of the eleven Governors, who he thought were often “too steeped in the old British 
Raj system and […] trying to find a solution which would do the least possible violence 
to the system as it then existed” (Collins and Lapierre, 1999: 40-75). In his reports on 
negotiations, Mountbatten consequentially describes progress in terms of gaining support 
from the various ‘Provinces’ (Hodson, 1969: 291).
47  This mandate of the Boundary Commissions was laid down in the 3 June Plan by Lord 
Mountbatten and Lord Ismay. 
48  With the consent of representatives of both conflicting parties, Sir Cyril Radcliffe was 
appointed the Chairman of both Commissions. The other members were Justices C.C. 
Biswas, B.K. Mukherji, Abu Saleh Mahomed Akram and S.A. Rahman for the Bengal 
Commission while the Punjab Commission was composed of Justices Mehr Chand 
Mahajan, Teja Singh, Din Mahomed and Muhammad Munir (Menon, 1957: 401).
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1950 Agreement between India and Pakistan on Minorities, but both 
Pakistan’s first Governor-General  Muhammad Jinnah and first Prime 
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru wrote already in early 1947 to British Viceroy 
Mountbatten that their aim was to separate communities to ensure post-
conflict security. Borders should be made “as complete and thorough as 
possible” by means of population transfers in order to leave no room for 
contention, they held (Menon, 1957: 355-356; Chester, 2009: 61-62). 
Hence practices in early decolonisation were guided by the negotiators’ 
emphasis on population rather than territory, yet the need for inter-
communal separation was treated as a means to increase the boundaries’ 
defensibility rather than as a practice inspired by ideology for entitlement 
to recognition and protection of identity.
Practices after Palestine and India: Territoriality
Then conflict broke out in the early years of independence in both 
Palestine and India, and the British Colonial Office simultaneously faced 
rejection of Commonwealth membership by Burma, riots in Baghdad and 
disorder in Accra and Malaya. This political unrest inspired widespread 
transformations in ideas about legitimate sources of statehood. The failure 
of the League of Nations, followed by wartime, had disrupted relations 
in international diplomacy more broadly. Professional diplomacy had 
become a means to achieve global order through the enforcement of 
systemic rules. Under the intense pressure of the public to create a new 
and more benign international order, political leaders had developed 
a system of international organisations in which summits worked to 
reconceptualise rather than reject conventional diplomatic methods as a 
departure from practices during World War II. Summits or conferences 
now did not end the regular efforts of the professional diplomats, while 
they provided conventional diplomats with a greatly expanded sphere 
for activities, not the least because leaders received diplomatic advice on 
the views of others and on how to pursue interests (Black, 2010: 210). 
Technological developments had made it easier to recall envoys for policy 
advice and special diplomatic missions gained significance in efforts to 
establish alliances or negotiation despite failing international agencies. 
And as a continuation from the pre-war developments, this diplomacy was 
increasingly guided by public politics in interstate relations determined by 
a multiplicity of non-state actors.
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When these developments affected the practice of boundary politics, 
they introduced a shift in the negotiators’ focus back to international 
security consequences of territorial changes. Public politics introduced 
in practice a transition to the recognition of self-determination rights, 
but professional diplomatic representation continued to reflect the 
social and ethnic understandings associated with the pre-war era and 
Latin America’s decolonisation in the nineteenth century.49 In British 
memoranda and dispatches, nationalism was increasingly coupled 
with Nazism and communism,50 to the extent that the two terms were 
even used interchangeably (Furedi, 1994: 100). The assumption in the 
statements of the British diplomats was that nationalism – and particularly 
ethnically defined nationalism – provoked political unrest and state break-
ups, disrupting the international order (Furedi, 1994: 196-198). The 
professionals considered that although the claims to self-determination 
originated in the domestic arena, their effects in cross-border tensions 
and interstate armed conflict would “threaten the whole world order with 
what an older generation would have termed ‘balkanisation’,” as political 
adviser in Africa William Macmillan (1959: 231) anticipated just a few 
months before the decolonisation of much of the continent.
This assessment was particularly strong concerning Africa because of 
the large number of entities eligible for independence under national 
self-determination and the complexity of many demographic situations 
there (Fabry, 2010: 161). State dissolution and the emergence of small 
homogenous successor states was hence considered a major threat 
to international peace and order – a shift in perception that made the 
British politicians reluctant to concede powers,51 particularly to what 
they perceived as militarily and/or economically unviable states. British 
49  The small number of African Americans who were accepted into the United States 
Foreign Service exemplifies this pre-war understanding of society and race (Krenn, 1999).
50  The idea that nationalist movements were manipulated by communists appears for 
example in the 1950 ‘Note on the aims, strategy and procedure of the communists in 
Africa’ by the British Chiefs of Staff, which reads “communist agitation seeks to stimulate 
and exploit nationalists like Nkrumah” and contains the assessment that to leave a colony 
piecemeal would fracture the fragile unity of the new states (Furedi, 1994: 103). Macmillan 
(1959: 231) similarly argues that “[w]orld communism […] will now be standing by, 
ready to take every advantage of unstable conditions – like those arising from the unequal 
development of the Balkans fringe of the European family of nations which led directly to 
the war of 1914 and the disruption of a former European order”.
51  The British continued to deny systematic decolonisation policies even after they had 
been forced to transfer power in West Africa and the Caribbean (Shepard, 2006: 58).
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politicians were convinced that “smaller territories could not exist on their 
own,” particularly in Africa because “[t]he Africans […] were nothing like 
as civilised or advanced as the Asians” (Heinlein, 2002: 26).
In line with this transformation of the security map, practices of 
decolonisation ‘territorialised’, resulting in territorial unity and boundary 
maintenance rather than partition in the British colonial areas of Africa. 
The Colonial Office used to present decolonisation policies as consistent 
with local aspirations of nationhood, but its resources were increasingly 
used to discredit ethnic and religious claims of anti-colonial nationalists in 
the period after 1948 (Furedi, 1994: 88). In contrast with its practices of 
decolonisation in Asia, the representatives of the Colonial Office’s African 
Division chaired by Andrew Cohen, a colonial governor who had joined 
the Colonial Office in the early 1930s, ‘guided’ the decolonisation process 
in Africa. They believed that “[t]he weaker need the help of the stronger 
peoples” and transferred the existing administrative unity – and thus the 
administrations’ territorial delimitations – to the separate African colonies 
in an effort to ensure the new states’ sustainability (Cohen, 1959: 80).52 
They allowed territorial adjustments through plebiscites only if the existing 
territorial units were considered unsustainable as independent states 
(Macmillan, 1959: 232).53 Indeed, “[i]n British policy, independence 
was the horse and unity the cart: the one was meant to pull the other” 
(Darwin, 1988: 181).
The British aimed in this process to work with “the right kind of 
nationalists” that embraced the professional diplomats’ objectives rather 
than opposed them with (military) force and that were thus more likely 
to make “reasonable concessions” in the step-by-step decolonisation 
process (Hall and Malešević, 2013: 241; Heinlein, 2002: 24). They used 
counter-insurgency tactics and covert operations to strengthen the loyal 
locals, hence weakening ‘extremist’ nationalism and disintegration of their 
administrative unity (Furedi, 1994: 195, 229-231; Heinlein, 2002: 23-24). 
52  In 1950, the Colonial Office’s report carried the preface: “The central purpose of 
British Colonial policy is simple. It is to guide the colonial territories to responsible self-
government within the Commonwealth in conditions that ensure to the people both a fair 
standard of living and freedom from aggression from any quarter” (Macmillan, 1959: 209). 
53  Notably, the British administered trust territories of Northern and Southern Cameroon 
were united with Nigeria and the Republic of Cameroon respectively while the British 
colony of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands partitioned after public votes in the territories 
because the areas were considered (economically) unviable independent states in their 
existing delimitations.
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Such attempts to divide and rule nationalist movements brought identity 
and shared experience to the fore in the development of decolonisation 
practices; they show the value negotiators themselves attached to who 
had influence in the practice of boundary politics and what their different 
beliefs were about territory and peoples. 
The French developed decolonisation policies that similarly bolstered 
the colonial administrative divisions, thus prioritising territory over 
population in the practice of boundary politics. French policies had long 
denied any political rights to Africans, but when in 1956 neighbouring 
states Morocco and Tunisia became independent and the office of 
Overseas Minister was taken by former mayor of Marseilles Gaston 
Defferre, who had worked in Senegal and who had (literally) been close 
to the Algerian issue, French Africa’s decolonisation became a tangible 
reality (Chafer, 2002: 93; 165). Defferre developed for French West Africa 
the Loi cadre, or ‘enabling act’. His chef de cabinet Fernand Wibaux then 
adopted a ‘territorialised’ as opposed to a federalist approach to this area’s 
decolonisation. This meant that the French devolved powers step-by-step 
to the territorial units constituting French West Africa, mirroring practices 
of 1955 in Togo. Aiming with the Loi cadre to maintain their foothold in 
the African colonies,54 the French started by granting local government 
councils internal autonomy. They then advanced decolonisation via local 
control of budgetary matters to the eventual transfer of jurisdiction in 
areas such as foreign affairs and defence, as such gradually locking the local 
authorities into the (territorial) structures of the existing administrations 
(Chafer, 2002: 166-167; Kahler, 1984: 194). When a referendum on 
independence was finally scheduled in 1958, votes were counted on 
a territorial basis to further consolidate the separate territories as units 
legible for independence. 
Just like the British, the French practices in decolonisation were supported 
by a conception of international peace and order as threatened by 
territorial dissolution. In France, the decolonisation and partition of India 
were generally considered “la grande débâcle coloniale” [the great colonial 
disaster], as the last governor of Chandernagor Georges Tailleur said, and 
a uniquely ‘British narrative’ that was not indicative of processes in French 
54  The French practices in the decolonisation process were generally inspired by a sturdy 
belief in what Chafer (2002: 85) calls the ‘colonial myth’ or “the belief in an indivisible 
republic composed on France and its overseas territories”.
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colonies (Tailleur, 1979: 19).55 The French deemed the post-independence 
violence in South Asia proof of the “dangers of decolonisation” (Marsh, 
2007: 66-67), hence arguing that it was necessary to continue France’s 
tutelage and to ‘guide nationalism’ in the colonies in order to avoid state 
break-ups into what the French representatives considered militarily and/or 
economically unviable new states (Marsh, 2007: 63-65; Martin, 1985).56 
In fact, the negotiators in French West Africa ensured the African députés’ 
support for territorial unity by exploiting the locals’ concerns about the 
economic and political consequences of a state break-up, which the French 
declared would leave the new states without their support (Chafer, 2002: 
172; Kahler, 1984: 188). Hence territorial changes for accommodation 
of nationalist demands were increasingly discredited in the practice of 
boundary politics; boundary maintenance gained prominence, also among 
the African diplomats whose competitive efforts to build alliances with 
their European colleagues were incompatible with desires for territorial 
adjustment (Black, 2010: 215).  
Indeed, the claims from African leaders who were bolstered in these 
guided processes of decolonisation increasingly contained the notion 
of territoriality. Prior to independence, several nationalists advocated 
boundary adjustments to accord with local realities. At the 1945 Pan-
African Congress in Manchester, they adopted under the chairmanship 
of Kwame Nkrumah for the first time a resolution proclaiming that “the 
artificial divisions and territorial boundaries created by the imperialist 
powers are deliberate steps to obstruct the political unity of the West African 
peoples,” in line with the then-prevailing practices in boundary politics 
(Touval, 1972: 23).57 Yet as decolonisation policies were implemented, 
55  In popular media, the events of 1947 were portrayed as the result of British rather than 
Indian actions (Marsh, 2007). Combined with repeatedly expressed scepticism with regard 
to the viability of the newly established states, this implicitly justified the continuation of 
French colonisation (Marsh, 2007: 63-65). The French colonies were rather represented as 
in need of France’s tutelage despite the act of decolonisation (Marsh, 2007: 65).
56  In fact, even the one exception that the French made to their practice of boundary 
maintenance in the decolonisation process – that is, the secession of the island Mayotte 
from the colony of Comoros after a public vote in 1975 – was justified on the basis of 
the state’s viability, which the French generally considered permanently dependent on the 
maintenance of the island’s link with France (e.g. Martin, 1985). 
57  The clearest call for boundary revision was articulated at the 1958 All-African Peoples 
Conference held in Accra, where the representatives of the African colonies approved a 
resolution entitled ‘Frontiers, Boundaries, and Federations’, the third of the four parts of 
which read:
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an increasing number of African state representatives considered 
territorial changes unacceptable in their effects on the international 
security situation.58 They feared that their engagement with (sub)national 
communities’ demands would “raise the spectre of endless conflict” 
(Lalonde, 2002: 116) and rather upheld a ‘territorialised’ interpretation of 
the communities legible for independence.59 Ultimately, their anticipation 
of conflict and outside interference that would render the new states 
militarily and/or economically unsustainable led the African politicians 
to collectively accept the boundaries existing at the date of independence 
under the auspices of the Organisation of African Unity.60
“Be it resolved and it is hereby resolved by the All-African Peoples Con-
ference that the Conference: 
(a) denounces artificial frontiers drawn by imperialist Powers to divide the 
peoples of Africa, particularly those which cut across ethnic groups and 
divide the people of the same stock;
(b) calls for the abolition or adjustment of such frontiers at an early date 
to this problem founded upon the true wishes of the people” (Legum, 
1965: 153).    
58  At the 1958 All-African Peoples Conference in Accra, for example, the representatives of 
French Togo and the Ivory Coast deemed such changes to support the disruptive Moroccan, 
Tunisian and Egyptian territorial aspirations while the Ethiopians had misgivings about 
them in light of Somali efforts to control parts of its territory (Touval, 1972: 60). And a year 
later, at the 1959 Sanniquellie Conference, politicians further endorsed territorial stability 
when they judged any mention of boundaries disruptive of Liberia’s renouncement of long-
standing territorial claims against Guinea only a few months earlier (Touval, 1972: 61).
59  This is evident in the Kenyan representatives’ response at the 1963 Addis Ababa 
Conference to the question whether applying self-determination to the Somalis would 
mean transfer of territory or merely transfer of population. They said: “If they do not want 
to live with us in Kenya, they are perfectly free to leave us and our territory. […] This is 
the only way they can legally exercise their right to self-determination’” (Mazrui, 1967: 
12), attesting to a conceptualisation of population as defined by territory rather than by 
national or communal background.
60  The president of Mali declared at the founding summit of the OAU in 1963: “[W]e 
must take Africa as it is, and we must renounce any territorial claims, if we do not wish 
to introduce what we might call black imperialism in Africa. […] African unity demands 
of each one of us complete respect for the legacy that we have received from the colonial 
system, that is to say: maintenance of the present frontiers of our respective states. […] 
Indeed, if we take certain parts of Africa in the pre-colonial period, history teaches us 
that there existed a myriad kingdoms and empires […] which today have transcended, in 
the case of certain states, tribal and ethnic differences to constitute a nation, a real nation 
[…] if we desire that our nations should be ethnic entities, speaking the same language 
and having the same psychology, then we shall find no single veritable nation in Africa” 
(Simmler, 1999: 84).
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In line with these practices in decolonisation, the United Nations, which 
proved a forum for the integration of newly independent states in the 
international diplomatic arena, applied a ‘territorialised’ interpretation 
of the ‘peoples’ entitled to self-determination following its 1948 Charter. 
This is particularly evident in its members’ failure to admit Mauritania as a 
member state independent from its annexation by Morocco at the fifteenth 
(1960) and sixteenth (1961) session of the UN General Assembly. The 
members of the Fourth Committee and the General Assembly also gave 
the Northern Cameroons only the option of joining the Federation of 
Nigeria upon decolonisation in the plebiscite they organised; they hence 
denied them the option of redrawing boundaries in accordance with 
the ethnically Ewe population’s demands. With the conflict following 
India’s partition still on the UN General Assembly’s agenda and Afro-
Asian representatives led by Indian Krishna Menon pressuring against 
the Cameroons’ partition, the fear of leaving the Cameroons as unviable 
states that disrupt the international order which underlay the plebiscite 
was directly inspired by events in India (Chem-Langhëë, 2004: 131). 
The broader emphasis on territory over population can be traced to the 
United Nation’s founding conference in 1945. An important reference 
point then was the “unhappy interwar history of Europe” that disrupted 
the prevailing security map, changing it for international peace and order 
following practices of territoriality in decolonisation (Fabry, 2010: 161). 
Practices after decolonisation: Territoriality
The stability of boundaries endorsed by the ‘territorialised’ practices both 
in the decolonised areas and in the broader international order, at least in 
terms of large-scale interstate conflicts, then strengthened the assessment 
among negotiators that state break-up and (nation-)state creation are a 
threat to the international system. Since the surge of decolonisation in 
Africa and Asia in the 1960s, in an era that had seen a reaffirmation 
of diplomatic procedures and an increase in professional diplomacy 
combined with official visits from heads of state encouraged by the Cold 
War and technological developments in communications (Black, 2010: 
218-219; 221), negotiators discouraged irredentism and secessionism in 
the Balkans and elsewhere by ensuring territorial unity upon Yugoslavia’s 
dissolution in 1991. There was broad consensus among European state 
representatives that Yugoslavia’s break-up in line with nationalist demands 
had unforeseeable and potentially disruptive effects on the international 
territorial order for opening a Pandora’s box of contradicting claims (Owen, 
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1995: 33). The President of the European Community, Dutch Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Hans van den Broek, indeed notes his colleagues’ fear 
of international disorder saying: “Imagine […] that the whole of Europe 
would partition itself along ethnic lines. That was a nightmare scenario” 
(Both, 2000: 85). The concern that one state’s break-up would stimulate 
territorial claims and the creation of small (ethnically homogenous) states 
elsewhere was considered particularly important in light of the growing 
unrest in the Soviet Union and the large number of entities expressing 
territorial claims in other European states, who would be eligible for 
independence under the recognition of national self-determination. 
In line with this conceptualisation of peace and international order, the 
practice of boundary politics in the post-Cold War era has been characterised 
by a prioritisation of territory over population. Sovereignty changes are rare 
and recognised only when boundaries are maintained. State dissolutions 
occur only with the federations’ highest order constituent units gaining 
recognition of their independence, and secessionist states are delimited 
within existing administrative boundaries. Indeed, claims to territory 
raised in communities that do not control existing territorial units have no 
place in contemporary boundary politics. While secessionist claims that 
are not tied to a defined territory remain ineffectual, peoples being unable 
to gain independence or autonomy on the basis of a definition of the 
‘community’, representatives of conflicting parties always consolidate the 
administrative delimitation of the legible ‘territorial unit’ as independence 
becomes a tangible reality in cases of secession. International negotiators 
then appeal to those who already control a defined territory, strengthening 
their positions as politicians. European politicians for example convened 
meetings concerning Yugoslavia’s dissolution with the republics’ presidents 
as parties’ representatives already in late 1990, establishing them as the 
relevant authorities in the negotiation process (Donia and Fine, 1994: 212-
213; Castellino and Allen, 2003: 160).61 This practice excludes identity as 
an alternative for territorial distribution in present-day boundary politics.
The shifts in the discourses and practices in boundary politics are 
summarised in Table 4.2. It displays the differences in five different eras, 
61  Although various attempts were made to manage the events, ranging from the codification 
of a right to secession from multi-ethnic federal states to the creation of a specific European 
right to self-determination founded on the democratic principles of the CSCE and other 
European agreements, it was assumed in all practices that sovereignty would be transferred 
to the republics along their borders determined in 1945 (Simmler, 1999: 228; Lalonde, 
2002: 194; Owen, 1995: 34).
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particularly noting practices with regard to territories and populations and 
their underlying assumptions about the sources and threats to peace and 
order. 
This alternative reading of history reveals that the implications of 
sovereignty change are fundamentally managed on the basis of actors’ 
conceptualisations of peace and order. While security is always central in 
proceedings, the prevailing conceptualisation of what is a security problem 
and what is not, and thus how certain policies can impact (inter)national 
security, transformed several times over the course the twentieth century. 
In contrast with the leading understanding of history in which the practice 
of boundary maintenance has for nearly two centuries been connected 
with the phenomenon of state independence, this genealogy of discourses 
and practices in boundary politics shows that security scenarios are drawn 
after political breaks and revolutionary challenges to the existing security 
map enable a different set of actors with different conceptions of threats to 
peace and order to gain influence in the practice of boundary politics. This 
casts doubt on the idea of scholars like Coggins (2001) and Castellino and 
Allen that discourses and practices are shaped by politicians from powerful 
states. Other agents than politicians have influenced practices in the past. 
And it was not coercion, nor the focal function of boundaries, but their 
argument in light of a recent contradiction of existing beliefs with regard 
to peaceful territorial change violence that introduced shifts in practices. 
Following nationalist violence, public and military influences established 
accommodation of communal demands for independence or geopolitical 
strategic realities to prevent outbreaks of such crises in the future.
The origins of the contemporary practice of boundary maintenance 
notably lie in the post-WWII partition of India and Palestine and in the 
consolidation of administrative unity in Africa as a consequence of European 
politicians’ desire to maintain their foothold in the continent. Territorial 
changes lost appeal after the failure of early twentieth century attempts to 
separate ethnic or religious communities peacefully. The stability following 
the ‘channelled’ African decolonisation process that imprinted the colonial 
maps onto the new states then secured practices in boundary politics that 
are based on the idea that prevailed among professionals of diplomacy that 
state break-ups and the emergence of small (ethnically homogenous) states 
were undesirable for international peace and order.
Too often, this origin of this practice of boundary maintenance is forgotten 
and people emphasise the adherence to the uti possidetis principle in the 
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Table 4.2: Key tenets of practices and discourses in boundary politics 
throughout history 
Nineteenth century Early twentieth century
Practices
Procedures for territory Boundary maintenance 
with adjustments to 
accommodate additional 
de facto territorial control 
Territorial partition, 
boundary adjustment 
to mirror communities’ 
patterns of settlement
Procedures for populations Communities are 
accommodated within 
existing territorial units 
Population unification, 
legal protection (free 
cities, minority rights) 
Tools Geographic maps, 









Threat to (inter)national 
security
(Re)occupation of 
territory that is under 
minimal de facto control 
by non-indigenous 
peoples forms threat to 
international security
Divided or intermingled 
communities form threat 
to national security
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along geopolitical strategic 
















Population statistics and 
calculations, (historical) 
maps
Most recent geographic 
maps and their 
foundational agreements, 
occasional plebiscites
Most recent geographic 
maps and their foundational 
agreements
Defensibility Sustainable transfer of 
state independence 
Consolidation of state 
independence 
Antagonistic communities 
able to make military 
strategic gains form threat 
to national security
State break-up in nation-
states forms a threat to 
international security 
State break-up in nation-
states forms a threat to 
international security
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decolonisation of Latin America in the early nineteenth century. Yet not 
only were the practices then importantly different from those associated 
with the principle’s present-day manifestations, these practices were 
undergirded by notably distinct security considerations. Both in opinio 
juris and in the practice of boundary politics in Latin America, the new 
state leaders emphasised (re)occupation by non-indigenous peoples as the 
major threat to peace and order in the region and they thus consolidated 
state independence by discrediting existing territorial titles and excluding 
unclaimed territory or terra nullius on the continent. As such, boundary 
maintenance was not a goal in itself but a means to ensure national 
self-determination beyond local leaders’ actual control over territory. In 
contrast, the practice of boundary maintenance contemporarily associated 
with the uti possidetis principle discredits nationalist claims to territory 
legally awarded to others. It thus restricts self-rule irrespective of local 
communities’ actual control over land; peoples need to accommodate 
territorial stability.
Conclusion
Social history shows that practices in boundary politics are the outcome 
of (discursive) struggles for definition of the security threat(s) related 
to territories and populations. Political breaks and revolutionary crises 
enable different sets of actors with different conceptions of threats to 
peace and order to gain influence in the practice of boundary politics, 
particularly when the violence challenges existing beliefs with regard to 
peaceful territorial change. While professionals in diplomacy in the past 
defined practices in light of their fear of state break-ups into nation-states 
as disturbances of international order when violence followed efforts to 
separate communities in territorial units, outbreaks of nationalist war 
enabling trends in public or armed diplomacy to influence boundary 
politics introduced self-determination and defensibility as criteria for 
territorial delimitation. This indicates that realists such as Coggins (2011) 
mistake the principal actors for professional representatives of states, while 
both realists and liberal institutionalists like Carter and Goemans (2011) 
misrepresent the mechanism by which actors establish practices. Practices 
are not the outcome of coercion, nor a retreat to the existing boundaries 
as focal points in negotiations, but the result of a compelling logic or 
doxa that negotiators introduce in response to challenges of the prevailing 
security map.
115
In contrast with the conventional wisdom that boundary maintenance 
logically connects with state independence, this genealogy reveals that the 
principle of uti possidetis has not been fixed. Practices have been redefined 
regularly under the notion of uti possidetis and the principle was side-
lined for consideration of strategic, military, economic, ethnographic, and 
political factors at various times. Hence the uti possidetis principle does not 
provide a standard of practices or expectations that could function as a focal 
point or norm for agents in boundary politics. In fact, the contemporary 
practices associated with the principle have rather recent origins. They do 
trace back to the decolonisation of Latin American states in the 1820s, as 
many in both theory and practice believe, but to post-WWII Europe and 
the early attempts at decolonisation in Asia and Africa, when professionals 
in diplomacy then established that nationalism was the main threat to the 
existing peace and order. Boundary maintenance is the response to the fear 
– whether realistic or not – that state break-ups and the creation of nation-
states are dangerous, which has prevailed in the practice of boundary 
politics since conflict broke out following the territorial division of India 
in the early 1950s while stability prevailed upon the recognition of the 
African states’ independence in accordance with their colonial maps. 
Inconsistent with the variability of practices in the past, boundary 
maintenance has institutionalised since the mid-1970s. The last state was 
created in violation of the uti possidetis principle in 1975. In the most 
recent cases of state secession, notably Kosovo and South Sudan, and 
the annexation of Autonomous Republic of Crimea, negotiators hardly 
addressed the territorial definition of units beyond an identification of 
the existing administrative boundaries. The acceptance of boundary 
maintenance as common practice to delimit international borders is to 
authorise and forget the historical arbitrariness of its establishment and 
the hazards that played a part in discrediting its alternatives. Indeed, 
negotiators in the contemporary practice of boundary politics operate with 
an ahistorical model that forges a link between the term uti possidetis and 
the practice of boundary maintenance. This link between the principle and 
the practice is confirmed in contemporary theory and practice; the claim 
for the principle’s origin in state independence wherever it occurred can be 
found in legal and academic accounts of developments in state creation, 
but this origin cannot be found in past practices of boundary politics.
Institutionalisation of boundary maintenance then freezes practices in 
boundary politics, which has permitted them to gain distance from other 
contemporary practices that concern the relationship between territory and 
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population. In many national and international legal systems, population 
and nationality have come to the foreground since the decolonisation of 
African states. Particularly since the end of the Cold War, individual human 
rights in international law have been supplemented by minority rights and 
(land) rights of indigenous communities. Subnational communities are 
increasingly empowered in their relation to the states they inhabit. This is 
also evident in recent transformations in the meaning of citizenship. While 
citizenship politics were territorialised in the early twentieth century with 
politicians seeking to ‘populate the land’ and to ‘homogenise’ populations, 
Ragazzi (2012) describes that citizenship has ethnicised. It is now common 
for citizens to gain dual citizenship and voting rights abroad, which are 
based on their nationality rather than on their place of residence, while 
non-nationals are increasingly excluded in practices of citizenship. This 
indicates a shift in the relationship between territory and population since 
the 1950s that renders practices associated with the uti possidetis principle 
incompatible with other practices in international diplomacy.
This social history of struggles to define the security map and thus 
practices in boundary politics leaves the situational conditions under 
which practices are shaped for further exploration. An in-depth study of 
international negotiations is necessary to understand how specific actors 
gain influence to define practices and how their logics are constituted in 
context on the basis of their social backgrounds. The following chapters 
hence examine negotiators and the strategies they use to legitimise their 
stances in the international negotiation process concerning the secession 
and subsequent internal territorial division of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
along the new Inter-Entity Boundary Line between 1991 and 1995. This 
analysis shows that different groups of negotiators anticipate different 
threats to security in territorial disputes, and hence differ in what they 
consider a ‘strategic’ or ‘realistic’ arrangement. Indeed, I conclude that the 
discourses and practices of boundary maintenance are not shared; it was 
exactly the contradiction of existing expectations of peace that created an 
opportunity for the military to settle disputes by codification of ethnic 




A Sociological Analysis of Practices 
in Boundary Politics: Professionals of 
Politics and Territoriality in the Yugoslav 
Federation
How do diplomatic actors manage the implications of sovereignty changes 
for international borders in the context of specific negotiations? The crisis 
in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991 was a moment 
open to define practices in boundary politics. The uti possidetis principle 
prevailed; the state dissolved with its successor states maintaining the 
republican boundaries. But the territory of one of these successor states, 
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was de facto divided between 
ethnic communities only five years later. This means that while boundaries 
were officially drawn in conformity with the uti possidetis principle, their 
effects contradict this prevailing practice. In order to understand this 
apparent anomaly, it is necessary to analyse the agents and the social 
processes through which they established these territorial arrangements in 
the negotiation process. It then appears that different groups of negotiators 
had different conceptions of peace and order. They identified different 
security threat(s) related to territories and populations for which they 
found alternative solutions. A particular set of professionals of politics 
supporting a doxa against the creation of nation-states gained authority 
first to define outcomes in the Yugoslav crisis without territorial changes. 
Yet military representatives influenced the practice of boundary politics 
after nationalist violence broke out challenging this territorial arrangement 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was through the military justification of 
defensibility that the nationalist vision ultimately became acceptable as the 
‘feasible’ or ‘realistic’ outcome.
In this chapter, I analyse how the possibilities to manage sovereignty 
change upon the emergence of the Yugoslav crisis were narrowed down 
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to one territorial arrangement in line with the uti possidetis principle. I 
argue that boundary maintenance was the outcome of an international 
negotiation process structured on the idea that creating nation-states 
by means of territorial adjustment was undesirable for international 
peace and order. This doxa prevailed among professionals of politics in 
the European Community as a response to the violence in the Yugoslav 
federation in July 1991. The hostilities foregrounded the association of 
boundary change with irredentism and a disruption of international 
order rather than dispute settlement. Particularly representatives facing 
aggressive nationalism in their home states then sided with Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs Gianni de Michelis and Hans-Dietrich Genscher in their 
early calls for boundary maintenance. De Michelis and Genscher had 
shown particular proponents of European integration in negotiations for 
the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. In line with this prioritisation of territory over 
population, they unequivocally rejected accommodating nations in the 
break-up of Yugoslavia. The belief that creating nation-states was ‘out of 
date’ and would open a ‘Pandora’s box’ of territorial changes elsewhere then 
convinced their colleagues to abandon the idea of boundary redrawing in 
Yugoslavia after violence had broken out. 
This response to violence in Yugoslavia definitively oriented the 
development of the territorial arrangement in the direction of boundary 
maintenance when the EC Ministers of Foreign Affairs established the EC 
Conference on Yugoslavia. Under the lead of German Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Hans-Dietrich Genscher, they mobilised a delegation of (former) 
politicians and civil servants to formulate a territorial arrangement, 
while they engaged a commission of lawyers trained in constitutional 
law at the initiative of French Minister of Foreign Affairs Roland Dumas 
(pressured by his President’s former Minister of Justice and President of 
the Constitutional Council Robert Badinter). The procedures of selection 
by the EC Ministers of Foreign Affairs remain unclear. Participants prove 
unwilling to discuss the matter openly while minutes of deliberations are 
absent or classified. Yet it is clear in line with the principal-agent approach 
that these actors were all likely and sometimes demonstrated supporters 
of statehood defined by political unity, so detached from nationalist 
sentiments of territorial adjustment, in accordance with what the ministers 
had coordinated on. They then structured the negotiation process towards 
independence of the territorial units in the Yugoslav federation. They 
set boundary maintenance as a (legal) condition for negotiation and 
strictly controlled who spoke when and with whom to leave the option of 
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territorial adjustments off the table. This gave the EC Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs the opportunity in December 1991 to materialise maintenance of 
the republican boundaries despite continued objections raised by President 
Milošević of the republic of Serbia. 
These findings are at odds with existing explanations. Realists in 
International Relations theory like Krasner (1999) and Coggins (2011) 
theorise accurately that boundary maintenance originates with powerful 
actors in international diplomacy, yet the international negotiations 
concerning Yugoslavia’s dissolution show that they might be misguided 
on the underlying mechanism. A detailed analysis of the international 
negotiation process demonstrates that integrationist EC Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs did not change behaviours by means of tacit or explicit 
coercion; attitudinal changes were based in beliefs or doxa on to the 
creation of nation-states. Professionals of politics generally shared 
association that irredentism needed to be curtailed for international 
peace and order, so once violence broke out in Yugoslavia, they agreed to 
respond by maintaining boundaries. This security map remained largely 
unquestioned among the professionals of politics in Europe; it was not 
based on pure rational choice and refrained them from settling with the 
Serbs, who constituted the second-largest ethnic community in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, in the territorial arrangement. The politicians believed 
in boundary stability as a remedy for state break-ups in nation-states. 
Analysis of the negotiation process furthermore reveals that there 
was not initially the broad agreement on outcomes expected in norm-
driven accounts of the practice of boundary politics. Many mainstream 
constructivist and English School theorists such as Fabry (2010) argue 
that norms of international legitimacy settled in the 1960s and early 
1970s and extended into the post-Cold War era to guide behaviour. Hence 
“international diplomacy never seriously explored [change of borders] in 
any contentious cases prior to recognition of the new states,” Fabry (2010: 
205) writes. But boundary maintenance was in fact not the expected 
outcome from the start in diplomacy on the Yugoslav federation. Until 
violence escalated in mid-July 1991, a snapshot of the process included 
negotiations that could well have led to a reconsideration of republican 
boundaries in contrast with a norm on territorial stability. It was in fact 
only when the association with nationalism spread that adherence to the 
uti possidetis principle became the only possible outcome for European 
professionals of politics. 
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And boundary maintenance did not serve as a simple rule or ‘focal 
point’ or lowest common denominator for negotiators, as neoliberal 
institutionalists like Zacher (2001) and Carter and Goemans (2011) 
argue. “[U]ncertainty is minimised for both local actors and leaders when 
borders they have previously coordinated on become the new international 
borders,” Carter and Goemans (2011: 284) claim. Whether this is true or 
not, at close look at the international negotiation process reveals that the 
political leaders of the Yugoslav republics at no point all considered it 
true. The uti possidetis principle did hence not minimise uncertainty, nor 
did it reduce the transaction costs in the negotiation process. With the 
(former) politicians and civil servants and the commission of lawyers in 
the EC Conference on Yugoslavia, the EC Ministers of Foreign Affairs in 
fact invested significantly to set boundary stability as a precondition for 
negotiation between the Yugoslavs exactly because the president of the 
later Republic of Serbia did not subscribe to the principle. 
My account fundamentally distinguishes from these existing explanations 
in its emphasis on actors in addition to context in order to develop how 
practices were constructed in boundary politics. A focus on context leads 
theorists in International Relations literature to consider as objective 
the effects of conflict in the international territorial order or the system 
of international norms on practices. Yet I find that these effects are 
interpreted in practice by negotiators on the basis of their socialisation in 
networks and practices. People with different social backgrounds tend to 
define different threats to peace and order and hence take different stances 
on territorial arrangements. This stance-taking can only be understood if 
one reconstructs the negotiators’ past experiences that are actualised in 
the context of particular negotiations. To then understand how particular 
stances shape practices, we need to consider their interactions in context, 
which means that we need to study the agents and the social processes 
through which they establish practices in managing a specific territorial 
dispute. 
In this chapter, I analyse first how boundary maintenance became the only 
‘realistic’ outcome in Yugoslavia’s dissolution for professionals of politics in 
the European Community. I find that consensus was reached first among 
directors general of political affairs. Quickly following the disruption 
of violence in the Yugoslav space, particularly representatives of states 
facing secessionism supported ‘integrationist’ Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
Gianni de Michelis and Hans-Dietrich Genscher in rejecting state break-
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up in homogeneous nation-states as ‘outdated’ and dangerous for peace 
and order. I then continue in the second and third section by exploring 
how the professionals of politics mobilised this security map to pave the 
way for adherence to the uti possidetis principle. I trace that the Yugoslavs 
were offered territorial statehood by a team of civil servants, which was 
supported by a commission of constitutional lawyers. Legal traditionalism 
and occupational experience in politics positioned these actors in line 
with the EC Ministers of Foreign Affairs. This leads to the conclusion 
that boundary maintenance upon dissolution of the Yugoslav federation 
was fundamentally based in the doxa of EC Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
against the creation of nation-states, which was enforced in the negotiation 
process.
European professionals of politics and a threat to international order
Early discussion on boundary maintenance
Early international diplomacy concerning the crisis in Yugoslavia was 
characterised by attempts to prevent state break-up. Soviet Foreign 
Minister Bessmertnykh said during his April 1991 visit to Belgrade that 
he considered the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia “one of the essential 
preconditions for the stability of Europe,” while representatives of the Bush 
Administration steadfastly supported maintenance of the state’s territorial 
unity (Cohen, 1993: 215). And when Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
assembled in the EC Council of Ministers on 28 June in Luxembourg, 
Gianni de Michelis initiated a ‘Troika’ mediation mission to leave in the 
afternoon to resolve the crisis through revived presidential appointment 
of Croatian representative Stipe Mesić and suspended implementation of 
the declarations of independence in line with the June 8 ‘EC Statement on 
Yugoslavia’ (Tanner, 1997: 251).62 Scheduled the next day with rotation 
of the EC Presidency to lose his membership of this Troika,63 De Michelis 
62  The June 8 ‘EC Statement on Yugoslavia’ stipulates that “[t]he normal rotation of the 
federal Presidency, negotiations on the future constitutional structures, respect for human 
rights in all parts of the country, a strengthening of the democratic process as well as the 
pursuit of the economic reform programme of Prime Minister Marković, will permit a new 
dimension to relations between the Community and Yugoslavia in accordance with the 
traditional ties that unite them” (Trifunovska, 1994: 286).
63  The Troika was traditionally composed of De Michelis himself as the past president 
of the European Council on Foreign Affairs and his colleagues Hans van den Broek and 
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used his last opportunity to mobilise a European Community diplomatic 
strategy to prevent territorial reconstruction of Yugoslavia.
Gianni de Michelis had as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy since 1989 
invested in the foundations of the European integration process. He had 
towards the end of 1990 convened an Extraordinary European Council 
meeting and two Intergovernmental Conferences in Rome on political 
union and on monetary and economic union that launched the process 
towards the 1992 Maastricht Treaty (General Secretariat of the Council, 
2012: 14). Thinking in terms of transfer of authority from the state to the 
supranational and intergovernmental level, he had little understanding of 
movements for the opposite fragmentation or ‘balkanisation’. For him and 
other fierce proponents of European integration like Jacques Poos, “it went 
against their whole philosophy” to see nationalism defeat a federation in 
the middle of Europe.64 “The realities of global interdependence are a fait 
accompli,” De Michelis (1990) wrote in the Los Angeles Times in March 
1990. And while he envisioned political integration to include the Eastern 
European states after the collapse of communism, he noted the end of 
nationalism or racism and fragmentation: “All that is certain for now is the 
obsolescence of the nation-state”. 
As such, he was the first one who spoke out against a change of republican 
boundaries upon dissolution of the Yugoslav federation. In line with his 
prioritisation of territory over population in the negotiation process for 
integration into a European Union that would coordinate a common 
foreign and security policy between member states, he objected to 
accommodating nations in the fragmentation of a state in the Yugoslav 
space. His German colleague Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who had also 
proven a supporter of transferring powers further from populations in the 
European integration process, supported him on boundary maintenance. 
In a Berlin statement, the Serbian leadership was called upon to “finally 
come to the realisation that the world has changed. […] Fighting for 
supremacy will not be accepted” (Jahn, 1991). 
Some others proved more willing to explore whether the Yugoslavs could 
reach consensus on boundary changes in line with the expressed desires 
of President Slobodan Milošević of the republic of Serbia and President 
Jacques Poos as the current and next EC presidents.
64  Interview with Richard Lewis
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Franjo Tuđman of the republic of Croatia. Preparing for formulation of the 
second phase of the EC intervention after the Troika mediation mission 
had failed, representative of the Dutch EC Presidency Director-General 
for Political Affairs Peter Van Walsum for example sent out a message 
to his colleagues on 13 July 1991 suggesting the voluntary redrawing 
of Yugoslavia’s republican boundaries as “a possible solution” (Owen, 
1995: 32).65 This idea proved acceptable to Danish Director-General for 
Political Affairs Hans Henrik Bruun and was supported by bureaucrats 
under the lead of Christopher Hulse at the British Foreign Office Eastern 
European Department in earlier briefing papers. Hence while much of 
the existing literature understands maintenance of boundaries in the case 
of Yugoslavia’s dissolution as paradigmatic of a trend towards territorial 
stability, the early phase of the international negotiation process shows a 
much more complex and contradictory pattern. The option of redrawing 
boundaries was in fact on the table until mid-July 1991 in contradiction 
with such a trend. 
This opposition to the necessity of boundary maintenance claimed by 
Gianni de Michelis and Hans-Dietrich Genscher mirrored diverging 
stances on peoples’ autonomy in European integration. The proponents of 
a voluntary redrawing of boundaries in Yugoslavia all worked for ministers 
that had proven hesitant to advance political integration along the lines 
set out by Gianni de Michelis. The British Foreign Secretary Douglas 
65  In a COREU (Correspondence Européene, the telegram style through which professionals 
communicated in the European Community) message, Van Walsum wrote for developing 
“a common position which may serve as guidance for possible Troika involvement in the 
Yugoslav negotiation process”: 
1. We seem to agree that it is not possible for Yugoslavia to continue to exist with its 
present constitutional structure intact. The joint declaration of Brioni clearly states 
that a new situation has arisen in Yugoslavia.
2. It is equally difficult to imagine that Yugoslavia could peacefully dissolve into 
six independent republics within their present borders. Both Serbia and Serbian 
elements in the federal administration – not least the JNA – have made it plain that 
they will never tolerate the emergence of an independent Croatia with 11 per cent 
Serbs within its borders.
3. A loosely structured Yugoslavia consisting of six sovereign republics is not likely 
to assuage these Serbian concerns either. The higher the degree of sovereignty 
for Croatia, the greater the need for solid guarantees for the Serbian minority in 
Croatia. The looser the federal structure, the more difficult it will be to supply such 
guarantees.
4. The foregoing seems to point in the direction of a voluntary redrawing of internal 
borders as a possible solution (Owen, 1995: 31-33). 
124
Hurd and Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 
Douglas Hogg had said in June 1991 to fear the extended Community’s 
competence under the 1992 Maastricht Treaty and maintained that 
supranational cooperation would not work for foreign and security policy 
(White, 2009: 128). Douglas Hurd expressed to his colleague EC Minister 
of Foreign Affairs that he feared the European Commission would 
penetrate the “nooks and crannies” of British life particularly through 
immigration policies (Oakley and Brock, 1991). The Danish Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Uffe Ellemann-Jensen then made sure that the final draft 
of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty contained a referendum in which the Danes 
voted ‘no’ a year later. Polls showed a great attachment to ‘Danishness’ and 
self-determination, which made a majority of voters sceptical of devolving 
sovereignty to Brussels (Barnes, 1992). Hence considerations of territorial 
changes in Yugoslavia were grounded in these ministers’ more general 
prioritisation of population over territory.
Different conceptions of security threats 
Their different understanding of the relationship between territory and 
peoples led the directors general of political affairs of Denmark and 
the United Kingdom to support Peter van Walsum in his initiative for 
a voluntary redrawing of Yugoslavia’s republican boundaries. Peter van 
Walsum raised the idea of territorial adjustment seeing such changes in 
light of negotiation on a border that settled disputes prior to independence. 
Boundary changes were for him a way to provide stability and certainty in 
terms of (political) position and entitlements for the Yugoslavs, establishing 
“states where everyone knows where he stands” rather than ethnically pure 
states (Van Walsum, 2001: 77-78). In fact, having more than twenty years 
of experience being posted as a civil servant in South-Eastern Europe first 
in 1967, Van Walsum based his proposal exactly on the fear that “some 
other party” would unilaterally change boundaries to create nation-states 
after he read in the Financial Times that Milošević and Tuđman had talked 
about dividing up the territory of the republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(NIOD, 2002: 63). 
A similar understanding of boundary changes as dispute settlement had 
informed efforts by the British Douglas Hogg and his Assistant Under-
Secretary of State for Soviet Union and Eastern Europe Michael Tait 
earlier that year when they visited Yugoslavia. Just like Peter van Walsum, 
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these professionals of politics had considered deliberation on territorial 
adjustments a means forestall nationalist aggression in Yugoslavia rather 
than to accommodate it. Redrawing boundaries “could prove a difficult 
and complicated exercise” and “the prospect of such an action made blood 
in Western Europe run cold” unless it was done by means of arbitration, 
they held, but they found the Yugoslav presidents “reasonable” people with 
whom they could do business to reconcile demands short of aggression 
for fragmentation in nation-states (Glaurdić, 2013: 555). They identified 
escalation of differences by the Yugoslav People’s Army as the “destabilising 
element,” particularly once it would act to unite the Yugoslavs (Glaurdić, 
2013: 551).
Gianni de Michelis and Hans-Dietrich Genscher had in contrast 
associated calls for boundary changes in Yugoslavia with the creation 
of nation-states, which they considered in opposition to the peace and 
order in Europe. “Attempts at disintegration, or fragmentation out of fear 
and uncertainty, are negative reactions to interdependence, manifest as 
protectionism, ethnic nationalism and religious fundamentalism” that 
characterised the “Dark Ages”, De Michelis (1990) had written in the Los 
Angeles Times in March 1990. This association with aggressive forms of 
nationalism became more widely shared among professionals of politics 
in the European Community with images of tanks on the streets, refugee 
columns and attacks on civilian targets to ethnically cleanse specific 
territories towards the end of July 1991. The Director-General of Political 
Affairs from France Jacques Blot and his Spanish colleague then joined the 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Italy and Germany in rejecting the idea of 
redrawing boundaries in line with ethnic patterns of settlement (NIOD, 
2002: 65). They faced secessionism in Corsica and in the Basque regions 
and Catalonia respectively and proved particularly inclined to oppose the 
creation of nation-states in the Yugoslav federation upon the outbreak of 
violence there. 
That such creation of nation-states was ‘out of date’ and would open a 
Pandora’s box forcing a change of boundaries in response to nationalism 
in the Soviet Union, which was about to disintegrate, and perhaps 
destabilising regions in Africa or even in Europe with its “patchwork 
structure”66 then convinced their colleagues to abandon Van Walsum’s idea 
of boundary redrawing in Yugoslavia (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 
66  Interview with Christiaan Kröner
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2000: 10). Van Walsum remembers that his message was “torpedoed” by 
his colleagues.67 The professionals of politics were hence not coerced to 
change behaviours, nor were their attitudinal changes based on the pure 
rational choice, as both realists and neoliberal institutionalists theorise. 
Professionals of politics rather shared association that irredentism threatened 
international peace and order, so they agreed on the basis of beliefs or doxa 
to respond by maintaining boundaries once violence foregrounded this 
association in Yugoslavia. The directors general of political affairs and their 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs have indeed shown a largely unquestioned 
attitude against boundary changes. Territorial stability was what Van 
Walsum’s deputy Christiaan Kröner calls their “basic instinct”68. Kröner 
found that many professionals of politics considered territorial changes 
to create states along ethnic patterns of settlement claimed in Yugoslavia 
“primitive,” which unified their stances against changes to the republican 
boundaries under nationalist war.69
A final response to aggressive nationalism
The option of boundary changes was decisively discarded at the following 
meeting of EC Ministers of Foreign Affairs on 29 July 1991. In an effort 
to forestall aggressive nationalism, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs’ 
stances converged on boundary maintenance in Yugoslavia; there was 
little to no discussion on the alternative, which was discredited in the 
integrationist framework of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) 
where the ministers met to coordinate their policies (Tweede Kamer der 
Staten-Generaal, 2000: 22-23).70 Neither the Dutch Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Hans van den Broek nor Deputy Director-General Political Affairs 
Christiaan Kröner, who attended the Ministerial Meeting in Peter van 
Walsum’s absence, raised their colleague’s note for a voluntary redrawing 
of the republican boundaries. The Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs Uffe 
67  Interview with Peter van Walsum
68  Interview with Christiaan Kröner
69  Interview with Christiaan Kröner
70  The EPC was an independent body for intergovernmental coordination of foreign 
policies rather than an integral part of the European Community. The terms of cooperation 
in the EPC were stipulated in the 1986 Single European Act, which was integrationist also 
in its clause that representatives of the member states should “avoid any action or attitude 
which reduces their effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations or within 
international organisations”.
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Ellemann-Jensen or his British colleague Douglas Hurd also chose not to 
reiterate their colleagues’ support for this idea. Rather, Ellemann-Jensen 
dismissed it as ‘bureaucratic flexibility’ that he considered unsustainable 
at the political level.71 “We have an enormously strong presumption in 
favour of existing boundaries,” Douglas Hogg stated only a few months 
later (Simms, 2003: 11-12), while Van den Broek described Van Walsum’s 
message as containing ‘several options’ to deny that it pointed in the 
direction of boundary change (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2000: 
22). The idea had by then become “unrealistic,” Kröner remarks, and 
“diplomacy is the art of the practical”.72 
The ministers’ engagement in the process of territorial integration in Europe 
contributed to reaching this eventual consensus on boundary maintenance. 
The EC President and Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans van den 
Broek in general subordinated management of the Yugoslav crisis to the 
integrative process in the European Community. With the development of 
the 1992 Maastricht Treaty on the table for completion within his term of 
presidency, Van den Broek had dismissed the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 
preparing for his time in office. The bureau for Eastern Europe that had to 
deal with both the Yugoslav federation and the Soviet Union in the Dutch 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was reduced in size under his authority and 
counted no more than three officials in the summer of 1991 (De Graaff, 
2004: 142). Van den Broek then often excluded this bureaucracy from 
interactions with his foreign counterparts (NIOD, 2002: 46), declaring 
later that he subordinated knowledge to keeping the standpoints of the EC 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs on the same line in preparation for the 1992 
Maastricht Treaty (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2000: 23). In fact, 
by some accounts he “lost interest” when he realised that there was not 
going to be a diplomatic success concerning Yugoslavia during his term 
as EC President of Foreign Affairs and concentrated on the integration 
instead.73
So the idea of redrawing boundaries in the Yugoslav federation was discarded 
on the basis of the unquestioned beliefs of EC Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
that creating nation-states by means of territorial adjustment threatened 
the international order. The ministers’ interests differed when calls for 
71  Interview with Uffe Ellemann-Jensen
72  Interview with Christiaan Kröner
73  Interview with Richard Lewis
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disintegration emerged in Yugoslavia, with EC Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs and their representatives who prioritised population over territory 
in European integration proving more willing to explore whether the 
Yugoslav political leaders could settle disputes through boundary changes 
than their colleagues. Yet the outbreak of violence in Yugoslavia in July 
1991 foregrounded the beliefs already expressed by the integrationists 
among professionals of politics at the European Community. Calls for 
boundary change were increasingly associated with the creation of nation-
states after unilateral actions had been taken for forced displacement 
and ethnic cleansing in the Yugoslav federation – an association that 
converged stances of professionals of politics in opposition to boundary 
changes. Boundary maintenance in Yugoslavia hence developed from a 
history of negotiations in which the option of redrawing boundaries was 
explored but discarded in responses to violence for territorial adjustment 
in correspondence with ethnic patterns of settlement in the Yugoslav 
federation.
European professionals of politics and their reinforcement through 
negotiations
Boundary maintenance in the EC Conference on Yugoslavia
After the European professionals of politics had agreed to disallow boundary 
changes in the Yugoslav federation, particularly President Milošević of 
the republic of Serbia maintained that secession in Yugoslavia necessarily 
entailed a redrawing of the republican boundaries. He considered 
nations and not republics subjects of the right to secession under the 
1974 Constitution, which meant that Serb nationals living across the 
republican boundary would have the right to join the republic of Serbia 
upon independence (Wynaendts, 1993: 66). Also President Tuđman of 
the republic of Croatia, with whom Milošević allegedly met in the spring 
of 1991 to determine a boundary between the two republics that carved 
up the republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, expressed discontent with the 
existing republican boundaries. Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher then prepared for the meeting with his colleagues on 27 August 
1991 to initiate an EC-sponsored conference involving all the Yugoslav 
parties (Both, 2000: 113). As part of an effort to regulate the disintegrative 
process and to instil the need to maintain the administrative boundaries 
in the Yugoslav political leaders, the structure of this conference permitted 
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a choice between continuation as a Yugoslav federation and independence 
of the republics, leaving the option of territorial adjustments off the table. 
The EC Conference on Yugoslavia opened on 7 September 1991 in The 
Hague. A month earlier, the EC Ministers of Foreign Affairs had issued 
a public statement stressing the inviolability of internal in addition to 
international boundaries in Yugoslavia (Trifunovska, 1994). EC President 
and Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans van den Broek reiterated 
this point at the end of the conference’s opening session. He commented 
that there should be “no changes in existing Yugoslav borders by force or 
unilateral decree and the agreement of all Yugoslav parties to any such 
changes” and ensured as such that negotiations would evolve on this basis 
(Drozdiak, 1991: A31). After he met chairman of the conference Lord 
Carrington, President Tuđman, President Milošević and Defence Minister 
of Yugoslavia Veljko Kadijević, he made public in a press conference on 
4 October 1991 three principles that necessarily formed the basis of a 
solution, which the chairman repeated in his ‘Statement to the Parties’ 
at the tenth plenary session in Brussels on 9 March 1992: no unilateral 
border changes, protection of minority rights and full respect for all 
legitimate interest and aspirations in political pluralism (Ahrens, 2007: 
47). These principles combined advanced the inviolability of borders while 
they underscored the need to accommodate peoples internally. 
Boundary maintenance in the case of Yugoslavia was hence not a ‘focal 
point’ – that is, a simple and clear rule that minimises uncertainty and 
reduces the transaction costs in a negotiation process – that negotiators 
agreed upon as a lowest common denominator against the difficulty of 
redrawing boundaries, as Carter and Goemans (2011) argue. Political 
leaders in the conflict did not agree and a specific group of actors invested 
importantly to establish in their negotiations that the republican boundaries 
needed to be maintained. The EC Ministers of Foreign Affairs under the 
lead of President of the European Council of Foreign Affairs Hans van 
den Broek set boundary stability as a precondition for negotiation upon 
the founding of the EC Conference on Yugoslavia, in opposition to desires 
expressed particularly by President Milošević of the republic of Serbia to 
allow peoples rather than republics the right to secede from the Yugoslav 
federation. 
In line with the prescriptions, the republican borders were not subject of 
discussion in this conference. “The only thing on the table at that phase 
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of the conference was an arrangement based on the existing borders,” the 
conference chairman’s personal secretary and the assistant to the chairman 
of the working group on minority rights recount. It was officially up to the 
international negotiators to translate the basic principles into a coherent 
and concrete proposal for a solution, and the Lord Carrington’s personal 
secretary confirms that they considered boundary maintenance “the 
starting point” of negotiations with the Yugoslav parties.74 Conference 
coordinator Henry Wynaendts, who took the lead in drafting the 
proposal, also held that any agreement that he and his colleagues proposed 
needed to be a representation of this principle established by the EC 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs as a framework for the negotiations. Indeed, 
international negotiators at this stage tended to understand their task as 
assisting the parties by making substantive suggestions in line with their 
mandate rather than as mediating on the basis of ideas brought to the 
table by the representatives of the Yugoslav parties. Wynaendts captured 
this when he noted that he introduced a clause on minorities’ special 
status as an instrument to obviate discussion on boundary changes.75 He 
hence considered himself a ‘formulator’ rather than a mere ‘mediator’ of a 
settlement for the crisis in Yugoslavia.
A configuration for territoriality and civic nationhood
The social constitution of the conference stimulated this dynamic for 
implementation of the ministers’ mandate. First of all, professionals of 
politics remained in charge by assigning coordination of the conference 
to Boutros Boutros Ghali, Cyrus Vance and Marrack Goulding as 
representatives of the United Nations and the EC Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs. Daily supervision was then delegated to chairman Lord Carrington 
and deputy chairman Thierry de Beaucé. They were not only in frequent 
contact with the politicians; they also shared professional experience 
in a European state’s politics and had proven to oppose the creation of 
nation-states in past assignments. Thierry de Beaucé had experience as 
Secretary of State attached to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
where he was in charge of international cultural affairs and francophony, 
and he worked as special advisor in charge of African affairs for President 
François Mitterrand at the time of the Yugoslav crisis. Lord Carrington 
74  Interview with Paul Sizeland
75  Interview with Henry Wynaendts
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was a retired Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom and he 
had in this position negotiated the terms of the independence constitution 
of Zimbabwe in 1980. He had overseen the transition from white-led 
Rhodesia to majority-led Zimbabwe. They had hence both worked to 
develop statehood characterised by political unity and civic bonds, so 
detached from nationalist sentiments of territorial adjustment. As such, 
they were likely candidates to support the European professionals of 
politics in boundary maintenance as a response to nationalist violence in 
the Yugoslav federation.  
The task of negotiation under their chairmanship was delegated to civil 
servants who had demonstrated familiarity with the politicians’ definitions 
of state- and nationhood in other processes of state formation. The 
chairmen of the working groups on succession issues and institutions and 
minority rights, Henry Darwin and Geert Ahrens respectively, both were 
constitutional lawyers that had worked for their Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs. They were hence acquainted with the constitutional processes 
of representation common in the European Community member 
states in contrast with the need to adjust boundaries for representation 
of ethnic communities. Henry Darwin had notably shown this before 
being assigned to the EC Conference on Yugoslavia in his role as legal 
adviser to a diplomatic mission concerning Cyprus’ independence in the 
1960s. He had been involved in drafting the 1960 London and Zürich 
Agreements that allocated government posts and public offices by ethnic 
quotas rather than permitted a change of boundaries to create nation-
states in Cyprus. Also a lawyer by training, the chairman of the working 
group on economic relations, Jean-François Durieux, had notably been in 
a position to watch the effects of nationalism in refugee movements and 
policy as a Protection Officer for the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees in amongst others Sudan, Djibouti and Canada. He had in 
this position proven committed to protect peoples by law rather than 
territorial separation (Durieux, 2008: 331).
These working group chairmen in the structure of the EC Conference 
on Yugoslavia responded to Henry Wynaendts, who was assigned the 
position of conference coordinator as a representative of the Dutch 
EC Presidency. Henry Wynaendts had a long career working for the 
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, gaining position as Van den Broek’s 
confidant and trouble-shooter (Freriks, 1991). He had as a special envoy 
led negotiations prioritising relations with China over Taiwan and 
authorising a return of Tamil refugees to Sri Lanka in the 1980s. So just 
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like the working group chairmen, Henry Wynaendts was experienced in 
diplomatic representation of a European state in which position he had 
proven committed to constitutional processes of representation. Hence 
the international negotiators at the EC Conference on Yugoslavia as well 
as their chairman Lord Carrington and coordinators from the United 
Nations and the European Community were likely and often proven 
supporters of the idea that aggressive forms of nationalism needed to be 
addressed within existing state boundaries in line with ideas expressed by 
the EC Ministers of Foreign Affairs in July of 1991. 
In line with logics of principal-agent interaction developed by scholars 
such as Hawkins et al. (2006) and Pollack (2003; 2007), the ministers 
as such minimised the risk of losses where the negotiators would act 
independently of their mandate. Changing boundaries was indeed “a 
non-starter” in the negotiation process, member of the working group on 
minority rights Richard Lewis recounts. It was discarded as a proposition 
among themselves as international negotiators without much, if any, 
discussion in line with their principal ministers’ preferred outcome. “There 
was no discussion about boundary changes,” Lord Carrington’s personal 
secretary confirms. 
As the conference coordinator, Henry Wynaendts associated calls for 
boundary change in Yugoslavia with the creation of nation-states, just like 
the EC Ministers of Foreign Affairs had done. President Milošević of the 
republic of Serbia wanted to establish a ‘Greater Serbia’, he explains, and 
thus fought to occupy all areas in the Yugoslav federation where Serbs 
were a majority.76 In light of this development, he wrote to the Dutch 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “boundary changes must be excluded”.77 Lord 
Carrington’s personal secretary similarly presented boundary changes 
in light of President Milošević’s desire to create a Greater Serbia. The 
anticipated threat of creating such nation-states to international peace 
and order convinced many of boundary maintenance in Yugoslavia. A 
change in the republican boundaries “would throw all the ethnic balls 
in the air,” Richard Lewis says, thereby expressing the association with 
irredentism and a disruption of international order that had paved the way 
to consensus among EC Ministers of Foreign Affairs a few months earlier. 
Lord Carrington confirmed during a visit to Italy in January 1992 that 
76  Interview with Henry Wynaendts
77  ABZ, DDI/DEU/ARA/00081 Henry Wynaendts, 1991
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accommodation of nationalism in Yugoslavia was dangerous in a Europe 
“inhabited by a host of nationalities and races, often crossed by artificial 
borders” (“Carrington Says Yugoslav Crisis”, 1992). 
Lord Carrington rather believed in boundary stability as a remedy for 
nationalist violence. He stated the day after Hans van den Broek had made 
public that boundary maintenance was a condition for negotiation that 
this had removed the motive for fighting. “What we must hope is that now 
[…] good sense will prevail,” he said (“Documentation: A History”, 1992: 
49). This means that the rejection of boundary changes in negotiations was 
not grounded in coercion, or in pure rational choice. The international 
negotiators generally shared beliefs against the creation of nation-states; 
they considered territorial changes to accommodate nationalists in 
Yugoslavia not really an option. “You could not choose anything else,” 
Richard Lewis says, capturing the absoluteness of their beliefs.
A structure of negotiations to discourage territorial change
Chairman Lord Carrington then tightly regulated negotiations with 
Yugoslavia’s federal and republican leaders and foreign ministers on this 
basis. He defused disputes by organising closed-door ‘tête-à-tête’ meetings, 
which formed the basis of negotiations in plenaries that never lasted more 
than two hours (Crnobrnja, 1996: 195). The Yugoslav political leaders did 
not have time and space to discuss among themselves and in the plenary 
sessions, they were managed in strict speaking time and alphabetical 
order to minimise discussion (International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, 2002: 11223). Ambassador of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia to the European Community Mihailo Crnobrnja sensed that 
“he carried out negotiations as if he was conducting them between British 
Lords,” expecting the Yugoslav political leaders to respect the boundaries 
of diplomatic interplay.78 Indeed, both secretary of the EC Conference 
on Yugoslavia Jola Vollebregt and Richard Lewis capture this style of 
negotiations when they refer to the Yugoslavs as “gentlemen”79 or “very 
78  Interview Mihailo Crnobrnja. José Cultieiro, who worked with Lord Carrington at the 
EC Conference on Yugoslavia after the federation’s dissolution, described Lord Carrington 
as an “old-fashioned Englishman” who organised negotiations where someone “keeps his 
word and expects others to do the same” in The Spectator of 11 September 1991.
79  Interview with Jola Vollebregt
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intelligent human beings, [not] Hitlers or that kind”80. This shows again 
that boundary maintenance was not simply a ‘focal point’. If it had indeed 
been the lowest common denominator, these investments to manage both 
speakers and content in the negotiations would have been redundant 
against alternatives that were considered too complicated. The problem 
facing Lord Carrington was exactly that the Yugoslavs did not all believe 
territorial change was complicated.
Yet this structure of negotiations did as such not only diffuse disputes 
between Yugoslav politicians, it also denied others such as representatives 
of the armies and minority communities that were striving to change 
boundaries in the Balkans an opportunity to raise alternatives in 
the context of the conference. Representatives of Serbs in the Serb 
Autonomous Regions of Krajina and Slavonia, Baranja and Western 
Srem in the republic of Croatia, supported by officials from the Yugoslav 
National Army and the Serbian irregular forces in the republics of Croatia 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina, notably strived to change boundaries. Upon 
the failure to maintain the Yugoslav federation, they worked to establish a 
‘mini-Yugoslavia’ of ‘federated Serbian state’ with borders around majority 
Serb areas and including areas that were strategic for territorial control 
(International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 1996: 282-
283). Milan Babić, the unrecognised ‘president’ of the Krajina region, for 
example, held that autonomous regions should be given the status of a ‘free 
territory’ – a position that the representatives of the Bosnian Serbs like 
Radovan Karadžić would also adopt six months later (Wynaendts, 1993: 
138-139). And spatial planners assembled in a working group in Sarajevo 
after the proclamation of the Serb Autonomous Regions in Croatia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina explored the possibility of reorganising the 
Yugoslav space in functional regions centred on large towns near the end 
of 1991 (Klemenčić, 1994: 34). Yet these alternatives did not reach the 
negotiation table. The negotiations in the EC Conference on Yugoslavia 
revolved around the choice between survival of the Yugoslav federation 
and the republics’ sovereignty. 
The outcome of the first round of negotiations in this setting was the 1991 
Carrington Draft Convention, which Lord Carrington presented to the 
Yugoslav political leaders in the sixth plenary session on 18 October 1991. 
It contained the right to secession as Yugoslavia’s republics “within the 
80  Interview with Richard Lewis
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existing borders, unless otherwise agreed” in line with what the EC Minsters 
of Foreign Affairs had agreed in July 1991. EC President of Foreign Affairs 
Hans van den Broek, who had engaged to make boundary maintenance a 
condition for negotiation from the opening of the conference, reiterated 
upon the proposal’s presentation that boundary changes “were not an 
option” (Gow, 1997: 57). National or ethnic groups were rather ensured 
protection under the international framework of human rights and 
minority rights. If they formed majorities in defined areas, such groups 
would under the 1991 Carrington Draft Convention enjoy a special 
status that permitted them to have national emblems, an autonomous 
political structure and an educational system that respected the values and 
needs of the group. This represents commitment under Lord Carrington’s 
chairmanship to states as political entities rather than organisations 
founded on nationalism. They establish multinational societies where 
minorities are represented and protected by the constitution, in line with 
the agenda that the ministers had agreed upon. 
Hence after the EC Ministers of Foreign Affairs had agreed to disallow 
territorial changes in July 1991, they laboured under the lead of EC President 
and Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans van den Broek to structure 
international negotiations with the Yugoslav political leaders on this basis. 
Van den Broek announced boundary maintenance as a basic principle 
of negotiation and the ministers ensured reiteration of these principles 
in the process through maintaining both direct and indirect control in 
the EC Conference on Yugoslavia. They delegated the task of negotiating 
with the Yugoslavs to a team of (retired) politicians and civil servants 
who just like the EC Ministers of Foreign Affairs dismissed boundary 
changes immediately and definitively for association with irredentism 
and a disruption of international order. Chairman Lord Carrington then 
maintained tight control over the negotiation process and directed the draft 
peace agreement within the frame of boundary maintenance. Alternatives 
were denied on the table. Boundary maintenance in Yugoslavia hence 
developed from intense labour in support of the widespread belief among 
European politicians and civil servants that redrawing boundaries was 
dangerous in response to nationalist violence. 
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European professionals of politics and their reinforcement through 
law
An Arbitration Commission to settle internal disputes
Signing of the peace proposal failed. President Milošević of the republic 
of Serbia and eventually also President Bulatović of the republic of 
Montenegro maintained that Lord Carrington too easily accepted the 
dissolution of the Yugoslav federation with the secession of the republics 
of Slovenia and Croatia (Wynaendts, 1993: 135-136). He had agreed a 
few days earlier in The Hague “in the framework of a general settlement, 
recognition of the independence, within the existing borders, unless 
otherwise agreed, of those republics wishing it,” but he did not accept 
the federation’s dissolution unless the Yugoslav peoples expressed consent 
in accordance with the 1974 Constitution (Trifunovska, 1994: 363-
365). Chairman of the EC Conference on Yugoslavia Lord Carrington 
then referred the delimitation of boundaries to a group of constitutional 
lawyers that were assembled in an Arbitration Commission commonly 
referred to as the ‘Badinter Commission’. French Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Roland Dumas had initiated the idea of an arbitration commission; 
he had exchanged it for support of the EC-sponsored conference with 
German Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans Dietrich-Genscher at the end 
of August 1991 to gain agreement by the EC Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
(Both, 2000: 113). As part of an effort to regulate the disintegrative 
process and to instil the need to maintain the administrative boundaries 
in the Yugoslav political leaders, the ministers put arbitration forward as a 
substitute to violence.
In the EPC Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of 27 August 1991, 
Roland Dumas advanced the need to create an ad hoc organ to resolve 
legal and thereby political problems expected with the dissolution of 
the Yugoslav federation. In the absence of established mechanisms for 
dealing with intrastate conflicts, he wished to create a juridical body to 
which authorities of the EC Conference on Yugoslavia could submit their 
differences (Blockmans, 2013: 143-144). The idea of creating a permanent 
‘European Court of Conciliation and Arbitration’ in the framework of the 
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) had then 
already been raised by Robert Badinter, who was the former Minister of 
Justice and President of the Constitutional Court under French President 
François Mitterrand. He had advocated in Le Monde on 21 June 1991 
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the need to found a European Court of Justice based on international 
law that could adjudicate on disputes concerning among others linguistic, 
religious and cultural issues (Badinter, 1991). Such a conflict management 
institution, he argued, could guarantee the safeguarding of peace and 
thus possibly prevent outbreaks of violent conflict like in Yugoslavia. His 
President François Mitterrand and Minister of Foreign Affairs Roland 
Dumas, who were both trained lawyers, had notably shown in favour of 
Badinter’s idea of a European system of dispute settlement (Schneider 
and Müller-Wolf, 2007: 15). So when the opportunity came for Robert 
Badinter to ‘legalise’ the dispute settlement process concerning Yugoslavia, 
he pushed his involvement to advance his agenda of a European Court 
of Conciliation and Arbitration.81 He met with chairman of the EC 
Conference on Yugoslavia in Paris on several occasions too discuss while 
his assistant Dominique Rémy-Granger remained in close contact with 
the representative of the European Commission Richard Lewis at the EC 
Conference on Yugoslavia.82 Lord Carrington then asked the members of 
the Arbitration Commission in November 1991 to adjudicate on a number 
of issues including whether the republican boundaries could be regarded 
as borders in terms of public international law upon the dissolution of the 
Yugoslav federation. 
Boundary maintenance in the Arbitration Commission
Several international lawyers found boundary maintenance not a legal 
principle for secession. Professor of international law Benedict Kingsbury 
for example argued in 1992 that such legalisation “exhibits an amalgam 
of often contradictory and unreconciled considerations about existing 
law, order, and justice” and “is not fully consistent with practice” 
(Kingsbury, 1992: 505; 507). His colleague Hurst Hannum similarly 
called it “dubious” to identify a rule of international law for boundary 
maintenance outside the colonial context and critiqued the reading of 
history underlying this legalisation (Hannum, 1993: 66). Yet these experts 
in the law related to recognition and succession were excluded from the 
negotiation process, even though the differences that were referred to the 
81  The Court of Conciliation and Arbitration was eventually created under the Stockholm 
Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration of December 1992. Robert Badinter became 
the President of this court, which convened for the first time in May 1995.
82  Interviews with Paul Sizeland and Richard Lewis
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Arbitration Commission in November 1991 concerned international law. 
The members of the Arbitration Commission referenced principles of 
international public law and peremptory norms of general international 
law as guidelines, and they included cases in international courts as legal 
precedents in their published Opinions (Pellet, 1992). But membership 
was restricted to “five members chosen from the Presidents of the 
Constitutional Courts existing in the Community countries” in line with 
the ‘Declaration on Yugoslavia’ adopted by the EC Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs on 27 August 1991 at the initiative of Roland Dumas (Trifunovska, 
1994: 334). This again exemplifies the significant investment of the EC 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs to avoid agency losses and guide negotiations 
toward boundary stability.
The Arbitration Commission was composed of lawyers who were trained 
and experienced in constitutional law: Robert Badinter from France, 
Roman Herzog from Germany, Aldo Corasaniti from Italy, Francisco Tomás 
y Valiente from Spain and Irène Pétry from Belgium. Legal adviser to the 
Arbitration Commission Andrey Liakhov positions these five constitutional 
lawyers among legal traditionalists such as Alfred Verdross, Georg Jellinek 
and Hersch Lauterpacht. He explains that legal traditionalism compelled 
the members of the Arbitration Commission to consider state succession 
a political rather than a legal act.83 International law did not guide 
processes of secession beyond codification of the conditions of statehood 
stipulated in the 1993 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of 
States – that is, a territory, a permanent population and a government 
capable of entering into international relations (e.g. Lauterpacht, 1944; 
Jellinek, 1914). The republics of the Yugoslav federation by the end 
of 1991 all qualified as ‘states’ under this reading of international law, 
which meant that unilateral or violent changes to their boundaries were 
legally unacceptable. Changes to the republican boundaries under these 
circumstances required political agreement to be effectuated and was not 
guided in legal provisions. Andrey Liakhov describes that the members of 
the Arbitration Commission hence considered their principal task was “to 
help the politicians understand legal implications of their actions”.84 
Indeed taking politics rather than law as guiding in considerations, the 
Spanish member of the Arbitration Commission Francisco Tomás y 
83  Interview with Andrey Liakhov
84  Interview with Andrey Liakhov
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Valiente then introduced boundary maintenance.  He was in charge 
of drafting Opinion No. 3 in response to Lord Carrington’s question 
concerning the status of the republican boundaries and concluded that 
agreement on boundary adjustments was impossible to reach between the 
Yugoslav political leaders without a retreat to violence.85 As the President 
of the Constitutional Court in Spain and professor in the history of 
law, he believed that states needed to be protected for law and rights to 
prosper over chaos (Gallego, 1996: 10). He saw the constitutional order 
threatened in Spain by nationalism in ethnic communities. Boundary 
maintenance would protect the states created upon dissolution of the 
Yugoslav federation against such nationalism, he held, and the other 
members of the Arbitration Commission agreed that this would thus calm 
tensions down. “If everyone enforces boundaries that have existed for 
some time, there is no reason to go to war,” legal adviser Andrey Liakhov 
explains, while “if anything else was adopted, it would [have resulted] in 
another spark of violence”. As such, the lawyers unanimously decided in 
affirmation of the definition of statehood reinforced by the EC Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs.
As such, they followed inspirer legal traditionalist Hersch Lauterpacht, who 
had under similar circumstances shown an opponent of accommodating 
nationalism with territorial adjustments. On 16 November 1938, less than 
two months after the Munich Agreement had been signed codifying Nazi 
Germany’s annexation of portions of Czechoslovakia along the border that 
were inhabited by German-speaking populations, he gave a speech at the 
League of Nations Union of Cambridge University. He posited that “a 
comprehensive and professionally administered system of cosmopolitan 
law and order in the image of the liberal state” was the means to overcome 
aggressive nationalism and disorder of the fin de siècle (Koskenniemi, 1997: 
217). Lauterpacht identified the First World War and the nationalism 
that had provoked it as a disturbance of peace and order advanced by 
the process of state integration in to a world federation (Koskenniemi, 
1997: 217). In line with ideas that Gianni de Michelis and Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher had first claimed among EC Ministers of Foreign Affairs in early 
1991, Hersch Lauterpacht had thus in his academic work proven critical 
of nationalism as a threat to international order.  
85  Interview with Alain Pellet
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And this idea was advanced in the Arbitration Commission particularly 
by members who had professional experience in politics. Robert Badinter, 
Roman Herzog and Irène Pétry had “a very strong position” upholding 
boundary maintenance in response to nationalist violence as “bringing 
some sense of order” and removing territorial claims as a motive for war.86 
In contrast with the other two members of the Arbitration Commission, 
they had experience with political in addition to legal considerations of state 
functioning. President of the Constitutional Court in Belgium Irène Pétry 
had a long career striving for equality of rights as a member of the Socialist 
Party to become Secretary of State for Cooperation and Development in 
a multinational federated state in 1973, while Roman Herzog had taken 
tough stances in enforcing the rule of law as the Minister of Interior of 
Baden-Württemberg between 1980 and 1983. Roman Herzog had in the 
late 1980s demonstrated notable interest in state development with his 
book ‘Staaten der Frühzeit’ [loosely translated, ‘Primitive States’], in which 
he describes states characterised by central authority and limited popular 
freedom for defence. He then identified nationalism and fundamentalism 
as the main threat to peace and order in Europe in his speech before the 
41st Meeting of Historians in Munich in 1996, when he referenced Ernest 
Renan and Ernest Gellner saying that “nations are not a God-given way 
of classifying men”.
Chairman Robert Badinter, who had acted to promote civil liberties as the 
Minister of Justice before he became the President of the Constitutional 
Court of France, had also demonstrated strong beliefs against the creation 
of nation-states. In his publication in Le Monde in June 1991, he (1991) 
identified nationalism as the principal threat in Europe. He considered 
Europeans to have entered a new stage of history in which they had 
overcome their ideological and political differences in favour of a shared 
belief in human rights and pluralist democracy. The peoples of Europe 
now for the first time saw their future from this ‘European’ perspective 
and that, Robert Badinter argued, needed to be protected from opposite 
forces of nationalism. As such, Robert Badinter, Roman Herzog and Irène 
Pétry were likely candidates to support boundary maintenance on the 
basis of a political assessment of the crisis situation in the deliberations 
with other members of the Arbitration Commission. Indeed, legal 
adviser Andrey Liakhov identifies them as having “very set views” against 
86  Interview with Andrey Liakhov
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boundary changes.87 These views of the constitutional lawyers were again 
not grounded in coercion, or in pure rational choice; rather, they were 
grounded in a belief that they shared with the principal EC Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs and the international negotiators in the EC Conference on 
Yugoslavia that boundaries should not be changed in light of aggressive 
nationalism. 
Legal justification in the uti possidetis principle 
In coordination with legal adviser Alain Pellet, Francisco Tomás y Valiente 
then moved beyond the mandate by connecting boundary maintenance 
to the international legal principle of uti possidetis that had been applied 
earlier in decolonisation. He described it in Opinion No. 3 as “a general 
principle, which is logically connected with the phenomenon of obtaining 
independence, wherever it occurs” (Pellet, 1992: 185). The members of 
the Arbitration Commission did not organise hearings with the Yugoslav 
parties, in spite of requests by among others President Milošević of the 
republic of Serbia, yet Alain Pellet recalls having “no doubt” about this 
decision to introduce the uti possidetis principle to maintain boundaries 
in Yugoslavia. He considered boundary change a “triumph of ethnic 
cleansing” while he held that maintenance of the republican boundaries 
created an opportunity for reason to prevail over aggressive nationalism 
or “ethnic hate”.88 In agreement with the members of the Arbitration 
Commission, his assessment for referring to the uti possidetis principle was 
hence inspired by the desire to avoid war rather than an interpretation of 
international law. 
By deciding to introduce the uti possidetis principle for stability of the 
republican boundaries upon Yugoslavia’s dissolution, the members of the 
Arbitration Commission positioned international law in support of the 
stance that professionals of politics had reinforced in the EC Conference 
on Yugoslavia. As such, they gave boundary maintenance a status beyond 
politics and outside the realm of Yugoslavia. Indeed, the principle gave 
a legal justification for the political assessment towards maintenance 
of boundaries not only within the Arbitration Commission. After the 
Opinions had been published, negotiators in the EC Conference on 
87  Interview with Andrey Liakhov
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Yugoslavia regularly invoked the authority of the uti possidetis principle 
or the Arbitration Commission to endorse respect for boundaries. This 
contrasts earlier practices of boundary politics in Latin America and 
Africa, where the uti possidetis principle had been referenced in relation 
to independence only after decolonisation within existing boundaries had 
taken effect. The legal justification gave the EC Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
the opportunity in December 1991 to materialise boundary maintenance. 
Under the lead of Hans-Dietrich Genscher, they recognised the republican 
boundaries as the international borders of the Republic of Croatia and 
Slovenia despite continued objections raised by President Milošević of the 
republic of Serbia. “We strongly objected to the decision of the Badinter 
Commission that internal boundaries would be international frontiers,” 
his Minister of Foreign Affairs Vladislav Jovanović recalls. 
Constitutional lawyers thus provided legal legitimation of boundary 
maintenance after politicians and civil servants had failed to negotiate an 
agreement between the Yugoslav political leaders. The EC Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs had upon founding of the EC Conference on Yugoslavia 
already agreed to create a commission of constitutional lawyers to settle 
internal disputes. When conference chairman Lord Carrington then asked 
them in November 1991 to formulate an opinion on the status of the 
republican boundaries in international law, they followed the EC Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs and their deputies in the conference in dismissing 
boundary changes based on a political assessment of the situation in 
the Yugoslav federation. Particularly those members who shared an 
occupational background in politics shared the belief widespread among 
European professionals of politics that territorial adjustment in response to 
nationalist violence threatened international order. But all members were 
legal traditionalists who understood politics rather than law as guiding in 
considerations, which led them to enforce boundary maintenance. Others 
were denied access to the Arbitration Commission under the authority 
of the ministers. This investment definitively discarded the option of 
redrawing boundaries and legitimated the EC Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
to recognise the Yugoslav republics within existing boundaries. 
Conclusion
Boundary maintenance in Yugoslavia was hence the outcome of a 
negotiation process that the European professionals of politics structured 
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on the basis of their aversion of creating nation-states. After violence 
broke out in July 1991, the association with irredentism spread and 
the EC Ministers of Foreign Affairs increasingly shared the idea that 
territorial adjustments would disrupt the international peace and order. 
They hence concluded in their following meeting on maintenance of the 
republican boundaries to forestall aggressive nationalism in Yugoslavia. 
At the initiative of Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Roland Dumas, the EC 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs then invested to structure the international 
negotiations towards boundary stability. They established the EC 
Conference on Yugoslavia and the Arbitration Commission composed of 
likely and sometimes demonstrated supporters of statehood characterised 
by political unity, so detached from nationalist sentiments of territorial 
adjustment. Legal traditionalism and occupational experience in politics 
positioned the civil servants and constitutional lawyers in line with the 
EC Ministers of Foreign Affairs, minimising the principals’ risk of losing 
their agents to actions in discord with their preferences in practice. They 
reinforced boundary maintenance in the negotiation process, ultimately 
legitimising the EC Ministers of Foreign Affairs to advance recognition 
on this basis in December 1991 despite President Milošević’s objections. 
Alternatives existed. Some representatives of Serb communities outside the 
republic of Serbia as well as officials from the Yugoslav National Army and 
experts of international law expressed opposition to boundary maintenance, 
while several less ‘integrationist’ professionals of politics in Europe explored 
boundary revision before large-scale violence erupted, yet their alternatives 
were discarded in the negotiation process. This indicates that boundary 
maintenance was not the outcome of an international norm, as Fabry 
(2010) argues, or a ‘focal point’ that negotiators subscribe to as a means 
to minimise uncertainty and reduce the transaction costs of secession, as 
Carter and Goemans (2011) hold. The EC Ministers of Foreign Affairs in 
fact invested significantly to set boundary stability as a precondition for 
negotiation. Their efforts were however not grounded in tacit or explicit 
coercion of advocates of the territorial alternatives, as Krasner (1999) 
and Coggins (2011) theorise. It was rather the outcome of the doxa on 
to the creation of nation-states, which ministers who prioritised territory 
over population also in the European integration process like Gianni de 
Michelis and Hans-Dietrich Genscher expressed early in the negotiations 
concerning Yugoslavia’s dissolution. The professionals of politics in 
Europe generally shared beliefs against accommodating irredentism for 
its threat to international peace and order, so the association of violence 
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with irredentism in Yugoslavia inspired their agreement to respond by 
maintaining boundaries.
It thus matters in boundary politics who manages to control the process 
of negotiations. People with different social backgrounds tend to interpret 
context differently; they may define different threats to peace and order 
and hence take different stances on territorial arrangements. If in fact the 
spatial planners familiar with maps of geography and settlement patterns 
in the Yugoslav federation, the military experts experienced in managing 
violent disputes, or the lawyers knowledgeable of the international law 
related to recognition and succession had influenced in the negotiation 
process, different boundaries might have been drawn in the Yugoslav 
federation. 
Despite this situational condition of the introduction of boundary 
maintenance in post-colonial practices of boundary politics, it set 
a precedent for more recent cases of territorial change. This implies 
that contemporary practices in line with the uti possidetis principle are 
grounded in a largely unquestioned association of territorial change with 
irredentism and a belief about the disruption of international peace and 
order that prevailed among professionals of politics in Europe in the early 
1990s. These commonplaces may however misrepresent conditions in 
contemporary cases. Many territorial disputes have resulted in violence 
within the confines of existing states since the dissolution of Yugoslavia, 
which sometimes could arguably have been prevented or resolved by 
boundary changes. In fact, boundary maintenance in the Yugoslav 
federation itself did not calm nationalism down but rather preluded 
the outbreak of violence in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina the 
following year. Disagreement over the boundaries continued among the 
Yugoslavs beyond the international recognition of republican boundaries 
in December 1991, with particularly President Milošević insisting to 
redraw boundaries. This violence contradicted the expectations of the 
professionals of politics in Europe. The next chapter explores how in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina this resulted de facto in abandonment of the 
republican boundaries for partition along ethnic lines five years later.
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Chapter 6
A Sociological Analysis of Practices in 
Boundary Politics: Military Officers 
and Ethnic Division in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
The republican boundaries were maintained upon the dissolution of 
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in accordance with the uti 
possidetis principle. The struggle to change these boundaries however 
continued in several independent republics. This demanded reinforcement 
of territoriality in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, yet the 
outcome of the negotiation process was de facto partition along ethnic 
lines. The 1995 Dayton Agreement ensured the continued international 
existence of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the one hand. It de jure endorsed 
the earlier decision to maintain Yugoslavia’s republican boundaries, 
leaving the international borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina intact. Yet it 
codified an internal division of territory between the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska on the other hand. The two 
ethnically organised entities share a central government, with a rotating 
State Presidency, but each entity has largely autonomous political power. 
They have their own political structures and even control over foreign 
affairs and the legitimate use of force rests in the entities rather than with 
the central government. Hence on the ground, the agreement contrasts the 
earlier decision and separates the peoples between territories on the basis 
of their ethnicity.
In this chapter, I analyse how possibilities to define the territorial 
arrangements for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina were narrowed down to 
the outcome of internal division of territory between ethnic communities. 
I argue that it was the outcome of an international negotiation process in 
which nationalism was legitimised by the military’s belief that antagonistic 
ethnic communities needed to be separated in territorial units for a 
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defensible peace and order. President Milošević of the Republic of Serbia 
continued upon dissolution his efforts to change borders through ethnic 
cleansing and forced migration with the leaders of the Serb community 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This contradicted the security map of 
the professionals of politics in Europe, who had insisted on boundary 
maintenance in negotiations concerning Yugoslavia’s dissolution to 
discourage aggressive nationalism and prevent state break-ups in nation-
states. It thus enabled a different set of actors to gain recognition of their 
expertise and thus influence in the practice of boundary politics. Military 
officers rose to power in the negotiations for a violent dispute in which they 
were professionally trained to operate. They had fundamentally different 
conceptions of security threats related to territories and populations than 
the professionals of politics in Europe. 
Military professionals in the negotiation process concerning Bosnia and 
Herzegovina generally shared a doxa that the implementation of a peace 
accord required defensibility and they interpreted the situation on the 
ground such that this meant a division of territory between the ethnic 
communities. They considered under the hostilities that the ethnicities 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina were inherently antagonistic and would 
be inflexible in a process of reconciliation. Hence peace and order for 
them demanded the communities to be separated in territorial units 
that they could sustain militarily. Military officers of international forces 
represented by Colonel Colm Doyle on this basis established the need to 
accommodate the Bosnian Serb community in territorial separation early 
in the negotiation process. Quickly following the outbreak of violence 
at the end of February 1992, they were able to convince international 
negotiators as their trained representatives on the ground in Sarajevo. Yet 
many professionals of politics in the United Nations and the European 
Community remained convinced to reinforce territoriality and civic 
nationhood. They appointed (former) politicians and civil servants to 
negotiate in the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia who 
were likely and often proven supporters of this idea. At the initiative of 
Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans van den Broek and his German 
colleague Klaus Kinkel, these negotiators indeed developed a territorial 
arrangement for integration of peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
 
The military representatives regained influence in the negotiation process 
with the conflict’s escalation. The 1992 Vance-Owen Peace Plan was 
rejected under the pressure of officials from the Army of the Republika 
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Srpska, while the international forces became permanently represented 
with the appointment of Major-General Graham Messervy-Whiting as 
an adviser to conference chairman Lord Owen in November 1992. The 
military representatives gained particular authority over the territorial 
solution to the conflict as map experts informed about the geopolitical 
strategic realities of war and the intricacies of implementing peace. And 
although they set out to prevent ethnic balkanisation, they endorsed a 
representation of the war as ethnic and intractable. Lord Owen and 
Thorvald Stoltenberg as well as the politicians assembled in the Contact 
Group no longer considered themselves ‘formulators’ of ideas trying to 
unite peoples in a single territory; they rather saw their task as mediating 
stances developed by representatives of the Bosnian Muslims, Croats 
and Serbs. Under these circumstances, the military representatives of 
the international forces justified a de facto ethnic division of territory 
as the only ‘feasible’ or ‘realistic’ solution to bring peace to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. In their effort to separate the warring parties in defensible 
units, they hence served as a conduit for acceptability of their nationalist 
agendas.
These findings are in contrast with existing explanations. Groups of 
negotiators disagreed on the territorial solution, and one needs to 
consider actors in addition to context in order to find that the different 
conceptualisations of peace and order correspond to different past 
experiences and practices. It was indeed the interplay and sequencing 
between professionals of politics and the military that ensured maintenance 
of the republican boundaries of Bosnia and Herzegovina; professionals 
of politics in Europe defined the international borders before the latter 
entered to settle disputes by territorial division within these bounds. 
This contradicts much constructivist and English School theorisation 
in International Relations literature on norm-driven behaviour towards 
territorial stability in boundary politics. While Fabry (2010: 205) cites 
Lord Owen in saying that international diplomacy “stuck unyieldingly to 
the internal boundaries of the six republics within the former Yugoslavia,” 
a detailed analysis of the negotiations shows that various actors in the 
negotiation process did not subscribe to the republican boundaries. 
Particularly the military officers did not share this norm, but also civil 
servants in the end found their exploration of territorial arrangements 
not limited by an international norm. In fact, the outbreak of conflict in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina itself is evidence of a contested practice in line 
with the uti possidetis principle in the Yugoslav space. 
148
This also means that the uti possidetis principle did not function as a lowest 
common denominator or ‘focal point’ for negotiators. Indeed, boundary 
maintenance did not bring certainty in the Balkans and was not taken as 
a guiding principle in negotiations concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Neoliberal institutionalists like Zacher (2001) and Carter and Goemans 
(2011: 284) argue that borders that do not follow administrative boundaries 
are uncertain and thus “likely to greatly slow or even prevent that border 
from becoming a stable institution”. Yet the deliberations for drawing the 
Inter-Entity Boundary Line reveal the military representatives contrarily 
considered the existing administrative borders unstable and hence costly to 
maintain. They thought that these borders were indefensible in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina because they did not represent the situation on the ground. 
This logic is based on belief or doxa that sustainable peace requires 
defensible provisions. The military officers took ethnic separation in the 
conflict for granted and thus considered the war intractable and in need of 
defensible territorial divisions. Yet Gagnon (2004: 1-5) finds that this is at 
odds with evidence from on the ground, where many did not mobilise for 
their ethnic community while communities remained internally divided. 
He argues that ethnicity in Bosnia and Herzegovina was fluid in fact, 
but that political leaders reconceptualised it to demobilise opposition 
for economic and political liberalisation in the state. Campbell (1999; 
2000) similarly finds that the war was not between three fixed ethnic 
communities. With local forces contesting the nationalist imaginary and 
all parties to the conflict agreeing to multi-ethnicity with the signing of 
the 1992 London Principles, the military logic of what was and was not 
possible was not purely rational (Campbell, 1999: 424). It was based on 
a contestable representation of reality that was hardly questioned among 
military officers in the negotiation process and refrained them from 
comprehensively pursuing alternative territorial arrangements. They 
believed in codification of the geopolitical strategic realities of ethnic 
separation to prevent violence in the future.
It was then not the professionals of politics from powerful states who 
defined outcomes in the negotiation process concerning Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, as realists in International Relations literature presume. 
Coggins (2011: 449) finds that “Great Powers” determine how and when 
new states are formed while Castellino and Allen (2003: 112) maintain 
that “the European powers” ensure territorial sovereignty. Yet particularly 
army officers shared the security map for an ethnic solution in Bosnia 
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and Herzegovina, which military representatives of the international forces 
then ‘sold’ in the negotiation process. Professionals of politics intervened 
several times to reinforce territoriality and civic nationhood, but their 
ideas were rejected because the military had an alternative understanding 
of their ‘national interest’ on the basis of a desire not to get (militarily) 
captured in an escalatory dispute rather than to maintain the international 
territorial order. Indeed, realists do not account for the fact that success 
in negotiations depended on implementation, which gave representatives 
of the warring parties and especially army officials a position of power 
to determine outcomes. This power rested not in coercion, as realists 
presume, but depended on relations with representatives of international 
forces, whose influence in the negotiation process in turn resulted from 
their authority as informed experts in map-making. Analysis of the 
negotiations concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina demonstrates that the 
military was key in transporting the ethnic solution from the battleground 
to the negotiation table. 
In this chapter, I first analyse how the parameters were set for the territorial 
division of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I find that as representatives trained 
to operate in violent disputes, army officers from international forces 
introduced accommodation of the Bosnian Serb pursuit of separation 
early in the negotiation process. They generally considered the hostilities 
a dispute between ethnic communities that was in need of a defensible 
territorial arrangement. I then continue by exploring how this security 
map was mobilised to pave the way for internal division of territory. I 
trace that it met opposition initially from a number of professionals 
of politics, which developed in an effort to codify territorial unity and 
integration in the 1992 Vance-Owen Peace Plan. When this proved 
unacceptable particularly to General Ratko Mladić from the Army of the 
Republika Srpska, the conflict had escalated to reestablish the influence 
of military officers from international forces in the negotiation process. 
They endorsed the military logic for ethnic separation, gaining particular 
control over the territorial arrangement. This leads to the conclusion that 
the acceptance of an internal territorial division of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
was fundamentally based in the doxa of military officers for pacification 
through defensibility, which added a layer of military justification to the 
nationalist agenda that made the unacceptable ethnic solution acceptable 
in the negotiation process.
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Military officers in international forces and a threat to order 
The military’s logic for territorial division 
The first republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia gained 
recognition of their independence in December 1991. As chairman of the 
EC Conference on Yugoslavia that had hosted international negotiations for 
boundary maintenance on dissolution of the federation, Lord Carrington 
then asked conference coordinator José Cutileiro two months later to 
lead a first round of negotiations in Bosnia and Herzegovina on future 
constitutional arrangements involving the Muslim, Serb and Croat parties 
that formed the coalition government (Cutileiro, 1992). José Cutileiro 
had been tasked coordinator of the negotiation process since Minister of 
Foreign Affairs João de Deus Pinheiro took over the seat of EC President 
in January 1992. But when he arrived with Lord Carrington to begin 
talks on 13-14 February 1992 at Villa Konak in Sarajevo, military officers 
were already present in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the European 
Community Monitor Mission to foreground the need to accommodate 
the Bosnian Serb community in its desire to create a separate territorial 
entity (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 2012).
The EC Monitor Mission had been established with the 1991 Brioni 
Agreement to observe and report on the withdrawal of the Yugoslav National 
Army from the republic of Slovenia. President Slobodan Milošević of the 
Republic of Serbia however continued after dissolution of the Yugoslav 
federation his struggle to change the republican borders in Croatia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. He wished to accommodate unification of the 
Serb nationals, which incited violent strategies to cleanse certain areas in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina for the Bosnian Serbs. Indeed, political leaders of 
the Bosnian Serb community started to organise in autonomous oblasts – 
that is, areas which they had declared autonomous as part of the ‘Republic 
of Serb Bosnia and Herzegovina’ or ‘Republika Srpska’ – months before 
international recognition of the republican borders in April 1992. “[The 
current] borders do not really exist. We should follow ethnic principles 
in establishing new borders,” said Radovan Karadžić, President of the 
Republika Srpska and close political ally of President Milošević, illustrating 
the nationalist intentions of territorial separation (Harden, 1991: A08).
International forces were then also sent to Bosnia and Herzegovina. As a 
military officer trying to carry out the mandate, head of the EC Monitor 
Mission Colonel Colm Doyle considered hostilities inspired by the Bosnian 
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Serb “determination to take control over territory that suited the purpose 
to adjoin the Republic of Serbia”.89 He believed under this violence that 
ethnicities would be inflexible in a process of reconciliation. “There is a 
lot of ethnic violence,” he reported in Associated Press on 14 January 1992. 
“A great many people here are armed” (Rosenblum, 1992). Three months 
later, a few days before the international recognition of the state of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, he told journalists from The Hamilton Spectator that 
“[t]he ethnic divisions are so wide now that the implementation may be 
impossible because these people want to fight” (‘World Digest’, 1992). 
Colm Doyle thus followed intelligence reporting in characterising tensions 
as grounded in ethnic solidarities and hatreds, rather than a reality of fluid 
alliances (NIOD, 2002: 48). Viewing the situation from the battlefield, he 
thought that relations between groups were inevitably mutually exclusive 
and segregated in the state Bosnia and Herzegovina.90
This representation of order in Bosnia and Herzegovina was grounded 
in his background as a military officer. Colonel Doyle had experience 
in a Foreign Service mission with the 11th infantry Group of the United 
Nations Forces in Cyprus. Ten years later, he served in Lebanon with the 
United Nations Interim Force after which he was a military observer with 
the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation in the Middle East 
monitoring the separation of armies behind the ‘Green Line’ drawn in the 
1949 Armistice Agreements. Colm Doyle considered particularly the latter 
experience of “considerable benefit” to work in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
With this experience in enforcing territorial separation between warring 
factions, he was likely to endorse a division in the violent circumstances in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Indeed, he considered that if the Bosnian Serb 
community was not accommodated with a separate entity after people had 
been displaced, “[t]here would be war, period”.91 “The situation is very 
dangerous,” he explained to reporters of The Irish Times (Hegarty, 1992); 
the Bosnian Serbs would continue a policy of ethnic cleansing to join the 
Republic of Serbia.92 
89  Interview with Colm Doyle
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Within his EC Monitor Mission army troops, this association of a 
territorial separation with defensibility in Bosnia and Herzegovina was 
widespread. Officers regularly expressed the need to separate armed forces 
to ensure the safety of the local citizens and soldiers as well as their own 
troops (Vulliamy, 1992: 1). Also among military officers in the United 
Nations peacekeeping forces, there was a felt need for territorial division 
between ethnic communities to establish peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Representative General John MacKenzie for example said in August 1992 
in the Kitchener-Waterloo Record that the most promising solution was 
the “cantonisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina along ethnic lines,” which 
would give regional governments a high level of autonomy. “My personal 
opinion is that there will be borders and I hope pretty bloody soon,” 
he said (“Partition of Bosnia”, 1992). Experiencing its violence on the 
ground, the international officers were hence inclined to repeat the idea 
of the warring army commanders that the conflict was intractable and in 
need of a resolution that recognised a physical separation of the ethnic 
communities for order. 
A response for integration from professionals of politics
The military’s acceptance of ethnic separation in the conflict met opposition 
among the (former) politicians and civil servants that assembled to negotiate 
in the EC Conference on Yugoslavia. Former consul-general in Paris José 
Tadeu Soares, who had joined José Cutileiro as the Portuguese secretary 
of the EC-sponsored talks, objected that “[w]hat existed in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was not ethnic division at all”.93 Conference coordinator José 
Cutileiro similarly saw no differences between the communities, which 
had lived intermixed in the past.94 They rather considered the dispute 
an outcome of power politics, just like their colleague civil servants had 
done when they chaired negotiations before the dissolution of Yugoslavia. 
José Tadeu Soares thus upheld the alternative territorial arrangement 
of a ‘Swiss-like’ confederation with many cantons of which none was 
ethnically delimited.95 As a civil servant with twenty years of experience 
in the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, serving amongst others 
in East Berlin and Paris, he believed in statehood defined by unity and 
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civic nationhood. He found that particularly with his experience at the 
Permanent Mission to the United Nations, he could “grasp the problems 
[of aggressive nationalism and territorial disintegration they] faced at the 
time”.96
Chairman of the EC Conference on Yugoslavia and retired Minister 
of Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom Lord Carrington similarly 
expressed desire to avoid disintegration into ethnically defined territorial 
units. He said in his speech on 26 August 1992 that cantons could not be 
“geographical entities, in the sense of consisting of only one nationality” 
nor “distinct self-contained blocks”. Just like José Cutileiro in his position 
as special adviser to Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs João de 
Deus Pinheiro, Lord Carrington had as chairman of the conference been 
at the forefront of the decision to maintain the republican borders upon 
Yugoslavia’s dissolution and subscribed to this effort to curtail irredentism. 
He had worked to enforce territoriality rather than ethnic division, just like 
during his period as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom 
in the 1980s when he oversaw the transition from white-led Rhodesia to 
majority-led Zimbabwe. This indicates that particularly military officers 
did not share a norm or ‘focal point’ that prescribed territorial stability in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, nor did the team of negotiators from the European 
Community cohere around a common understanding of their stakes in 
the negotiation process. In contrast with the (former) politicians and civil 
servants in the negotiation process, the military officers in fact associated 
division of territory with order as a codification of the geopolitical strategic 
realities of ethnic separation in the war. 
The military’s influence in early negotiations
The outbreak of violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the end of 
February 1992 then challenged the political representatives’ expectation 
of order. They had considered integration in shared territory possible 
upon the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation in line with the uti 
possidetis principle. José Tadeu Soares says about the violence in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina: “It was strange to us. […] It is like today you cannot 
think of people fighting in Britain”. His colleague civil servant Henry 
Wynaendts confirms that in the earlier negotiations under chairmanship 
96  Interview with José Tadeu Soares
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of Lord Carrington, the main challenge had been dealing with the war 
between the republics of Croatia and Serbia. The professionals of politics 
in Europe had insisted that boundary maintenance would calm nationalist 
tensions down, eliminating irredentist motives for conflict, while minority 
issues could be dealt with by means of a law mirroring the agreement on 
the Alto Adige between Italy and Austria.97 German Director-General of 
Political Affairs Jürgen Chrobog captures this when he says that at the 
time, he thought that “the fragility [of Bosnia and Herzegovina], we had 
stalled in the past”.
The fighting leading up to the referendum on independence then offered 
an opportunity for representatives of the military to influence conceptions 
of reality in the negotiation process. Rather than through coercion, 
this influence derived from the military’s position as their permanent 
representatives who were professionally trained to operate in violent 
disputes. Lord Carrington remained chairman of Christie’s Auction House 
throughout his term as chairman of the EC Conference on Yugoslavia, and 
he shuttled with the other international negotiators in-and-out of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. Colonel Colm Doyle, as head of the EC Monitor Mission 
and then Lord Carrington’s personal envoy, became for them an important 
source of information when violence erupted. Being constrained by the 
war, they relied on him for briefings on the political and military situation. 
“I remember coming to Sarajevo and being informed that a huge number 
of the population had been expelled from the region,” José Tadeu Soares 
recounts. These briefings generally followed the military’s shared beliefs. “I 
was able to tell [the negotiators] that the Muslims were worried in areas 
where the Serbs were a majority and that the Serbs were trying to move 
out of places where the Muslims were a majority,” Colm Doyle says. He 
notes his effort to instil in them that populations were moving and that 
the Bosnian Serbs would not halt until territories were cleansed.98 And he 
felt that “overall, […] there was little doubt on that”.99 
97  Interview with Henry Wynaendts; Legal adviser Andrey Liakhov supports that in 
deliberations for the Arbitration Commission, “we paid little attention to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina” and focused on tensions between the republics of Croatia and Serbia and 
Croatia instead. “We did not expect a conflict there,” he says.
98  Interview with Colm Doyle
99  Interview with Colm Doyle
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As such, the armed officers established the need to accommodate the 
Bosnian Serb community among the (former) politicians and civil 
servants in the EC Conference on Yugoslavia. Acting independently of 
their principals in a broad mandate to “promote dialogue” and to reach “a 
constitutional solution which must take into consideration the legitimate 
concerns of all peoples involved within the inviolable frontiers of [Bosnia 
and Herzegovina]” (Trifunovska, 1994: 514-515), José Cutileiro indeed 
believed after a while that coexistence could not be restored in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. He deemed it an “illusion”100 that it would remerge 
after peoples had been separated. His colleague José Tadeu Soares 
was also convinced that the violence made codification of the ethnic 
separation in territories necessary for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.101 
“New arrangements were needed because Bosnian Serbs did not wish 
to belong to an independent Bosnia,” José Cutileiro wrote in The New 
York Times in August 1992 (Cutileiro, 1992). Not the professionals of 
politics but representatives of armed forces hence developed the idea of a 
territorial division between communities in the negotiation process. After 
violence had erupted to separate peoples by displacement in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, they ‘sold’ the need to codify this geopolitical strategic reality 
to international negotiators in the EC Conference on Yugoslavia, who 
then slipped, shifting policy away from their principals’ desired outcome 
of integration. 
On 22 February 1992, conference coordinator José Cutileiro indeed 
reported to journalists from Reuters News that representatives of the 
Bosnian Muslim, Serb and Croat communities considered “internal 
arrangements based on ‘several national constituent units to be defined’” 
while agreeing to recognise the republican border (Pontes, 1992). The 
‘Statement of Principles for a New Constitutional Arrangement for Bosnia 
and Herzegovina’ that was presented on 18 March 1992 then codified 
that the state would be “composed on three constituent units, based on 
national principles and taking into account economic, geographic and 
other criteria” (Ramcharan, 1997: 24). The negotiators hence established 
a possibility for the Bosnian Muslim, Croat and Serb communities to 
be given self-determination, albeit without complete sovereignty. The 
statement did not offer a final map, but it contained that territory would 
be divided along ethnic lines. The territory of each unit would be decided 
100  Interview with José Cutileiro
101  Interview with José Tadeu Soares
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with “a map based on the national absolute or relative majority in each 
municipality” (Ramcharan, 1997: 26). A map recording the 1991 census 
figures and depicted the ethnic structure of each municipality would thus 
be the basis for the territorial division.
So after violence broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the nationalist 
vision of an internal territorial division along ethnic lines was introduced 
and legitimised among international negotiators by representatives of the 
military personnel on the ground. The armed forces at war were fighting 
to homogenise communities in the declared autonomous oblasts in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Army officers generally interpreted this violence 
as intractable for its basis in ethnic solidarities and hatreds. Sharing the 
belief that peace and order required defensibility of the provisions of a 
peace accord, the international military officers were then inclined to 
support territorial codification of the physical separation between the 
ethnic communities. The members of his negotiation team initially 
objected to endorsement of the territorial division. As civil servants and 
(former) politicians under the auspices of the European Community, they 
upheld reinforcement of statehood characterised by political unity and 
civic bonds. Yet the violence increased the influence of military officers as 
negotiators’ trained representatives on the ground in Sarajevo, who then 
established acceptance of territorial separation in the negotiation process.
Professionals of politics and their attempt to reinforce territoriality 
A territorial alternative in the International Conference on the Former 
Yugoslavia
As negotiations developed for territorial separation in the EC Conference 
on Yugoslavia, professionals of politics intervened in the negotiation 
process to secure integration of peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 
disregard of continuing efforts to negotiate under the leadership of Lord 
Carrington, British Minister of Foreign Affairs and President of the 
European Council of Foreign Affairs Douglas Hurd announced on 25 July 
an international conference under United Nations aegis (NIOD, 2002: 
435). In line with the earlier efforts by professionals of politics in Europe 
to regulate the disintegrative process in the Yugoslav federation, where 
they invested significantly to uphold the republican boundaries, Douglas 
Hurd hence created an opportunity for professionals of politics to reinforce 
statehood defined by political unity detached from nationalist sentiments 
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of territorial adjustment. They structured the negotiation process towards 
a territorial solution based on integration of peoples for it to be rejected 
under the pressure of military officers from the Army of the Republika 
Srpska.
With the founding of a wider conference on Yugoslavia, Douglas Hurd 
accepted the proposal by French President François Mitterrand at the 
Group of Seven (G7) Conference in Munich two weeks earlier. Since 
Douglas Hurd became EC President of Foreign Affairs in July 1992, he 
had experienced the lacking communication between himself and UN 
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. A row in which the latter 
expressed that he “was not just going to be steamrolled by the British” led 
Douglas Hurd to attempt improving relations with an enlargement of the 
European Community Conference on Yugoslavia (NIOD, 2002: 435). In 
this light, he set out to develop a set of principles for negotiation under 
the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. He requested 
adherence to international law, suggesting that borders could be changed 
upon mutual agreement, which British director of Political Affairs Leonard 
Appleyard communicated to his colleagues in the European Community 
(NIOD, 2002: 436).102 
Yet the same set of professionals of politics who had enforced boundary 
maintenance upon the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation now invested 
to establish a stricter adherence to the republican boundaries in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans van den Broek 
particularly asserted that peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina should not be 
based on a division into ethnic areas. He had set boundary stability as a 
precondition for negotiation in the EC Conference on Yugoslavia in 1991 
and wanted the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia to 
endorse this. His preference for territoriality can be found for example in 
his statement at the opening of the conference in London on 26 August 
1992,103 in which he expressed that discussions on borders and minority 
102  Marrack Goulding, the Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations in charge of 
peacekeeping who attended the opening of the International Conference on the Former 
Yugoslavia in London with Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali, in his memoirs 
Peacemonger (2002) writes that most of the drafting was done by staff from the host 
country rather than the United Nations. 
103  The opening session assembled 34 representatives of states and international organisations 
including the United Nations and the European Community, as well as the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference.
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rights “lose credibility and become counter-productive when certain 
parties use them as a cover in order to continue their policy of creeping 
expansionism” (Ramcharan, 1997: 146). Van den Broek could count for 
support on his German colleague Klaus Kinkel, whose predecessor had 
sided with him in his earlier efforts as EC President of Foreign Affairs 
in Yugoslavia. Klaus Kinkel said at the opening session in London: “The 
international community will never accept the acquisition of territory 
though force and terror” (Crossette, 1992). 
These professionals of politics managed to import their stances in the 
negotiation process. The ‘Statement of Principles’ in the end denoted 
thirteen principles to guide development of a peace proposal that included 
not only respect for the integrity of state borders, but also non-recognition 
of all advantages gained by force (Owen, 2013).104 The political leaders 
of all parties to the conflict Alijah Izetbegović, Radovan Karadžić and 
Mate Boban signed for agreement with the 1992 London Principles. 
This indicates that there was at this stage an opening for unity in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. In contrast with the military’s representation of reality 
earlier in the negotiation process, alternatives to territorial separation 
of communities were in practice possible. Representation of the war 
as intractable and belief in the codification of the geopolitical strategic 
realities for defensibility had refrained the military representatives of the 
international forces from comprehensively pursuing these alternatives, but 
they were foregrounded by professionals of politics in the International 
Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. Indeed, boundary changes were 
treated “very delicately” in the conference, with international negotiators 
trying to explore agreement between the Yugoslavs.105 Spokesman Frederic 
Eckhard recounts that the explicit aim was integration of peoples, or 
to “stitch this new country back together,” in refutation of any ethnic 
separation. 
A configuration for territoriality and civic nationhood
The conference was designed “to hold all the Yugoslav parties to the 
commitments made at the London session” (Secretary-General, 1992: 
104  The ‘Statement on Bosnia’ contained in support that “[t]he negotiations will need to 
cover […] a genuine and lasting end to the conflict throughout the Republic, and return 
of territory taken by force” (Owen, 2013).
105  Interviews with Graham Messervy-Whiting and Lord Owen 
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1552). International negotiators were thus to establish an arrangement 
for integration of the Bosnian Muslims, Croats and Serbs peoples in a 
single Bosnia and Herzegovina. The professionals of politics then invested 
significantly in the social constitution of the conference to minimise the 
risk of agency losses and hence ensure implementation of their mandate, 
mirroring the practices they had used to regulate the disintegrative process 
of the Yugoslav federation in the EC Conference in 1991. First of all, 
politicians remained in charge by assigning coordination of the conference 
to the President of the European Council John Major and the Secretary-
General of the United Nations Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Daily supervision 
was then delegated to two chairmen who were in frequent contact with 
these politicians and a Steering Committee made up of representatives of 
the European Community, the Commission on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (CSCE), the United Nations Security Council, the Organisation 
of the Islamic Conference, neighbouring states, and Lord Carrington. 
The professionals of politics thus adopted key positions of control in the 
negotiation process.
They also assigned the task of negotiation to proven supporters of their 
shared beliefs against division in ethnically homogeneous territories, in 
line with logics of interaction between principals and agents theorised by 
for example Hawkins et al. (2006). Co-chairmen Lord Owen and Cyrus 
Vance had professional experience in common with the politicians and 
they had shown committed to oppose the creation of nation-states in past 
assignments. Lord Owen had served as British Foreign Secretary between 
1977 and 1979, when he worked with then-US Secretary of State Cyrus 
Vance to endorse an Anglo-American plan for the transition from white-
led Rhodesia to majority-led Zimbabwe upon independence. Cyrus Vance 
had as Deputy Secretary of Defence been at the centre of the escalating 
Vietnam conflict, and he helped negotiate the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty 
by which the United States returned control of the canal zone to Panama 
and the 1979 Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty that meant the Israelis withdrew 
armed forces from the annexed Sinai peninsula before representing the 
UN Secretary-General on fact-finding missions to South Africa and the 
Nagorno-Karabakh dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia. They had 
hence both worked to avoid expansionism and return territory instead. As 
such, they were likely candidates to support the professionals of politics in 
reinforcing territoriality in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
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Convening for the first time on 3 September 1992 at the Palais des 
Nations in Geneva,106 the co-chairmen brought their own personal staff 
that had demonstrated reluctance to accommodate nationalism with 
territorial changes in past assignments. Cyrus Vance brought senior civil 
servant Herbert Okun and aide from his own law firm in New York Peter 
Beshar. Herbert Okun was a Soviet specialist that had spent much of his 
diplomatic career confronting the politics of the Cold War in amongst 
others East Germany and at the United Nations when the Berlin Wall 
fell. He told journalist David Binder from The New York Times in 1993 
that he became a diplomat to enforce the strategy of containment for 
resistance to Soviet expansionism recommended by George F. Kennan 
in ‘The Sources of Soviet Conduct’ in Foreign Affairs in 1947 (Binder, 
1993). Lord Owen’s staff initially comprised the senior British civil servant 
and former ambassador in Belgrade Peter Hall and David Ludlow, a 
private secretary supplied by the Foreign Office. As British Ambassador 
to Yugoslavia between 1989 and 1991, Sir Peter Hall had represented 
policy of containment and unwillingness to accept boundary changes in 
Europe (Simms, 2003: 11-12). He had objected to President Milošević’s 
irredentism. “He was a man addicted to power and that was the route he 
took,” he later explained to Jimmy Jamieson for the British Diplomatic Oral 
History Programme. Hence the negotiators as well as their coordinators 
from the United Nations and the European Community were likely and 
often proven supporters of the ideas expressed by the professionals of 
politics in London.
The international negotiators indeed subscribed to territoriality and civic 
nationhood in Bosnia and Herzegovina . Chairman Lord Owen holds that 
he aimed at integration; it was his intention to unite peoples in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.107 Just days before the presentation of the 1992 Vance-Owen 
Peace Plan, he confirmed in Reuters News that the principles agreed in London 
“still hold, will hold, and will apply” (Naughton, 1992). In accordance 
with the mandate formulated by Ministers of Foreign Affairs Hans van den 
106  In Geneva, the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia had a small 
secretariat run by executive director Bertrand Ramcharan, a United Nations official who 
had previously worked as a Director in the United Nations Political Department, focusing 
on conflicts in Africa (Ahrens, 2007: 58).
107  Interview with Lord Owen; Lord Owen in a meeting with Sir Peter Inge, Chief of the 
General Staff of the Ministry of Defence in London on 24 November 1992 confirmed: 
“Rolling back ethnic cleansing might not be a bad long-term aim. The parties did end up 
living together after WWII” (Owen, 2013: 138).
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Broek and Klaus Kinkel, he hence wished to avoid the territorial separation 
endorsed in negotiations earlier by military representatives. Just like their 
colleagues who had invested in boundary maintenance upon dissolution 
in the EC Conference on Yugoslavia, many (former) politicians and civil 
servants who led negotiations between the Yugoslavs in the International 
Conference on the Former Yugoslavia associated boundary changes with 
irredentism. They shared the belief in territorial adjustment as a threat to 
international peace and order that professionals of politics in London had 
coordinated on. “President Milošević of the Republic of Serbia had a plan 
to carve up Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Lord Owen says, which made the 
conflict a “war on aggression” that could not be awarded with territorial 
adjustment. Lord Owen’s envoy in Sarajevo Jeremy Brade similarly viewed 
changes in territorial distribution in light of President Milošević’s desire to 
create a Greater Serbia. Speeches were “inflammatory and nationalist,” he 
held, so he aimed to uphold the principle of territoriality in response.108 
A structure of negotiations to discourage territorial division
The international negotiators then regulated deliberations with the Bosnian 
Muslim, Croat and Serb representatives on this basis. They generally took 
instructions from the principal professionals of politics in the European 
Community and the United Nations; they understood their task not as 
facilitating ideas brought to the table by representatives of different parties 
to the conflict, but as assisting the Yugoslavs in devising an agreement 
by making substantive suggestions on the basis of the 1992 London 
Principles. Chairman Lord Owen captures this when he describes his role 
as “try[ing] a position,” hence preparing a plan for conflict resolution, 
and “hav[ing] to adjust it and modify it” after learning what the different 
parties’ representatives would accept. His envoy in Sarajevo Jeremy Brade 
confirms that the negotiators were committed to a role as ‘formulators’ of 
a territorial solution. “They were always attempting to act in good faith, 
which meant upholding the principles,” he says. Indeed, under the lead of 
Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance, the negotiators took considerable time to 
devise a plan before presenting it to the Yugoslavs.
In line with this directive approach, head of the Working Group of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina Martti Ahtisaari gave the Yugoslav delegation heads a 
108  Interview with Jeremy Brade
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‘Checklist of London Principles in Relation to the Future Constitution of 
BH’ and reminded them that they were meant to negotiate an agreement 
on the basis of these principles when he started negotiations in the second 
half of September 1992 (Ramcharan, 2011: 54).109 He requested legal 
expert Paul Szasz to brief each delegation on human rights (Ramcharan, 
2011: 56). Martti Ahtisaari and Paul Szasz had cooperated on drafting 
the constitution for independent Namibia just three years earlier. As head 
and legal adviser in the United Nations Transition Assistance Group, they 
had structured statehood where many suffered from “racial discrimination 
and the practice and ideology of apartheid,” as article 23 of the Namibian 
constitution reads. In this line, Paul Szasz argued in a memorandum 
‘Problems in Basing Institutions on National or Ethnic Status’ that 
constitutional provisions related to ethnic groupings were “against the 
entire trend of international human rights developments of the past several 
decades (e.g., in particular, the firm rejection of apartheid)” and could 
be the pretext for resorting to ethnic cleansing (Ramcharan, 2011: 55-
56). As such, he supported Ahtisaari in a quest to ensure that the parties’ 
contributions met the principles of territoriality and civic nationhood.
Ahtisaari then developed the guiding principles further in the negotiations 
for a future constitution. He presented a paper to the co-chairmen on 4 
October 1992 in which he argued that “[a] centralised federal state but 
with significant functions (especially in fields of education and culture) 
carried by 4-10 ‘regions’ whose boundaries would take into account 
ethnic and other considerations” was the “apparent position of ICFY”. 
He embraced integration, but found that a centralised state was strongly 
opposed within the Bosnian Croat and Serb delegations. Martti Ahtisaari 
thus argued in his paper for a compromise where regions would not 
be autonomous or homogeneous enough to secede. He subsequently 
distributed among the delegations a questionnaire on the responsibilities 
of a central government and ‘constituent units’ that led him to conclude 
that “each of the parties desired a state in which the central powers would 
be minimised and those of the regional units maximised” (Owen, 2013: 
109  The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia additionally incorporated the 
working groups on ethnic and national communities and minorities, succession issues and 
economic issues from the EC Conference on Yugoslavia, which remained chaired by Geert 
Ahrens, Henry Darwin (who was succeeded by Jorgen Bojer after his passing in September 
1992) and Jean-François Durieux respectively, and comprised the working groups on 
humanitarian issues and confidence and security-building and verification measures under 
Sadako Ogata and Vicente Berasategui (Ramcharan, 1997: 1210).
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85). Yet he did not concede on the ethnic basis of territorial separation. He 
discussed with the Bosnian Muslims, Croats and Serbs on 28/29 October 
a final plan to create seven to ten provinces taking into account ethnic as 
well as geographic, historical, communication and other features in order 
not to acquiesce in already accomplished ethnic cleansing. 
Political representatives of the Bosnian Muslims and Croats Haris Silajdžić 
and Mate Boban accepted the general outline of the proposal for a division 
of territory into ethnically mixed provinces; only the head of the Bosnian 
Serb delegation Nikola Koljević insisted on the three ethnic areas enforced 
by the military representatives. Officials of the Army of the Republika 
Srpska indeed proved particularly unwilling to compromise on territorial 
control in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They tied stability to the liberation 
of the Bosnian Serbs in an area that they could defend. “In Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, protection of the Serbs was a key issue,” Colonel Duško 
Četković says. And in a meeting with NATO Permanent Representatives 
on 4 December 1992, Lord Owen described his colleague General Ratko 
Mladić as “not joking when he talked about Greater Serbia”; “I did not 
believe that anyone would stop him” to secure an area for the Bosnian 
Serbs, Owen (2013: 157) said. These military officials insisted on the 
creation of an ethnically pure area in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As the 
deputy commander forces, General Milan Gvero told journalist John 
Burns from The New York Times in May 1993: “We say everybody has to 
live on his own territory, Muslims on Muslim territory, Serbs on Serbian” 
(Burns, 1993), while Duško Četković describes motivation to preserve the 
Serb identity that the army had fought to defend after “over a million 
Serbs [had been] brutally murdered, cleansed” during the Second World 
War.110 
The military’s rejection of a territorial alternative
Military officers did not have a place at the negotiation table in the 
International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. Just like chairman Lord 
Carrington in the earlier negotiations concerning Yugoslavia, chairman 
Cyrus Vance insisted on restricting attendance to heads of delegation 
Haris Silajdžić, Mate Boban and Nikola Koljević plus one (Owen, 2013: 
85). Yet representatives of the military proved decisive in the rejection 
110  Interview with Duško Četković
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of territorial unity and integration as a solution. In the co-chairmen’s 
final efforts to convince the Bosnian Serbs to sign the 1992 Vance-Owen 
Peace Plan, President Krajišnik of the Republika Srpska conditioned 
signing on ratification by the Bosnian Serb Assembly. Lord Owen proved 
contemptuous in his dismissal of these representatives. In line with his 
earlier efforts to restrict participation in the negotiation process to political 
leaders, he assumed others to have little authority to shape outcomes. “I 
am telling you,” he said to the journalists who assembled to report on 
development in negotiations, “and believe me I have been in politics a 
long time, I know that Milošević is on board and that is what counts” 
(Silber and Little, 1995: 314). But as soon as the debate in the Bosnian 
Serb Assembly began, his optimism proved misguided. 
The “decisive speaker” in the Bosnian Serb Assembly was General Ratko 
Mladić, correspondent for Financial Times Laura Silber and BBC journalist 
Allan Little find (Silber and Little: 1995: 316). He showed a map of the 
geopolitical strategic realities on the ground and used a transparency of the 
territorial arrangement in the 1992 Vance-Owen Peace Plan to illustrate 
how much conquered territory would be isolated or returned to the 
Bosnian Muslims. This would leave the Serb population in these territories 
vulnerable to future violence. The General’s strictly military logic carried 
weight among the political representatives gathered in the Bosnian Serb 
Assembly, Momir Bulatović found (Silber and Little, 1995: 316). Indeed, 
a majority of fifty-one representatives out of sixty-five who cast a vote 
decided to organise a referendum on the 1992 Vance-Owen Peace Plan – a 
referendum in which ninety-six per cent of the voters said ‘no’.
Political representatives of the Bosnian Serbs and Croats were more 
generally susceptible to a military representation of reality. They tended 
to distrust politicians from the Republic of Serbia or Croatia to negotiate, 
considering that they would outbid desires for territorial separation in a 
political manoeuvre, but they acknowledge the military’s contribution to 
their negotiation strategies. While politicians like the Serbian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Vladislav Jovanović hold that military representatives had 
no influence on their negotiation strategies, members of the Bosnian Serb 
delegation aimed to facilitate the army in its potentials. Maksim Stanišić 
captures this when he says that they meant to “never sacrifice army units 
in a negotiation”.111 Negotiator for the Bosnian Croats Vitomir Miles 
111  United Nations Chief Political Officer in Bosnia and Herzegovina Phillip Corwin (1999: 
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Raguž confirms that it was their main responsibility to take their military’s 
assessment into account. Negotiations were for him not guided by 
“knowledge and skill, or fairness” but determined by “the rule of applied 
power,” which implied for him that “the party with most military strength 
can dictate the terms”. Unlike politicians from the neighbouring republics, 
these representatives agreed with their army officers that autonomy would 
have little meaning without territorial demarcation,112 and they were 
unwilling to compromise on territory for a political deal.
The peace settlement demanding their agreement, the military hence 
had a position of power in the negotiation process. In fact, exactly the 
army officials controlled the strategic means to upset a settlement that 
they considered unfair in terms of the territorial distribution. They had a 
different understanding of their national interest in the negotiations, yet 
their influence tends to be disregarded in realist theories of International 
Relations literature. Scholars such as Coggins (2011) emphasise the role 
of “Great Powers” represented by professionals of politics rather than local 
actors, let alone military officers. But in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
professionals of politics representing the most powerful institutions of the 
European Community and the United Nations proved unable to impose 
statehood defined by political unity and civic bonds. Not even allied 
politicians from the Republic of Serbia were able to convince political 
representatives of the Bosnian Serbs to accept the 1992 Vance-Owen Peace 
Plan. President Slobodan Milošević of the Republic of Serbia had signed 
the settlement. Minister of Foreign Affairs Vladislav Jovanović then called 
the Bosnian Serb insistence on an ethnic solution “unfortunate,” while 
it led Chris Spirou, a confidant of President Milošević, to describe them 
as “zealots”. Still they refused to sign it as their military rather than their 
political allies influenced their stances.
 
So military officers from the Army of the Republika Srpska notably pressed 
to discard territorial unity in the negotiation process. When officers from 
the international forces had introduced and legitimised the demand 
for territorial division between ethnic communities in negotiations, 
professionals of politics intervened to pursue the alternative. At the 
initiative of EC Ministers of Foreign Affairs Hans van den Broek and Klaus 
89) confirms in his memoirs that with regard to the Bosnian Serb delegation, “everyone 
knew who was in charge: the military. […] General Ratko Mladić gave the orders”. 
112  Interview with Maksim Stanišić
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Kinkel, politicians assembled at the opening session of the International 
Conference on the Former Yugoslavia foregrounded integration in shared 
territory. They gained agreement by the political representatives of all 
parties to the conflict and structured negotiations towards implementation 
of this agreement. In line with practices in boundary politics concerning 
the dissolution of Yugoslavia, they maintained both direct and indirect 
control in the conference, delegating the task of negotiation to a team of 
(former) politicians and civil servants who shared their rejection of ethnic 
separation for association with irredentism and disruption of international 
order. Yet the territorial arrangement the international negotiators then 
developed proved unacceptable for army officers under the lead of General 
Ratko Mladić, who the chairmen had excluded from the negotiation 
process. They informed rejection of the draft peace agreement by the 
Bosnian Serbs for creation of an ethnically pure territory in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.
Military officers in international forces and their reinforcement 
through negotiations
Military advisers in the negotiation process
The escalation of the conflict offered an opportunity for the military 
officers from international forces to regain influence in the negotiation 
process. The structure of the International Conference on the Former 
Yugoslavia set up by professionals of politics in London had not included 
representation of the military. But in October 1992, when fierce fighting 
had broken out with the Bosnian Croats who until then had sided with 
the Bosnian Muslims, chairman Lord Owen suggested to have in-house 
military advice in a meeting with the British Chiefs of the Defence and 
General Staff. “There was an on-going battle,” Lord Owen clarifies. “A 
breakdown of structures. A breakdown of trust. A breakdown of the whole 
society – It was a terrible mess”.113 He hence brought representatives of 
the international armed forces back into the negotiation process. He 
gave military officers permanent representation on the team and they 
only gained strength of position with progression of the war, being able 
to establish among negotiators the need to delimit ethnic separation 
territorially to end the war.
113  Interview with Lord Owen
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Major-General Graham Messervy-Whiting became the military adviser 
to Lord Owen in November of 1992. He had served intelligence and 
counter-intelligence duties in amongst others Germany, Libya and 
Cyprus, after which he was appointed the plans staff officer in Northern 
Ireland responsible for the armed forces estate. He then became the 
Briefing Officer for NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe General 
John Galvin during the ending of the Cold War and the extending of 
military contacts to the former Warsaw Pact countries before entering the 
International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. So just like Colonel 
Colm Doyle, Major-General Graham Messervy-Whiting had experience 
defending boundaries of separation between warring communities. And 
he shared his perception that the ethnic communities in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina were irreconcilable under the hostilities. In line with the 
representation of the conflict foregrounded by nationalists, Graham 
Messervy-Whiting considered that ethnicity was “a factor we had to take 
into account”114. He saw his task as identifying where armies were fighting 
and what their longer-term territorial aims were (Messervy-Whiting, 1993: 
30). Accommodating these aims in the distribution of particular areas 
and villages among the ethnic communities, he thought, was essential for 
pacification of the situation (Messervy-Whiting, 1993: 31). 
The military gained particular authority in developing the territorial 
arrangement for conflict resolution in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The volatile 
situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina foregrounded among negotiators 
concerns about the implementation of the peace accord, on which army 
officers are experts in charge. They were on the ground and professionally 
trained to operate in violent disputes, so they knew the geography of 
the war zone and understood how it related to military strategy. Their 
representatives controlled information on the locations and movements 
of army units, particularly because officers on the battlefield tended not 
to communicate directly with the negotiators (Corwin, 1999: 42-43). 
As the liaison between the various troops and forces in international 
diplomacy, Major-General Graham Messervy-Whiting then knew what 
international services were likely to be made available and what they could 
achieve to implement a plan. He was hence in a unique position to inform 
international negotiators on the practical challenges in enforcing certain 
territorial solutions; as the chairman’s military adviser, Graham Messervy-
Whiting made it known what he considered possible in terms of moving 
the various warring armies to a particular situation and what he thought 
114  Interview with Graham Messervy-Whiting
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the armies were capable of violating. He captures this when he declares 
that his role was to “inject into the decision-making process what the art 
of the practical would be”. He accounts his ability to give ‘realistic’ advice 
about the sustainability of ideas for a territorial solution.
Authority over the territorial arrangement additionally developed from his 
military training in reading geographic maps. In a team of international 
negotiators where some were “incurably map-dyslectic” while he instructed 
others, Major-General Graham Messervy-Whiting was educated in the 
identification and analysis of geopolitical strategic elements on maps 
for drawing a defensible boundaries (Messervy-Whiting, 1993: 33). 
A boundary, he thought, needed to take into account geographic and 
economic elements on land such as ports, rivers, factories, mines, mineral 
resources, and railways.115 In this situation, the military adviser notes that 
he was left in charge of producing maps for territorial arrangements. Exactly 
these maps were instrumental in justifying the territorial separation of 
ethnic communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Campbell (1999) finds. 
They created an image that confirmed the divisibility of territory along 
ethnic lines while excluding alternatives for a territorial arrangement. So 
it was the position in the negotiation process as map experts informed 
about the geopolitical strategic realities of war and the intricacies of 
implementing peace that gave the military influence among international 
negotiators, in contrast with assumptions about coercion in realist theories 
in International Relations.
A military justification for territorial division
To learn what the ‘art of the possible’ was for a territorial arrangement, 
Graham Messervy-Whiting exchanged views primarily with commanders of 
the Bosnian Muslim, Croat and Serb armies. They shared his understanding 
of geography, he found. They could read maps and subscribed to the idea 
that a sustainable settlement required due consideration of the lines of 
confrontation and the military balance on the ground.116 “We could talk 
the same language,” Messervy-Whiting says. In contrast, he found many of 
the political representatives of the warring parties lacked experience with 
geographic maps. Such maps had been treated as military secrets in the 
communist era, when they were closely controlled by the Yugoslav National 
115  Interview with Graham Messervy-Whiting
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Army, so many political leaders considered them misrepresentations; 
they brought out sociological maps instead that showed population 
distribution within administrative boundaries (Messervy-Whiting, 1993: 
33). The local army commanders’ power in negotiations then developed 
from their relations with representatives of the international forces, who 
could insert their views in the draft territorial arrangement for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.
But the army officials on the sides of the conflicting parties were generally 
intransigent interlocutors. Their aim was to liberate and defend their 
peoples. “It was necessary to preserve the [Bosnian Serb] population,” 
Colonel Duško Četković from the Army of the Republika Srpska says. 
“The citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina had the right to defend their 
homeland,” Deputy Commander of the Headquarters of the Army of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina General Jovan Divjak maintained on the other 
side of the battlefield. They both considered the war intractable and 
divisive, occurring between communities that would be separated in future 
relations because they could not live together peacefully, and considered 
their armies capable of military defeat. This made them generally reluctant 
to compromise in political settlement. Commander in the Army of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina Selmo Cikotić captures this when he said: “There was 
no reason for our attitude to be changed; quite the opposite, the situation 
on the ground developed in our favour”. The armies rather fought to 
maintain and, if possible, increase the territory that they occupied in order 
to safeguard their communities. “It was not in their mind-set to give up 
territories,” deputy to the President of the Committee for the Relations 
with the United Nations Amir Hadžiomeragić says in confirmation of the 
military’s intransigence in negotiations. “They had spent much energy and 
lives to control it”.
This informed Graham Messervy-Whiting to consider an internal 
territorial division “a necessary step” for pacification in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.117 Just like military representatives of international forces in 
earlier negotiation, he took for granted ethnic separation in the conflict 
and interpreted the situation such that the Bosnian Serbs needed to be 
accommodated in their desire for a territorial entity. He believed that 
the settlement needed to be defensible for the safety of locals and the 
international troops, in accordance with the military’s shared conception 
of peace and order, and justified the territorial codification of ethnic 
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separation as the strategically ‘feasible’ or ‘realistic’ solution on this basis. 
Viewing the situation from perspectives on the battlefield, he thought that 
peace without recognition of the territorial advancements of the Army of 
the Republika Srpska would be unsustainable. This army, he held, was 
with the support of the Serbian army capable of overthrowing such an 
unsatisfying settlement. “The Bosnian Serbs, without a doubt, were the 
most powerful from a military point of view because they were de facto 
the remnants of the Yugoslav National Army,” Major-General Graham 
Messervy-Whiting says. This meant that they had heavy weapons and 
professional army officers, while the Bosnian Muslims “were starting 
from an almost zero baseline”.118 He thus deemed maintenance of existing 
boundaries costly. As a military officer, he rather associated peace with 
the territorial delimitation of geopolitical strategic realities. He sought to 
establish a boundary that separated ethnic communities so that particularly 
the Bosnian Serb armed forces would find limited reason to upset the 
arrangement. 
So following the 1992 Vance-Owen Peace Plan, which was “not heavily 
influenced by implementation factors” according to Lord Owen’s military 
adviser, the 1993 Union of Three Republics Plan returned to the ethnic 
solution introduced in the 1992 Statement of Principles of the EC 
Conference on Yugoslavia. Drafted under the co-chairmanship of Lord 
Owen and Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Thorvald Stoltenberg, 
who had replaced Cyrus Vance on 1 May 1993 as representative of the 
United Nations Secretary-General in the International Conference on the 
Former Yugoslavia, the 1993 Union of Three Republics Plan presented a 
territorial division of Bosnia and Herzegovina into three units that was 
explicitly ethnic in nature. Article 1 reads: “The Union of Republics of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is composed of three constituent republics and 
encompasses three constituent peoples: the Muslims, Serbs and Croats, 
as well as a group of other peoples” (Trifunovska, 1994: 1032). These 
constituent republics, which are referred to as the ‘Muslim’, ‘Croat’ and 
‘Serb’ majority republics, could not withdraw from the union in violation 
of the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
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Rejection of territorial alternatives in negotiations 
The departure from the principle of territoriality was a source of 
disillusionment for many professionals of politics in Europe. Notably 
objections came from the Dutch and German Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 
who had at the opening session of the International Conference on the 
Former Yugoslavia in London insisted on endorsement of peace based on 
integration. In a letter to his Belgian colleague on 29 July 1993, Dutch 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Pieter Kooijmans opposed the 1993 Union of 
Three Republics Plan saying that he was “concerned that the negotiations 
in Geneva could lead to a settlement, which would in many respects be at 
odds with the basic principles subscribed to in London and Copenhagen” 
(Both, 2000: 162). “It is the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina that 
worries us,” his spokesman said in Reuters News a month later, that is, 
“whether a Muslim state can survive and whether the Muslims will accept 
it voluntarily” (‘Dutch to Voice Doubts’, 1993). A week later, German 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Klaus Kinkel made it known to his colleagues 
in the European Community that he shared Kooijmans’ reservations about 
the negotiations.119 He held that peace should not impose a territorial 
division of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the Bosnian Muslims, who he 
characterised as the main victims of the conflict, and he expressed concerns 
about whether the plan for a Union of Three Republics could produce a 
fair and equitable outcome on the basis of the London principles (‘Kinkel 
Skeptisch Zu Bosnien-Friedensplan’, 1993).
Co-chairmen Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg discarded the 
politicians’ claim for integration in shared territory. In visits to Frankfurt 
and The Hague on 25 August, they said that they were pursuing the best 
possible settlement under the constraints of the war and needed full support 
from the European Community Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Lord Owen 
argued that the plan for ethnic separation had emerged in negotiations 
where he and Thorvald Stoltenberg had been forced to accept what was on 
offer, thence discursively positioning their political principals at distance 
in an asymmetry of knowledge and ‘grasp’ of the situation (Williams, 
1993). He specialised to the point where he felt no longer bound and 
acted independently of his mandate. The London principles had “died 
with the ditching of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan,” Lord Owen asserted, 
119  ABZ, DEU/ 05238 Memorandum, Chef DEU, 12/08/1993
172
confirming slippage from his principals’ preferred outcome.120 
In the circumstances of uncertainty about outcomes, Lord Owen 
and Thorvald Stoltenberg were influenced by context and negotiators 
with different social backgrounds; they accepted the representation 
of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina as intractable that had been 
foregrounded by their military adviser. Lord Owen no longer categorised 
tensions as irredentism, which could not be awarded with territorial 
adjustments, but found that “as the war developed, the ethnic element 
became stronger”. Both he and Thorvald Stoltenberg hence believed in the 
need to accommodate the Bosnian Serbs in their quest for territory.121 Lord 
Owen was convinced that forcing back territorial gains would prolong the 
conflict and increasingly considered it an “illusion, and hence bad policy” 
to insist on population resettlement for integration in shared territory 
(Owen, 2013: 262).122 Co-chairman Thorvald Stoltenberg, who was as the 
representative of the Secretary-General also head of the United Nations 
military forces, says: “territorial separation was necessary for future peace”. 
Professionals of politics hence proved unable to enforce territoriality in the 
negotiation process. Military officers rather established among members 
of the international negotiation team that the peoples were separated on 
the ground, and that it was necessary under the circumstances of violence 
to codify this geopolitical strategic reality. Dutch Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Pieter Kooijmans warned the co-chairmen of the conference for 
the military’s influence in the negotiation process. He believed that their 
emphasis on ‘realism’ and ‘negotiability’ led the 1993 Union of Three 
Republics Plan to be determined largely by the military superiority of the 
Bosnian Serbs at the cost of the principles laid down in London.123 But 
the negotiators moved around their mandate. They did notably not find a 
norm on boundary maintenance in international diplomacy that limited 
their exploration of this territorial arrangement. They accepted that the 
republican borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina did not represent the de 
facto situation and that sustainable peace and order therefore required an 
alternative allocation of territory.
120  ABZ, DEU/ 05239 ICFY/Briefing Lord Owen, 20/01/1994
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122  ABZ, DEU/ 05239 ICFY/Briefing Lord Owen, 20/01/1994
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Acceptance of territorial division in negotiations
The continued intensification of the fighting only strengthened the position 
of the military officials in the negotiation process. Acceptance of the ethnic 
division of territory increased with the number of military representatives. 
By the end of 1993, Vigleik Eide, a retired Norwegian general and former 
Chairman of NATO’s Military Committee who was assisted by a Finnish 
colonel and major, reported from Zagreb and an UNPROFOR liaison team 
in Geneva included Finnish Major Pasi Karonen and his French colleague 
as assistants to Australian brigadier John Wilson. So when the Contact 
Group was established to intervene after President Alijah Izetbegović of 
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina had rejected the 1993 Union 
of Three Republics Plan, its members according to British representative 
David Manning agreed without much discussion that peace required an 
arrangement that recognised areas for the different ethnic communities. 
The Contact Group was composed of the directors general of political 
affairs from the United States, the Russian Federation, France, the United 
Kingdom and Germany and their representatives Charles Redman, Vitaly 
Churkin, Jacques-Alain de Sedouy, David Manning and Michael Steiner. 
These professionals of politics came to accept the ethnic solution upon 
their engagement in the negotiation process. While German Director-
General of Political Affairs Jürgen Chrobog had objected to recognition 
of the fait accompli of ethnic cleansing still in November 1992, he and 
his British colleague Pauline Neville-Jones hold that their efforts in the 
Contact Group were aimed at identifying areas for ethnic communities 
to live separated (NIOD, 2002: 479). “We had to accept facts on the 
ground otherwise we would not have stopped the war,” Jürgen Chrobog 
says, echoing the military’s shared association of territorial division with 
the codification of the geopolitical strategic realities of ethnic separation. 
David Manning strikingly distances himself from the division that the 
members of the Contact Group as such endorsed by calling it a “rather 
old-fashioned sort of solution”. This indicates his disappointment with the 
negotiators’ inability under the constraints of the war to attain the ideal of 
in statehood defined by unity and civic nationhood.
The politicians and civil servants on the Contact Group more generally 
dissociate from the ethnic separation codified in the 1994 Contact Group 
Plan by denying a role as ‘formulators’ in the drafting process. They 
considered themselves mediators of stances developed by representatives 
of the Bosnian Muslims, Croats and Serbs. “We were trying to find out 
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what might work, where the difficulties lay, […] and see whether there 
were ways forward,” British representative David Manning says. For 
him, “[t]he whole point of the Contact Group was to make contact, that 
is, to find out what people felt and then to come back and report”. So 
just like Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg half a year earlier, they 
identified themselves as ‘facilitators’ of dialogue between the conflicting 
parties. Lord Owen had insisted on not attaching his name to the peace 
process, unlike in earlier negotiations for integration in the 1992 Vance-
Owen Peace Plan.124 United States representative Charles Redman then 
reported in May 1994 that the members of the Contact Group were “not 
prepared to define a map” and impose it on the peoples of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.125 His colleagues Pauline Neville-Jones and Jürgen Chrobog 
confirm that they came in without images of a settlement. They considered 
the representatives of the warring parties responsible for formulating 
it.126 These professionals of politics as such distance themselves from the 
outcome they authorised, which contrasts integration in shared territory. 
A combined politico-military intervention in negotiations
When negotiations finally came to the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base 
in Dayton on 1 November 1995, “[t]he centre of gravity was getting an 
agreement,” the Political Deputy to Special Envoy of the European Union 
to the Former Yugoslavia Carl Bildt says. At the initiative of United States 
National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, who spent more time with 
President Clinton than any other senior foreign policy official by virtue of 
his job, President Clinton had agreed to a major American intervention 
in the negotiation process (Chollet, 2005: 19). This intervention brought 
military officers to the front in the negotiation process. In a combined 
politico-military mission, representatives of the international forces 
became equal members in the international negotiation team after (former) 
politicians and civil servants had composed the Contact Group. Anthony 
Lake had indeed in late June asked his senior adviser on European affairs 
Alexander Vershbow to develop an ‘endgame’ strategy paper for levelling 
the military playing field, which he combined with Robert Frasure’s earlier 
124  ABZ, DEU/ 05239 ICFY/Briefing Lord Owen, 20/01/1994
125  ABZ, DEU/ARA/05240 Former Yugoslavia, 16/05/1994
126  A report on the Contact Group meeting in Geneva of 13 May 1994 confirms that 
enforcement of a territorial solution was “not an option” (ABZ, DEU/ARA/05240 Bosnia, 
17/05/1994).
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proposal for diplomacy with the political leaders of the warring parties 
(Chollet, 2005: 20; 26-27).127 
Support for this politico-military intervention in the negotiation process 
increased after July 1995, when the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
escalated. Bosnian Serb army units then overran two of the United Nations 
safe areas, Zepa and Srebrenica, and the Croats commenced offensives in 
the Krajina and in western Slavonia regions of the Republic of Croatia 
in order to reverse Serb territorial gains from the beginning of the war 
in Yugoslavia. “This is an extremely escalatory step,” United Nations 
spokesman Alexander Ivanko said in the Los Angeles Times when Croatian 
forces attacked to lift the siege of Bihać on the border of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. “We have an attack across an international border. We have 
basically three warring factions taking part in this attack …[and] might 
see more factions drawn in,” which could mean an escalation of the war to 
draw in Croatian forces that had pledged to support the Bosnian Muslims 
against the Serbs (Wilkinson, 1995). US President Clinton then brought 
the negotiation process to the United States. He agreed to the mission, 
saying: “We must commit to a unified Bosnia. And if we cannot get that 
at the bargaining table, we have to help the Bosnians on the battlefield” 
(Chollet, 2005: 40). 
The negotiations were shaped under the lead of politicians and civil 
servants. The chairman was US Assistant Secretary of State for Europe 
and Ambassador to Germany Richard Holbrooke, who had in 1993 
already volunteered to be a special envoy. Richard Holbrooke had proven 
to support integration in shared territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Just like his colleagues earlier in the negotiation process, and in line with 
US President Clinton’s expressed commitment, he had objected to the 
creation of nation-states in Foreign Affairs in April/May 1995. “Local 
conflicts, internal political and economic instability, and the return 
of historical grievances [are] the greatest threat to peace in Europe,” he 
wrote. With “democracy, stability, and free-market economies,” states are 
vulnerable to the “most dangerous [problems of ] territorial and ethnic 
disputes” (Holbrooke, 1995). Indeed, Richard Holbrooke describes in his 
127  Robert Frasure was the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European 
Affairs and the United States representative to the Contact Group since July 1994. He had 
in this position proposed “one more roll of the diplomatic dice,” aiming to negotiate with 
President Milošević of the Republic of Serbia as the negotiator for the Bosnian Serbs in 
return for sanctions relief (Chollet, 2005: 22).
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memoirs To End a War that his goal for the negotiations in Dayton was 
to gain agreement for a multi-ethnic state. “We would not legitimise Serb 
aggression or encourage Croat annexation,” he writes in objection to a 
division of territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina between the three ethnic 
communities (Holbrooke, 1999: 232-233).
Yet representatives of the military gained authority in the development 
of the territorial arrangement. Principal US National Security Advisor 
Anthony Lake, who had objected to Richard Holbrooke’s assignment 
as head of the mission, set the conditions for negotiation. He did not 
share the politicians’ understanding of their interest to maintain the 
international territorial order, as realists would argue, but considered it 
their national interest not to get (militarily) trapped in a dispute that could 
easily escalate into another war (Chollet, 2005: 20). He instructed the 
agent negotiators that Bosnia and Herzegovina “would be composed of 
two highly autonomous entities (one majority-Serb and another majority-
Muslim/Croat)” on the basis of the 51-49 territorial division endorsed by 
the members of the Contact Group (Chollet, 2005: 42-43). His talking 
points had been drafted by Alexander Vershbow, the Senior Director for 
European Affairs at the National Security Council who had proven to 
accommodate ethnicities in his dealing with Soviet Union affairs between 
1988 and 1991 (Meyer, 2014: 6; Friedman, 1992: 1). An emphasis on 
separation of ethnic communities also underlay Alexander Vershbow’s 
‘endgame’ strategy paper in 1995. “[W]e will need to have a heart-to-heart 
discussion with the [Bosnian Muslims] aimed at eliciting greater flexibility 
on the map, constitutional arrangements, and possibly the Bosnian Serbs’ 
right to secede from the Union after an initial period,” it reads. 
The military’s influence in the final negotiations
The military representatives then advanced the instructions on territorial 
division in the negotiations. James Pardew from the US Department of 
Defence, Lieutenant General Wesley Clark from the US Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, supported by Executive Assistant Daniel Gerstein, and the Director of 
European Affairs at the US National Security Council Lieutenant General 
Donald Kerrick were members of the inter-agency negotiation team 
headed by Richard Holbrooke. These trained and experienced military 
officers, United Nations Chief Political Officer in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Phillip Corwin confirms, had in negotiations a primary allegiance to 
military commanders. “Once a soldier, always a soldier,” he writes in 
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his memoirs (Corwin, 1999: 55). They indeed followed the military 
representing the war as intractable for its origins in ethnic differences. 
Daniel Gerstein describes how he considered that “it was not possible to 
bring these peoples together and to make them want to live together”. Just 
like the representatives of international armed forces in earlier rounds of 
negotiations, they did hence not deem reconciliation in shared territory 
possible. They shared the belief that the ethnic communities in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina were and would have to remain separated in territorial units 
to ensure defensibility and thus peace. “That was just the nature of the 
ties,” Donald Kerrick says.
The representation of the conflict as intractable was widespread in the 
United States military. The idea that age-old ethnic tensions underlay the 
war, and that the war reflected the violent history of the region, can be 
found for example in public statements by former Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell and in studies by analysts like Elihu 
Root Chair of Military Studies at the US Army War College William 
Johnsen. Johnsen found that “substantial time – perhaps decades or 
generations” was necessary for integration in the Balkans (Johnsen, 1995: 
63). He thus found maintenance of the existing borders in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina inconceivable; “the price would be considerable,” he claimed 
(Johnsen, 1995: 63; 72). The military representatives on the negotiation 
team supported the essence of this policy brief. They considered the war 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina the result of ancient hatreds between ethnic 
communities, unlike the professionals of politics that had pursued 
integration. The (former) politicians and civil servants chaired by Lord 
Owen and Cyrus Vance had associated violence with power politics by 
the Yugoslav political leaders, while Donald Kerrick says: “They have long 
memories in this area”. James Pardew also found that “the resentment in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina was extreme”. “I do not think that you can go in 
and expect to change cultures,” Daniel Gerstein says capturing the same 
representation of the conflict, which had been foregrounded by nationalists 
in the war.128 
Seeing the situation thence from perspectives on the battlefield, the military 
representatives were inclined to reason that peace and order required a 
128  The book Balkan Ghosts (1993) by Robert Kaplan may have been a factor in the evaluation 
of the situation. Daniel Gerstein at least read it in preparation for the negotiations. Scholars 
of the region like Noel Malcolm (1993) criticised the book for overemphasising violence 
and ignoring traditions of coexistence in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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territorial delimitation of ethnic separation. Just like Major-General 
Graham Messervy-Whiting in the International Conference on the Former 
Yugoslavia, they intended to assess the positioning and capabilities of the 
various armed forces in order to codify their lines of confrontation in a 
way that discourages the use of further violence. With great reluctance in 
the principal US Joint Chiefs of Staff to deploy significant ground forces 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina for enforcement,129 this meant that the agents 
needed to appease particularly the militarily capable in their demands. 
Lieutenant General Donald Kerrick says: “There had to be an agreement 
that [the Bosnian Serbs] could accept, which meant accepting a republic 
as part of the larger country”. The Bosnian Serbs had to be accommodated 
in order to get them to the negotiation table, James Pardew confirms 
in support of his Department of Defence’s written contribution to the 
‘endgame’ strategy in July 1995 (Chollet, 2005: 39). As military officers, 
they thus considered enforcement of existing boundaries costly, in contrast 
with what neoliberal institutionalist scholars like Carter and Goemans 
(2011) find. They thought that this required deployment of considerable 
ground forces to establish a military balance; they instead sought to freeze 
the conflict and ensure defensibility with a standoff zone that outreached 
the max-effective range of a standard gun of attack.130 
Their shared association of territorial separation with defensibility refrained 
the army officers from comprehensively pursuing alternative territorial 
arrangements in the final rounds of negotiations. They took the ethnic 
separation in the conflict for granted and did not question that the peace 
accord thus needed to codify this separation in territorial units that armies 
could defend upon agreement. Yet several civil servants deployed in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina challenged the military representation of the Army of the 
Republika Srpska as a threat. “What I saw was an army of thugs and often 
drugs,” United States Ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith accounts. 
Having the benefit of permanent representation over shuttle diplomacy 
by the military representatives in the negotiation process, he and United 
Nations Chief Political Officer Phillip Corwin were convinced after 
visiting the frontlines that the army’s ability to counter attacks and hence 
to undermine a peace settlement was hugely overestimated (Corwin, 1999: 
129  Lieutenant General Wesley Clark writes in his memoirs Waging Modern War that he 
“sensed a lot of truth in what Holbrooke was saying” when Richard Holbrooke asked him 
during the negotiations if he understood “that there are members of the Joint Chiefs who 
want our effort to fail” (Clark, 2002: 65). 
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127).131 At the same time, United States Special Envoy for the Bosnian 
Federation Daniel Serwer argues, the military representatives failed to 
acknowledge that the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
was “a military force that had been shaped by the war. [It] was a serious 
military force”. 
On the basis of their shared conception of peace and order, however, 
military officers James Pardew, Donald Kerrick and Daniel Gerstein 
unequivocally rejected support for the Bosnian Muslims in efforts to 
recover lost territory in the context of the ongoing violence. Daniel 
Serwer describes in his memoirs being treated as a “threat to [the] broader 
enterprise” (Serwer, 1999: 570). After objecting to the territorial division 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an award for strategies of ethnic cleansing, 
he describes that both he and his colleague Peter Galbraith were excluded 
from the negotiation process. Territorial division of ethnic communities is 
“a centuries old program” that is more commonly applied than trying to 
“solve ethnic issues through law,” James Pardew says, as such exemplifying 
that his rejection of integration was based on strong beliefs about peaceful 
territorial change rather than pure rational choice. “The other million 
voices out there,” he finds, “were not in the game, so to speak”.
The military representatives were then able to insert the territorial division 
into the settlement for Bosnia and Herzegovina. United States Ambassador 
to Croatia Peter Galbraith illustrates the extent of their influence when 
he says that “they certainly played a big role in the instructions”. As 
representatives of the international forces on the ground who were 
trained to operate in violent disputes, they delivered their reflections on 
the situation and its prospects, making it known to the negotiation team 
members what the minimum conditions were for a territorial arrangement 
to be sustainable. Particularly Lieutenant General Wesley Clark and 
his Executive Assistant Daniel Gerstein, who were educated in analysis 
of geopolitical strategic elements on maps, then drew the Inter-Entity 
Boundary Line. “Military representatives are good at that kind of stuff,” 
US Under Secretary of Defence for Policy Walter Slocombe explains. 
“They know what a defensible line is”. They developed it in a small group 
131  In his memoirs Dubious Mandate, Phillip Corwin describes that “[t]he common 
perception of [the Army of the Republika Srpska] as a ruthless and effective military 
machine, much like the Nazis of World War II, was hardly accurate. Ruthless, yes, but 
efficient and well-trained, not necessarily” (Corwin, 1999: 202). 
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composed of mainly military officers.132 Daniel Gerstein recounts: “There 
were probably no more than ten people in the room when we drew the 
border”. 
Indeed, their team member representing the US Department of State 
Christopher Hill acknowledges that the territorial arrangement was 
under the circumstances of war a ‘military matter’ and “the militaries 
understood each other”. “We all knew the destructive power of weapons 
and ammunition,” military attaché to the Bosnian Muslim delegation at 
Dayton Selmo Cikotić confirms. Christopher Hill then mirrors practices 
by Lord Own and Thorvald Stoltenberg, who discursively positioned their 
political principals at distance after interaction with context and negotiators 
with different social backgrounds. He declares that he found his colleagues 
in the US Department of State in Washington had strong views that were 
“ideology-driven” and “out of proportion to their actual knowledge,” 
establishing an asymmetry of knowledge and ‘grasp’ of the situation. His 
ideas for the territorial settlement developed in the negotiation process, 
he holds, attesting to a decreasing orientation on instructions from his 
professional field. He even used his autonomy to influence decisions by his 
principals; his knowledge of what was going on in the negotiation process 
strengthened his position “as someone who knew what [he] was talking 
about,” he sensed.
When the 1995 Dayton Accords were concluded, they hence codified 
an ethnic division of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Not 
professionals of politics from the European Community or the United 
States but military officers shaped this outcome of the international 
negotiation process; after territorial unity had been rejected under the lead 
of military officer from the Army of the Republika Srpska General Ratko 
Mladić, the escalation of the conflict provided the military representatives 
of the international forces with an opportunity to establish the need 
to codify the geopolitical strategic reality of ethnic separation in the 
negotiation process. First General-Major Graham Messervy-Whiting and 
then James Pardew from the US Department of Defence and Lieutenants 
General Donald Kerrick and Wesley Clark mastered development of the 
territorial solution as map experts informed about the geopolitical strategic 
realities of war and their implications for implementation of peace. They 
relied on commanders of the Bosnian Muslim, Croat and Serb armies 
to learn what the ‘art of the possible’ and justified codification of their 
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divisions on the basis of the military’s shared conception of peace and 
order, although this was against the interests of many (former) politicians 
and civil servants who intervened to reinforce integration. It was through 
the military justification of defensibility that the ethnic was ultimately 
accepted as an outcome. 
Conclusion 
The division of Bosnia and Herzegovina in ethnic areas was hence the 
outcome of a negotiation process in which nationalism was legitimised by 
a need to create defensible territorial units for antagonistic communities 
separated in war. After armies had started to homogenise areas in contrast 
with the security map of the professionals of politics in Europe, who had 
insisted that boundary maintenance would discourage such irredentism 
upon Yugoslavia’s dissolution, military officers gained influence to shape 
outcomes in negotiations. They developed authority as professionals 
trained to operate in violent disputes. In the context of the violence, 
the military representatives of the international forces then endorsed a 
representation of the war as intractable, being based in ancient ethnic 
hatreds, and they established among negotiators the need to accommodate 
geopolitical strategic realities of ethnic separation to prevent crises in the 
future. As such, they added a layer of military justification to what was 
essentially a nationalist outcome. With this acceptable justification for an 
essentially unacceptable outcome, they defined in the negotiation process 
that a de facto division of territory between the ethnic communities was 
the only ‘feasible’ or ‘realistic’ territorial arrangement for peace and order 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Professionals of politics intervened regularly in the negotiation process to 
pursue territorial alternatives for integration. After they had insisted on 
boundary maintenance upon the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation, 
they sought to avoid a division of territory along ethnic lines in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. Yet military officers were strengthened in their position 
by the escalation of violence and they rejected the alternatives. In fact, 
representation of the war as intractable and a doxa on the defensibility of a 
peace accord refrained the military representatives from comprehensively 
pursuing them, and they established support among the international 
negotiators in interaction with their political principals. Viewing the 
situation from the battlefield, they tended to believe as trained and 
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experienced military officers that integration was costly in implementation 
where the existing borders did not represent the situation on the ground. 
The military representatives did hence not subscribe to existing boundaries 
as ‘focal points’ in the negotiations concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
as Carter and Goemans (2011) note, and they did not regard a universal 
norm on boundary maintenance, as many constructivists and English 
School theorists argue. They rather shaped negotiations towards acceptance 
of ethnic division of territory. Under the constraints of an ongoing war, 
the outcome foregrounded by army officials fighting on the ground thus 
prevailed over the alternatives desired by professionals of politics. Their 
power developed not from tacit or explicit coercion, as for example Krasner 
(1999) argues, but from relations with representatives of international 
forces. Commanders in the conflict, who were in a powerful position 
to undermine peace, shared assumptions with colleagues among the 
international negotiators, who could insert their logic into the territorial 
arrangement when drafting instructions and maps for negotiation. 
These military representatives did not share an understanding of their 
national interest with the professionals of politics, as realists assume. They 
emphasised the risk of conflict re-escalation rather than the disruption of 
the international territorial order.
In order to understand how outcomes are constructed in the practice of 
boundary politics, it is hence important to understand where power to 
interpret reality lies – that is, it is necessary to consider who takes control 
of the negotiation process and how they are influenced by their different 
backgrounds. It was the interplay and sequencing between professionals 
of politics and the military that shaped outcomes in the Yugoslav space. 
Professionals of politics in Europe assumed authority to pressure boundary 
maintenance upon dissolution of the Yugoslav federation in order to 
discourage the aggressive nationalism that threatened international order. 
When violence escalated in Bosnia and Herzegovina in contrast with this 
understanding of peaceful territorial change, the military entered the 
negotiation process to settle disputes within these confines. They sought to 
codify the geopolitical strategic realities of war and as such, legitimised an 
internal division of territory along ethnic lines. So it was not the strength 
of a principle like uti possidetis or even the quality of existing boundaries 
that ensured that the borders of the republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
were left intact; specific agents with particular backgrounds managed to 
structure the process for these practices in boundary politics in line with 




This dissertation takes on the widespread acceptance of boundary fixity 
in sovereignty change and asks how diplomatic actors manage the 
implications of changes in state sovereignty for international borders. I 
argued that we must shift the study’s focus to the social space of boundary 
politics, historicising practices and locating them in their social structures 
to analyse the social processes and agents that develop outcomes.
The findings challenge a number of conventional wisdoms. Existing 
boundaries have no inherent value for peace and order upon territorial 
change. Over the course of the twentieth century, maintaining 
international and administrative boundaries in territorial change has 
been followed by domestic, regional and interstate unrest more often 
than drawing original borders. Adherence to the uti possidetis principle 
has thus proven considerably more volatile than most in the theory and 
practice of international diplomacy suggest. The historical background 
of this practice is similarly surprising. Boundary maintenance does not 
have its origins in Roman law, as is widely reported, and it has not been 
adhered to as a practice ‘logically connected’ to sovereignty change since 
the process of decolonisation in Latin America in the nineteenth century 
in line with what the judges of the International Court of Justice declared 
in the 1986 Burkina Faso/Mali case. Adherence to existing boundaries 
rather originates in the outbreak of violence in partitioned India and 
Palestine in the 1950s. This inspired a reintroduction of the practice in 
a ‘channelled’ African decolonisation process. The stability of boundaries 
there, at least in terms of large-scale interstate conflicts, strengthened the 
position of boundary maintenance in the practice of boundary politics. 
Boundary maintenance is thus related to significantly more recent events 
than many in both theory and practice believe.  
The practice developed from the shared opinions and unquestioned beliefs 
that prevailed when professional state representatives gained authority 
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in international diplomacy. The violence following attempts to separate 
ethnic or religious communities peacefully in Asia and the Middle 
East disrupted the existing security map. It permitted professionals in 
diplomacy to redefine practices of boundary politics on the basis of a fear 
of nationalism and state dissolution. They reintroduced border fixity in 
the drawing of new international borders. They then enforced it with 
the assistance of lawyers after decolonisation in the dissolution process 
of the Yugoslav federation in what is best understood as a strategic move 
to discredit calls for territorial change that they associated with aggressive 
nationalism and irredentism that contrast political integration. 
Yet neither territoriality nor integration is the shared stance of agents 
involved in boundary politics. When war broke out in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina following its secession from the Yugoslav federation, military 
officers gained influence in diplomacy as map experts informed about the 
geopolitical strategic realities of war and the intricacies of implementing 
peace. They believed that boundaries primarily needed to be defensible 
in implementation, which culminated in a division of the state’s territory 
between ethnic communities as a representation of the geopolitical strategic 
realities of war. And throughout history, trends in armed diplomacy and 
intelligence operations paralleled abandonment of territoriality when 
boundary maintenance failed to prevent outbreaks of nationalist violence 
in contrast with the security map of the professionals in diplomacy. So 
it matters who takes control of the negotiation process and how they are 
influenced by their different backgrounds; territoriality may be much less 
fixed as a practice than is commonly assumed. 
If indeed practices tend to vary with agency and groups of negotiators 
generally take typical stances on their development in practice, this 
suggests that boundary politics are shaped in a social space where people 
from different established fields interact for the common purpose of 
drafting an agreement. 
The practice of boundary politics as a social space of interaction
Practices in boundary politics are constructed in negotiation processes 
characterised by limited autonomy. In addition to being subject to external 
forces of notably conflict and politics, relations are divided internally by 
the logics of the military and politics or diplomacy because individual 
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negotiators are primarily invested in these professional arenas. The 
negotiators’ socialisation and models for action are largely structured and 
defined outside the negotiation process. The pathways by which agents gain 
authority in negotiations reveal that seniority and the degree of investment 
in the process are important. In the negotiations concerning Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, for example, knowledge of the conflict and its leading parties’ 
strategies gave the military representatives of the international forces 
influence among negotiators while the configuration under the auspices of 
the European Community was characterised by continuity despite failure 
to conclude an agreement. Yet previously acquired capitals and extra-
diplomatic assets remain a critical factor for influence. Negotiators tend 
to be drawn from high positions in their professional fields. Access to the 
central positions in the practice of boundary politics hence remains heavily 
dependent on resources of which the value is defined outside it.
And the negotiators tend to maintain their professional networks in the 
negotiation process; in fact, their position derives to a significant extent 
from these networks with their status as representatives of a professional 
tradition (i.e. a representative of a state or international organisation or the 
armed forces on the ground). This means that they not only report back to 
their represented institutions, but they remain oriented on the professional 
fields to which they return after their assignment in the negotiation 
process. The negotiations are not an endpoint for its participants; 
participation is often a detour in their professional careers or a passage to 
another job at home. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, many representatives 
of the warring parties stayed in power upon conflict resolution. And for 
chairmen of international negotiations like José Cutileiro or Richard 
Holbrooke, their positions were an assignment in employment by national 
civil services, while Lord Owen continued public life as a member of the 
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict after he resigned. 
Acceptability of outcomes at home thus remains the focus of many 
professionals of politics, whether it concerns constituencies or colleagues 
in international diplomacy, while representatives of the armies are rather 
inclined to focus on the conditions under which their forces are left to 
implement an agreement. 
Negotiators in fact tend to develop and maintain relations with their 
colleagues in the negotiation process. Sharing an understanding of what is 
necessary for an arrangement to be workable or stable in terms of codifying 
the relationship between ‘territories’ and ‘nations’, they relate as agents with 
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a similar professional background across national and cultural bounds. 
On arrangements for conflict management in the Yugoslav federation and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, politicians indeed structured negotiations to 
exclude others. They secured control over discussions particularly related 
to issues of political power distribution and the movement and protection 
of minorities, labouring to reinforce integration through civic nationhood 
and shared territory. To the same effect of excluding alternatives from their 
deliberations, military representatives of the international forces relied on 
army officials to provide them information for producing the territorial 
arrangement. “We could talk the same language,” Major-General Graham 
Messervy-Whiting says, confirming the military-to-military association in 
practice. As such, the different groups of negotiators tended to be affirmed 
rather than confronted in their prevailing conceptions of reality.
So in many ways, the international negotiation processes in which new 
borders are drawn are crossroads of different interests. And it is exactly this 
characteristic of the negotiations that accounts for outcomes in boundary 
politics that are contradictory in nature – that is, the weak connection 
between groups of negotiators helps to explain why territorial arrangements 
may vary at instance between opposites of border fixity or territoriality and 
ethnic division. The practice of boundary politics has no settled end goal 
and negotiation processes are not undisputedly dominated by agents from 
any particular profession, so agents in strategically important positions 
are critical forces driving the importation, legitimation and enactment 
of their logics. They advance their ideas in the process of negotiations, 
convincing negotiators from other professional fields, and as such help to 
make outcomes in line with their commonplaces meaningful in boundary 
politics. 
The limited cohesion of negotiators is not a sign of imperfection or 
incompletion in the practice of boundary politics; the findings in this 
dissertation reveal that it is a hallmark of the standard mode of operation in 
this practice. Throughout history, outcomes have been distributed across 
different logics in line with trends of professionalisation and popularisation 
or militarisation in international diplomacy. Under the contemporary 
institutionalisation of the practice of boundary maintenance, professionals 
of politics tend to assume authority to provide instructions on the basis 
of what they consider acceptable for international peace and order. Yet 
an outbreak of violence that contradicts this security map, as with the 
outbreak of nationalist war in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the republic’s 
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boundaries were maintained in line with the uti possidetis principle in 
1991, generates opportunities for army officials to gain recognition of 
their expertise and thus influence. This violence discredits existing beliefs 
about peaceful territorial change and foregrounds militaries in negotiations 
concerning the situations of armed dispute in which they are trained to 
work. 
It is hence important to know where power lies in the practice of boundary 
politics to understand outcomes. One needs to learn who takes control 
of the negotiation process and how these negotiators are influenced by 
their backgrounds. Yet barriers exist for ‘outsiders’ to analyse negotiation 
processes. Exactly the interior structures and their influence on specific 
elements of the outcomes are covered by what Bourdieu (1977: 79) calls 
‘genesis amnesia’, which literally means the forgetting of conditions and 
reasons for their origin. I find that negotiators share mystification of the 
terms of their appointment as well as the historical conditions and social 
relations by which critical decisions were taken. Not only the introduction 
of a territorial division in Bosnia and Herzegovina for example remains 
unspoken, also the setting in which 49 per cent of the territory was 
assigned to the Republika Srpska is guarded. According to chairman of the 
International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia Thorvald Stoltenberg, 
“[i]t came from the skies”. “Whenever we talked about the future of this 
area, we talked about a 51-49 partition,” he says, capturing the amnesia 
of its origins.
The genesis amnesia obstructs scrutiny of origins and their underlying 
power relations and thus induces acceptance of the outcome as a fait 
accompli. It produces twofold arbitrariness concerning the process of 
international negotiations, i.e. recognition of the negotiators as legitimate 
representatives of a community and recognition of the legitimacy of 
the outcome that it offers. This legitimacy is underscored by a taboo on 
disagreement. Its manifestation depends on the negotiators’ subscription 
to a notion of harmony among negotiators within different delegations. 
Discussion on individual negotiators’ separate opinions opens roads for 
examination of outcomes on the basis of their objections. Negotiators thus 
tend to emphasise unanimity in the process. “We had no major internal 
differences of perception on the issue,” Major-General Graham Messervy-
Whiting says about negotiators with whom he did not share principles 
for the territorial arrangement of Bosnia and Herzegovina. And despite 
his personal objections, José Cutileiro stresses: “We, on the side of the 
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negotiators, were in good faith”. By this means, negotiators obstruct 
intervention in the process and reinforce for themselves and others that 
outcomes were pursued independent of social origins. 
In the remainder of this concluding chapter, I assess the findings of this 
dissertation by considering the theoretical and policy implications that 
emerge from the analysis. I then discuss questions raised here that open 
avenues for future research and finally consider the normative implications 
of my conclusion that practices in boundary politics are constructed on 
the basis of negotiators’ conceptions of peace and order, raising the issue 
whether the practice of boundary maintenance should be altered or 
maintained today.
Implications for theory and practice
This dissertation generates the conclusion that the implications of 
sovereignty change are managed on the basis of shared opinions and 
unquestioned beliefs instilled in (groups of ) negotiators who gain 
influence in boundary politics. This conclusion speaks to the need for an 
inclusive ontological framework addressing both agents and context. It 
suggests that practices, and particularly changes in practices, have to be 
explained in light of both challenges and opportunities in the context of a 
territorial dispute and the preferences and habits of the agents involved in 
international negotiations. 
In the academic debate on boundary politics, we see the limits of focusing 
on structural factors, assuming negotiators to be neutral actors, to explain 
outcomes. The argument is that borders are drawn in accordance with 
strategic interests of the materially capable (e.g. Coggins, 2011), or on 
the basis of border fixity as a shared interests (e.g. Zacher, 2001; Carter 
and Goemans, 2011; Prorok and Huth, forthcoming) or an international 
norm (e.g. Jackson, 1990; Fabry, 2005). The genealogy however shows 
a durability of practices in boundary politics that incompatible with the 
realist premise that principles and established practices such as boundary 
maintenance are abandoned whenever it pleases the powerful in their 
national interest. At the same time, it is wrong to consider the practice 
of boundary maintenance without variations over time and space from 
a liberal institutionalist or constructivist and English School perspective. 
The sociological analysis of the international negotiation process in which 
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borders were drawn for the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation and the 
internal territorial division of Bosnia and Herzegovina shows that actors 
engage actively to foreground varying practices, which is in contrast with 
structure-oriented explanations of practices in boundary politics. 
Evidence furthermore shows that the causal mechanisms in boundary 
politics are different. The in-depth sociological analysis suggests that not 
necessarily representatives of the materially capable states shape outcomes, 
nor that negotiators are necessarily compelled by its logic. The decision 
to maintain the administrative boundaries upon Yugoslavia’s dissolution 
remained disputed by President Milošević as a representative of the republic 
of Serbia, which contrasts the theoretical notion that negotiators considered 
it in their interests or in accordance with prevailing norms to accept them. 
And in the subsequent negotiations concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
military representatives of the international forces were the key agents that 
introduced and legitimised a territorial division along ethnic lines. They 
generally considered it in their national interest to prevent re-escalation of 
war with their involvement, while politicians more often thought about 
their interest in terms of maintaining the international territorial order. 
Territorial division was indeed against the expressed interest of politicians 
from powerful states. In fact, the politicians that intervened in this process, 
like for example Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen did under a mandate from 
the joined United Nations and European Community, failed to conclude 
outcomes in line with territoriality and civic nationhood. 
By focusing on structure or context, theorists in International Relations 
hence arrive at an unsatisfactory explanation of outcomes in boundary 
politics; I find that the influence of context is in practice mediated by 
the agents involved in international negotiation processes, who import 
it and interpret the effects for peace and order. Scholars in mediation 
studies emphasise agency in negotiation processes. They have come a 
long way in identifying specific traits (e.g. Walter, 1997; Kleiboer, 2002; 
Svensson, 2007) and behaviours (e.g. Kressel, 1972; Touval and Zartman, 
1985) that influence the work of negotiators. But they follow theorists 
in International Relations in treating agents as interchangeable when 
they describe them as direct representatives of the state or as actors using 
rational strategies to influence the negotiation process. My findings show, 
however, that preferences and habits are rooted in negotiators’ various 
social backgrounds, which are activated in the specific contexts of war and 
international negotiation in the practice of boundary politics. In the past as 
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well as in the recent negotiation process concerning Yugoslavia and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, variation in the socialisations of negotiators generally 
introduced variation in the territorial arrangements. These variations are 
black boxed particularly when negotiators are approached as collectives, 
like ‘the mediators’ and ‘the disputants’, ‘the international community’ or 
‘the United States’ and ‘the separatists’, or even as communities under a 
chairman in for example ‘Richard Holbrooke’s team’. 
What we are missing regardless of whether negotiators are considered neutral 
or influenced by cultural or professional backgrounds (e.g. Salacuse, 1998; 
Banai, 2013; Neumann, 2002; 2005; 2007) is an understanding of how 
specific negotiators interact to shape the outlook of the peace settlement 
– that is, we lack the agents and social processes through which they 
gain control in the negotiations. My argument is therefore based on how 
(groups of ) negotiators interact to produce the knowledge that underlies 
outcomes in boundary politics. I find that (groups of ) negotiators’ ability 
to shape outcomes depends on the recognition of their authority in 
practice; it is socially established in the context of specific negotiations 
rather than predetermined for example for politicians or representatives of 
‘great power’ states or institutions. 
Scholars such as Hawkins et al. (2006) and Pollack (2003; 2007) give a 
meaningful account of how negotiators manage constraints by mandates to 
establish their stances in practice, but they do not provide how negotiators 
formulate preferences in discord with their principals and move in practice 
to establish themselves as authorities on the negotiated outcome. Indeed, 
my findings show that principals seek to reduce agent slack by selecting 
agents who share their preferences. But negotiators are in practice open 
to influences from context or (groups of ) negotiators with different social 
backgrounds. Negotiators with different backgrounds tend to establish 
different systems of beliefs about peace and order. And while negotiators 
assume authority on the basis of previous practices, events that contradict 
the existing system of beliefs provide opportunities for other sets of 
negotiators to gain influence and introduce their ideas about peaceful 
territorial change. They can then move in interactions within and across 
fields to strengthen their position, specialising on specific discussions to 
create an asymmetry of knowledge or ‘grasp’ and ‘appreciation’ of the 
situation that increases their authority in practice. As such, the negotiators 
may construct practices in boundary politics, blurring the hierarchy 
between principal and agent.
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This means in practice that partiality is not necessarily strategic choice, as 
for example Maoz and Terris (2006), Rauchhaus (2006) and Kydd (2003) 
debate, but may be an unconscious outcome of structure influencing 
agency through social backgrounds. If we take this logic to the present-
day practice of boundary politics, it suggests that the international 
negotiations concerning Ukraine of February 2015 are unlikely to result 
in a recognised secession of the eastern part of the state. Professionals of 
politics Chancellor Angela Merkel from Germany and President François 
Hollande from France took the lead in these negotiations, ensuring that 
international borders would be maintained. “If we give up this principle of 
territorial integrity of countries, then we will not be able to maintain the 
peaceful order of Europe,” Angela Merkel attested when she stood besides 
President of the United States Barack Obama on the 9th of February (Sabin 
and Gander, 2015). She thus confirms in the practice of boundary politics 
the existing belief by professionals of politics in territoriality and civic 
nationhood, which is grounded in a widespread fear for disturbance of 
international order by nationalism and state dissolution. 
We face many crises in the world today that emerged as a consequence 
of upholding this belief. The most recent secessions of the Republic of 
South Sudan, which gained recognised statehood within the borders of 
the ten southern states of Sudan in 2011, and Kosovo three years earlier 
were followed by unrest. The former provincial boundaries of Kosovo have 
left minorities unsatisfied and uncertain about their status in the new 
state, while maintenance of the poorly demarcated 1/1/56 boundary to 
separate South Sudan and Sudan has kept many fighting for authority 
within and between the states. This unrest is unsurprising in light of my 
findings, which suggest that adherence to the uti possidetis principle may 
be more volatile for domestic, regional and international relations than 
renegotiating existing boundaries. And if maintenance of the international 
borders of Ukraine leaves internal boundaries to be drawn by the militaries, 
we may be creating another trouble spot. We may see another cycle of war 
or a territorial arrangement mirroring the one codified in the 1995 Dayton 
Accords for Bosnia and Herzegovina, which internationally confirms the 
existence of the state but internally divides its territory between ethnic 
communities.
So what needs to be done in international negotiations concerning a 
territorial arrangement? For one, we need to be mindful of who we send, 
invite and meet at the negotiation table as representatives. Practices in 
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boundary politics heavily depend on the specific (group of ) negotiators 
entitled to speak in the name of a party. In order to reach comprehensive 
agreement, negotiators then need to invest in a deep understanding of 
the different partners’ needs, trade-offs and uncertainties and do justice 
to their different perspectives. Diversity may under these circumstances 
offer new routes for resolution of the conflict. Negotiators with different 
backgrounds can break an impasse by bringing alternatives into an ongoing 
negotiation process.
Future research 
This dissertation’s contributions to theory and practice in challenging 
the conventional wisdom about boundary maintenance and the role of 
negotiators in establishing practices in contemporary boundary politics 
raises further questions and issues. First, it would be interesting to study 
the genesis of negotiation processes. The current analysis is restricted to 
negotiators and their interactions in the process, but how were negotiators 
selected for interaction in the process? What were the criteria for their 
appointment? Were their social backgrounds and experiences at all relevant 
for participation? And perhaps even more importantly, who defined the 
criteria for selection and what were their interests? This information 
remains hidden if at all present in archives on the negotiations for 
Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina while negotiators themselves tend 
to mystify the conditions of their appointment. Input remains limited 
to current occupational positions – that is, negotiators announce that 
they were ‘available’ or ‘in the neighbourhood’ to explain their roles in 
international negotiations. Analysis of selection procedures drawing on 
the sociological approaches to ‘professionals of (in)security’ as well as other 
transnational networks would be an interesting avenue for research (e.g. 
Bigo, 2002; 2006; Kauppi and Madsen, 2013). 
Related to this research on the selection of negotiators, additional research 
may be conducted on the social constitution of negotiation teams 
throughout history. I find that shifts in the practice of boundary politics 
follow trends of professionalisation and popularisation or militarisation 
in international diplomacy, yet the in-depth sociological analysis in this 
dissertation is restricted to the international negotiation process in which 
borders were drawn for the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation and the 
internal division of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A similar detailed analysis of 
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negotiation processes at critical moments of transformation in discourses 
and practices can provide insight in how different (groups of ) negotiators 
introduced and legitimised their logics to set durable practices in boundary 
politics. 
Second, scholarship could develop on the reasons for disorder following 
boundary maintenance in practice. I have proven adherence to existing 
boundaries to be more volatile than drawing original borders, yet an 
element that has been willingly left out of the analysis in this dissertation 
is what constitutes a stable border. It would be interesting to examine the 
territorial adjustments that contribute to future domestic, regional and/
or interstate peace. Do territorial changes need to address communities’ 
patterns of settlement to lower the risk of war, or do modifications rather 
need to address the defensibility of geographies? Are international borders 
that follow lines of communication and trade stable, or do existing 
boundaries need to be adjusted where there are oilfields and mines? 
Examination of the effects of specific territorial adjustments is difficult; 
it requires analysis of the totality of territory exchanged and the source 
of their contestation, which is often multidimensional. How would we 
separate for example language barriers from other cultural aspects and 
what would make an oil field a strategic rather than an economic interest? 
Analysis of contested areas with geographical information system (GIS) 
software to map the sources of dispute would however provide a fruitful 
start for this research.
The study of International Relations on discarded practices may finally 
build on the framework that this dissertation creates for this new focus. 
It is inherently difficult to study events that contradict common or 
institutionalised practices in international politics. I have addressed 
border adjustment here by considering practices in boundary politics over 
a long timespan and including internal as well as international borders 
for the test of observable implications drawn from my own sociological 
and existing alternative explanations. This framework may however be 





I began this dissertation by noting the practical and moral nature of 
the dilemma whether to draw the map in accordance with lines already 
sketched or to take into consideration altered realities on the ground. 
Conventional wisdoms on the territorial order reinforcing effects of the 
uti possidetis principle or the origins of practices in the earliest processes of 
international territorial change in nineteenth century Latin America serve 
to legitimise adherence of existing boundaries. They represent events in 
such a way that they support the contemporary institutionalisation of the 
uti possidetis principle. My findings however reveal an alternative story; 
boundary maintenance is in fact the outcome of a history and context 
of mixed practices and it may negatively impact the domestic, regional 
and interstate order. Still practices in boundary politics are constructed 
on the basis of such wisdoms captured in specific negotiators’ conceptions 
of peace and order. Professionals of politics particularly tend to support 
adherence to the uti possidetis principle to secure international order and 
prevent the creation of nation-states in contrast with integration. 
This casts doubt on the maintenance of existing boundaries in practice. 
But does it mean that boundaries should be redrawn to accommodate 
the complex reality of overlapping or absent effective authorities, divided 
and moving populations, and diverging accounts of history and historical 
rights to territory? Do peoples have a right to attempt to establish a new 
state, as Birch (1984) and Buchanan (2004) for example argue, and do they 
then have a right to be recognised as having a state delimiting their own 
territorial space? Beran (1998) sketches a normative theory for political 
borders, which means that borders represent the wishes of groups of 
people that express to be united in statehood. And history reveals practices 
to establish international borders by means of plebiscites, population 
statistics, and thematic maps. Should negotiators involved in boundary 
politics take this direction, perhaps sometimes permitting borders to be 
drawn in violation of the uti possidetis principle?
The challenge in the future will be to deal with territorial disputes 
without encouraging aggression to create alternative boundaries. Dutch 
diplomat Peter van Walsum proposed before the outbreak of violence in 
the Yugoslav federation to create states where specific ethnic communities 
rule. He argues in his memoirs that although borders do then not delimit 
states based on the principle of equality, the positions and entitlements of 
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all citizens in for example political participation are clearly defined in such 
states – that is, they are “states where everyone knows where he stands” 
(Van Walsum, 2001: 77-78). But accommodating nations is particularly 
problematic after the event of war, because nations are socially constructed 
and aggressors can create nations and their homogeneity with violence 
and the framing of that violence. But should we not strive for practices 
that ensure local acceptance of boundaries without opening the door to 
nationalists and armies? 
The normative questions surrounding practices in boundary politics are 
undeniable and may remain unresolved for some time. For the most part, I 
have in this dissertation addressed a narrower question: how do negotiators 
mange the implications of sovereignty change for international borders? I 
have argued that we have to emphasise both the agents and the social processes 
through which they establish stances on managing territorial disputes in 
order to understand outcomes in boundary politics. My argument upsets 
basic notions in International Relations theory about the reason or ‘sense’ 
in social reality and limits assumptions about power and actor neutrality 
and thus interchangeability in mediation studies. It generates conclusions 
for contemporary practices shaping the world map. Indeed, this first step 
towards understanding the practice of boundary politics should serve as a 
reminder that no principle that fixes peoples’ futures should be guaranteed 
a place in practice.
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Table 2.4: Outcomes ten years after state independence in the twentieth 
century                                      
               
Cuba 1902 x x
Panama 1903 x
Norway 1905 x x
Bulgaria 1908 x x
Albania 1912 x x
Najd 1914 x
Qatar 1915 x
Finland 1917 x x
Poland 1918 x x
Czech Republic 1918 x x
Estonia 1918 x x
Latvia 1918 x x
Lithuania 1918 x x
Ukraine 1918 x x x
Armenia 1918 x x x
Georgia 1918 x x





Hungary 1919 x x x
Canada 1920 x
Newfoundland 1920 x
South Africa 1920 x
Hijaz 1920 x
Australia 1920 x
New Zealand 1920 x











Ethiopia 1941 x x
Czechoslovakia 1945 x x x
Albania 1945 x x
Syria 1946 x x
Lebanon 1946 x x
Jordan 1946 x x
Philippines 1946 x x x x
India 1947 x x
Pakistan 1947 x x
Israel 1948 x
North Korea 1948 x x x
South Korea 1948 x x
Myanmar 1948 x x x x
Sri Lanka 1948 x x
Taiwan 1949 x x x x
Bhutan 1949 x x
Indonesia 1949 x x x x
Libya 1951 x
Japan 1952 x x x
Cambodia 1953 x x x
Laos 1953 x x x x
East Germany 1954 x x
Vietnam 1954 x x
Republic of 
Vietnam
1954 x x x
Morocco 1956 x x
Tunisia 1956 x x x
Sudan 1956 x x x x
Ghana 1957 x x
Malaysia 1957 x x x






Guinea 1958 x x
Cyprus 1960 x x x
Mali 1960 x x x
Senegal 1960 x x x
Benin 1960 x x x
Mauritania 1960 x x
Niger 1960 x x x
Ivory Coast 1960 x x
Burkina Faso 1960 x x
Togo 1960 x x x
Cameroon 1960 x x
Nigeria 1960 x x
Gabon 1960 x x x
Central African 
Republic
1960 x x x
Chad 1960 x x x x
Congo 1960 x x x
Dem. Republic 
of Congo
1960 x x x
Somalia 1960 x x x
Madagascar 1960 x x
Sierra Leone 1961 x
Tanzania 1961 x x
Syria 1961 x x x x





Uganda 1962 x x x
Burundi 1962 x x x
Rwanda 1962 x x x x
Algeria 1962 x x x x
Kenya 1963 x x x
Zanzibar 1963 x
Zambia 1964 x x







Gambia 1965 x x
Guyana 1966 x x
Lesotho 1966 x x
Botswana 1966 x x x
Yemen People’s 
Rep.
1967 x x x




Qatar 1971 x x
Bangladesh 1971 x x x
Guinea-Bissau 1974 x x
Cape Verde 1975 x x
Angola 1975 x x x




1975 x x x
Djibouti 1977 x x
Solomon Islands 1978 x x
Zimbabwe 1980 x x x
Namibia 1990 x x
Georgia 1991 x x x x
Croatia 1991 x x x x
Slovenia 1991 x x x x
Moldova 1991 x x x x
Belarus 1991 x x x x
Azerbaijan 1991 x x x x
Kyrgyzstan 1991 x x x x
Uzbekistan 1991 x x x x
Estonia 1991 x x x x
Latvia 1991 x x x x






Lithuania 1991 x x x x
Armenia 1991 x x x x
Tajikistan 1991 x x x x
Turkmenistan 1991 x x x x
Ukraine 1991 x x x x
Kazakhstan 1991 x x x x
Bosnia 1992 x x x x
Macedonia 1993 x x x
Czech Republic 1993 x x
Slovenia 1993 x x
Eritrea 1993 x x x






Table 3.1: List of interviewees
Name Occupational position during negotiations
Boyle, Francis A. Legal adviser to Alija Izetbegović, the President of the Re-
public of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1992-4; General Agent 
for Bosnia and Herzegovina with Extraordinary and Pleni-
potentiary Powers before the International Court of Justice 
1993-4
Brade, Jeremy Monitor in the European Community Monitoring Mission 
for Bosnia 1992; Representative of Lord Carrington, the 
Chairman of the European Community Peace Conference 
on Yugoslavia, in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992; Represen-
tative of Lord Owen, the Co-Chairman of the International 
Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina 1992-4
Četković Duško Colonel in the Army of the Republika Srpska (VRS) 1992-
5
Chrobog, Jürgen Director and Chief of Staff at the Foreign Office of Ger-
many 1984-91; Political Director at the Foreign Office of 
Germany 1991-5
Cikotić, Selmo Commander in the 3rd Corps of the Army of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 1993; Military attaché at the Embassy of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina to the United States 1994-7
Crnobrnja, Mihailo Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the 
European Community 1989-92
Cutileiro, José Deputy to Lord Carrington, the Chairman of the European 
Community Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, 1992
Divjak, Jovan Deputy Commander of the Territorial Defence forces of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992; Deputy Commander of 
the Headquarters of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
1993-7
Doyle, Colm Head of the European Community Monitoring Mission 
for Bosnia 1991-2; Representative of Lord Carrington, the 
Chairman of the European Community Peace Conference 
on Yugoslavia, in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992
Eckhard, Frederic Spokesman for the United Nations Protection Force in Sa-
rajevo 1992; Spokesman for Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance, 
the Co-Chairmen of the International Conference for the 
Former Yugoslavia, 1992-3
Ellemann-Jensen, Uffe Foreign Minister of Denmark, 1982-93
Feith, Douglas Legal and military adviser to Alija Izetbegović, the President 
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995
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Galbraith, Peter Ambassador of the United States to Croatia 1993-8
Gallucci, Robert Ambassador at Large at the Department of State of the 
United States 1994-8
Gerstein, Daniel Executive Assistant to General Wesley Clark, the 
Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J5) at the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff of the United States, 1994-6
Granić, Mate Foreign Minister of Croatia 1993-2000
Hadžiomeragić, Amir Deputy to Hasan Muratović, the President of the Commit-
tee for the Relations with the United Nations in the Repub-
lic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1992-6
Hill, Christopher Deputy to Richard Holbrooke, the principal negotiator of 
the Dayton Accords, 1995
Hoh, Christopher Desk Officer for the Balkans at the Department of State of 
the United States, 1994-6
Jovanović, Vladislav Former Foreign Minister of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro) 1992; Foreign Minister of Serbia 
and Montenegro 1993-5
Kerrick, Don Director of European Affairs at the National Security 
Council of the United States 1994-5
Kröner, Christiaan Deputy Director General Political Affairs at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 1990-3
Lewis, Richard Representative of the European Commission to the Euro-
pean Community Peace Conference on Yugoslavia 1991-2
Liakhov, Andrey Consultant-Expert to the Arbitration Commission of the 
International Conference on Yugoslavia (Badinter Commis-
sion) 1991-4
Lukić, Vladimir Prime Minister of the Republic of Srpska 1993-4; Map 
adviser to Radovan Karadžić, the President of the Republic 
of Srpska, 1994-5
Manning, David Representative of the United Kingdom to the International 
Conference on the Former Yugoslavia 1994
Messervy-Whiting, 
Graham
Military adviser to Lord Owen, the Co-Chairman of the 
International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia 1992-3
Muratović, Hasan President of the Committee for the Relations with the 
United Nations in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
1992-6
Murphy, Colum Deputy Head of Political Affairs of the United Nations in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1994-5
Neville-Jones, Pauline Political Director at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
1994-6
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Owen, David Co-Chairman of the International Conference on the For-
mer Yugoslavia 1992-5
Pardew, James Senior Executive Service and Chief of the Balkan Force in 
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy at 
the Department of Defense of the United States 1995-6
Pellet, Alain Consultant-Expert to the Arbitration Commission of the 
International Conference on Yugoslavia (Badinter Commis-
sion) 1991-3
Raguž, Vitomir Miles Special Adviser to the Permanent Representative of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina to the United Nations and staff member 
of the Bosnian Croat delegation, 1992-8
Roberts, Ivor Chargé d’Affaires and Consul-General of the United King-
dom to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro) 1994; Ambassador of the United Kingdom to 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montene-
gro) 1994-7
Sabrihafizović, Džemil Legal adviser to the Government of the Republic of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina 1989-92; Legal adviser to Haris Silajdžić, 
the Prime Minister of the Republic of Bosnia and Herze-
govina, 1993-6
Sacirbey, Muhamed Permanent Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the 
United Nations 1992-5; General Agent for Bosnia and Her-
zegovina with Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Powers be-
fore the International Court of Justice 1993-2001; Foreign 
Minister of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995
Sadović, Bakir Clerk in the Intelligence Agency of the Republic of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina 1991-4; Private Secretary of Alija Izetbe-
govic, the President of the Republic of Bosnia and Herze-
govina, 1994-5
Sell, Louis Political Deputy to Carl Bildt, the Special Envoy of the 
European Union to the Former Yugoslavia, 1995-6
Serwer, Daniel Minister-Counsellor at the Department of State of the 
United States, serving as special envoy and coordinator for 
the Bosnian Federation, 1994-6
Shattuck, John Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights 
and Labour at the Department of State of the United States 
1993-8
Simonović, Ivan Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs in charge of Multi-
lateral Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Croatia 
1994-5
Sizeland, Paul Private Secretary of Lord Carrington, the Chairman of the 
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Hoe worden grenzen bepaald? Of beter gezegd, hoe komen onderhandelaars 
bij een afscheiding of annexatie tot het besluit om bestaande grenzen 
te behouden, of juist om bezette gebieden te begrenzen? In de huidige 
internationale diplomatie is het regel om landsgrenzen te bepalen volgens 
het uti possidetis principe. Het uti possidetis principe voorschrijft dat de 
bestaande internationale en administratieve grenzen als uitgangspunt 
dienen voor nieuwe internationale grenzen, zoals die recentelijk getrokken 
zijn in Kosovo en Zuid Soedan. Het uti possidetis principe onderschrijft 
het principe van territoriale stabiliteit in internationaal recht. Maar het 
legt een nieuwe context van sociale en politieke verhoudingen vast zonder 
inachtneming van factoren zoals etniciteit of religie en vaak in tegenspraak 
met geografische en economische patronen. In alle recente gevallen van 
secessie en annexatie heeft dit geleid tot onrecht en instabiliteit. Veel 
minderheden zijn onzeker of ontevreden over hun status binnen de 
grenzen van Kosovo en de begrenzing van Soedan en Zuid Soedan is van 
beide zijden bevochten. Elders, of het nu in Transnistrië is of in Nagorno-
Karabakh, zorgt het behoud van grenzen ervoor dat gemeenschappen geen 
externe zelfbeschikking hebben, omdat zij geen aanspraak maken op een 
gebied binnen bestaande administratieve grenzen. 
In het tweede hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift staat dan ook de vraag centraal 
of grensbehoud bijdraagt aan vrede en veiligheid. Onder academici en 
onderhandelaars is het idee wijdverspreid dat behoud van bestaande grenzen 
volgens het uti possidetis principe het risico beperkt op verspreiding van 
separatisme in de regio, internationaal conflict en onrust in de getroffen 
staten. Grootschalige kwantitatieve analyse van gebeurtenissen volgend op 
veranderingen van soevereine macht in de twintigste eeuw wijst echter 
uit dat deze aanname niet gewaarborgd is. Het tegenovergestelde blijkt 
waar. Na een grenswijziging ontstonden in de twintigste eeuw juist minder 
vaak internationale, regionale en interne conflicten dan in situaties waarin 
de grenzen werden behouden. Dit roept vragen op over de redenen van 
onderhandelaars om het uti possidetis principe te volgen. 
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Mijn stelling is dat grenzen in internationale onderhandelingen worden 
bepaald op basis van de gedeelde meningen en nauwelijks betwiste 
overtuigingen van de (groepen) onderhandelaars die invloed krijgen 
in grenspolitiek. In het derde hoofdstuk beschrijf ik internationale 
onderhandelingen als sociale ruimtes waar mensen met verschillende 
sociale en professionele achtergronden samenkomen. Zij verschillen in 
hun opvattingen over ‘land’ en ‘natie’, en de relatie daartussen, bij het 
bepalen van een grens. Ik beargumenteer dat de relatieve invloed van deze 
opvattingen bepaald wordt door de strijd voor erkenning van expertise 
tussen de onderhandelaars. Iemands positie in deze strijd wordt in eerste 
instantie grotendeels bepaald door de hiërarchie van vertegenwoordigde 
instituties, maar onderhandelaars bewegen strategisch in internationale 
onderhandelingen om hun positie ten opzichte van anderen te behouden 
of verbeteren. Zij proberen discussies over staat en natie te beheersen 
waardoor het voor anderen steeds moeilijker wordt om hun standpunten 
te bestrijden. Dit betekent dat grensbehoud, net als grenswijziging, de 
uitkomst is van interactie tussen verschillende ideeën die een (groep) 
onderhandelaar(s) vestigt als de ‘haalbare’ of zelfs de enige ‘realistische’ 
grensbepaling in de context van de onderhandelingen.
De analyse van actoren en de sociale processen die ten grondslag liggen aan 
hoe zij grenzen bepalen op basis van hun overtuigingen of doxa stoelt in de 
eerste plaats op Pierre Bourdieu’s ‘theorie van de praktijk’ (Bourdieu, 1977). 
Deze theorie is in de studie van internationale betrekkingen gebracht door 
auteurs zoals Kauppi (2003; 2010), Bigo (2005; 2006; 2011), Kauppi 
en Erkkilä (2011) en Madsen (2007; 2011). Mijn onderzoek richt zich 
op ontwikkeling van de theorie voor ontmoetingen tussen mensen met 
verschillende achtergronden, in navolging van academici zoals Dezalay en 
Garth (2002), Vauchez (2008) en Kauppi en Madsen (2013). 
Dit levert bevindingen op die in tegenspraak zijn met conclusies in 
bestaande theorieën over internationale betrekkingen waarin academici 
grenzen zien als bepaald onder dwang (bijv. Krasner, 1999; Coggins, 
2011), eigenbelang (bijv. Zacher, 2001; Carter en Goemans, 2011) 
of legitimiteit (bijv. Fabry, 2010). Vanuit het beginsel dat principes 
worden losgelaten zodra het de machtigen dient, kunnen realisten niet 
verklaren dat het uti possidetis principe wijdverspreid is. Zelfs als dit 
empirisch te onderbouwen zou zijn, is dit beginsel nog een ontkenning 
van de veelzijdigheid van macht. Het ontkent de invloed van degenen 
die de vrede moeten verdedigen na internationale onderhandelingen zoals 
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militairen en politieke vertegenwoordigers van de strijdende partijen. 
Bovendien, als nationaal belang inderdaad doorslaggevend was, zouden 
onderhandelaars van eenzelfde staat of organisatie overeenkomstige ideeën 
hebben. In werkelijkheid verschillen hun standpunten echter in lijn met 
hun sociale en professionele achtergronden. Onderhandelaars hebben dan 
ook geen gezamenlijk belang of socialisatie in het uti possidetis principe, 
zoals neoliberale institutionalisten en sociaal constructivisten stellen. Zij 
zoeken een verklaring de structuur of context van grenspolitiek en veinzen 
daarmee dat onderhandelaars inwisselbaar zijn en dat grenzen bepaald 
worden in een rechtlijnig en onbetwist (historisch) proces. Zij nemen dus 
aan dat grensbehoud ‘logisch’ is in de huidige internationale diplomatie. 
Academici in internationale diplomatie benadrukken weliswaar de rol 
van onderhandelaars, maar ook zij ontkennen variaties in hun handelen 
en de onderliggende discoursen. Zij hebben de neiging onderhandelaars 
te zien als directe en rationele vertegenwoordigers (bijv. Kydd, 2003; 
Maoz en Terris, 2006; Rauchhaus, 2006) en stellen de partijen voor als 
collectieven van vertegenwoordigers met een gezamenlijk standpunt dat 
verschilt van de standpunten van andere partijen (bijv. Touval en Zartman, 
1985; Fearon, 1995; Powell, 1999). Mijn bevinding is echter dat de 
verschillende sociale achtergronden van onderhandelaars hun voorkeuren 
en gedragingen ingeven. Een enkele auteur concludeert inderdaad dat 
gedrag in internationale onderhandelingen beïnvloed wordt door cultuur 
(bijv. Salacuse, 1998) of ambt (bijv. Neumann, 2002; 2005; 2007), maar 
zij geven geen inzicht in hoe verschillende (groepen) onderhandelaars zich 
tot elkaar verhouden. Met andere woorden, zij stellen onvoldoende vast 
waar de macht ligt in onderhandelingsprocessen. 
De principaal-agent theorie beschrijft machtsverhoudingen tussen degenen 
die een onderhandelingsmandaat uitschrijven (principaal) en degenen die 
het uitvoeren (agent). Het klopt dat onderhandelaars soms andere belangen 
nastreven dan hun opdrachtgevers voor ogen hadden, maar de theorie laat 
de mechanismes achter deze ‘ambtelijke ongehoorzaamheid’ onbesproken. 
Ik breng in hoe onderhandelaars hun standpunten vormgeven en 
strategisch handelen in zowel verticale als horizontale verhoudingen om 
de uitkomst van internationale onderhandelingen te beïnvloeden.
De theorie van de praktijk volgend, analyseer ik in hoofdstuk 4 de historie 
van grensbepalingen en hun onderliggende discoursen. Met gebruik van 
juridische en beleidsdocumenten en secundaire bronnen onderzoek ik de 
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totstandkoming van wijdverspreide aannames. Deze genealogie laat zien 
dat grensbehoud het resultaat is van een geschiedenis waarin veelvuldig en 
voor diverse redenen gekozen is voor grenswijziging; grensbehoud heeft 
geen wortels in Romeins recht, zoals velen berichten, en het is niet ‘logisch 
verbonden’ met het verkrijgen van onafhankelijkheid in Latijns Amerika in 
the 19e eeuw. Dit laatste is in tegenspraak met hetgeen rechters beweerden 
in de 1986 Burkina Faso/Mali zaak voor het Internationaal Gerechtshof. 
Grensbehoud is de ‘strategische’ reactie op een angst voor nationalisme en 
staatontbinding als verstoring van de internationale orde die heerst onder 
politici sinds de geweldsuitbraken in India en Palestina in the jaren ’50. 
Land was hier verdeeld tussen etnische of religieuze gemeenschappen. 
Nadat over deze verdeling onrust ontstond, werd grensbehoud opnieuw 
geïntroduceerd om soortgelijk geweld in de toekomst te voorkomen.
Hoe onderhandelaars tot een dergelijk besluit over grenzen komen 
is het onderwerp van een sociologische analyse van internationale 
onderhandelingen over de afscheiding en daaropvolgende interne 
opdeling van Bosnië en Herzegovina tussen 1991 en 1995 in het vijfde 
en zesde hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift. Internationale onderhandelingen 
over een grensregeling vinden plaats in de extreme onzekerheid 
die machtsverschuiving teweegbrengt. Op basis van historisch 
en literatuuronderzoek en analyse van interviews met betrokken 
onderhandelaars stel ik vast dat verschillende onderhandelaars onder 
deze omstandigheden verschillende bedreigingen van vrede en veiligheid 
voorzien, die zij bedwingbaar achten met verschillende ‘strategische’ 
reacties in grenspolitiek. Deze opvattingen zijn grotendeels ingegeven door 
verschillende sociale achtergronden; politici en hun afgezanten hebben 
de neiging grenswijziging te zien als tegemoetkomingen aan agressie en 
nationalisme, terwijl militairen het over het algemeen nodig achten in een 
territoriaal conflict om grenzen te wijzigen. Zij zien grenswijziging als een 
voorwaarde voor de verdediging van vrede omdat alternatieve grenzen de 
geopolitieke strategische realiteit weerspiegelen.  
Deze studies laten zien dat variaties in standpunten uiteindelijk gebaseerd 
zijn op opvattingen over vrede en veiligheid. Deze onderliggende 
opvattingen blijven vaak onbesproken en boven twijfel verheven. Wanneer 
(groepen) onderhandelaars de relevantie hiervan in onderhandelingen 
erkennen, zijn zij beperkt op basis van hun achtergrond – dat wil zeggen, 
hun socialisatie in netwerk en ervaring – in de diversiteit aan reacties die 
zij effectief of zelfs ‘haalbaar’ of ‘mogelijk’ achten in grenspolitiek.
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De onderlinge strijd voor erkenning van expertise bepaalt vervolgens 
de invloed van diverse opvattingen in onderhandelingen. Vooral 
wanneer geweld uitbreekt in tegenspraak met heersende opvattingen 
over vreedzame territoriale verandering schept dit mogelijkheden voor 
onderhandelaars met andere ideeën om hun expertise erkend te krijgen 
en aldus grensbepalingen te beïnvloeden. Het geweld dat volgde op 
grenswijzigingen voor etnische of religieuze eenwording in Azië en het 
Midden Oosten stelde politici in staat om grensbehoud te herintroduceren. 
Politici handhaafden vervolgens samen met juristen naleving van het uti 
possidetis principe bij het uiteenvallen van Joegoslavië om nationalisme en 
staatontbinding te ontmoedigen. Maar toen in Bosnië en Herzegovina 
geweld uitbrak, stelde dit net als tijdens de Eerste Wereldoorlog anderen 
in staat om de heersende opvattingen te beïnvloeden. Militairen werden in 
internationale onderhandelingen erkend als experts in cartografie die op 
de hoogte waren van de oorlogssituatie en de te verwachten moeilijkheden 
bij het behoud van vrede. Zij beheersten in toenemende mate discussies 
over interne grenzen en bepaalden grotendeels dat deze getrokken werden 
ter scheiding van de strijdende partijen. 
Grenzen worden dan dus bepaald in onderhandelingen waarin mensen een 
‘wereld’ voorstellen – en uiteindelijk vormen – van plaatsen en de mensen 
die er (mogen) verblijven op basis van de opvattingen over veiligheid van 
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